I find this narrow scope of analysis in an argument about why America doesn't need nuclear weapons in Europe to deter Russian use of nukes frightening:
In a series of RAND wargames held in 2014 and 2015, Russian conventional forces overran Estonia and Latvia in less than three days. In such a scenario, Sweeney asked, why would Moscow feel the need to order a nuclear strike?
Obviously Russia would feel no need to conduct a nuclear strike when they have overwhelming ground superiority at the point of contact.
But Russia will face superior NATO forces in a counterattack if NATO will to mobilize and fight holds.
And that is where Russia's conventional weakness and reliance on nuclear weapons means America should have non-strategic nukes in Europe to deter a Russian first-use of nuclear weapons to hold their gains. If the Europeans (Britain and France) have to use their own nukes alone to deter Russian use of nukes, the Europeans will worry that America is trying to hide behind Europeans in an escalation to major nuclear attacks on cities. Europe wants America to share the nuclear risk.
How all that isn't obvious is astonishing to me. Maybe growing up during the Cold War when all that was routinely discussed gives me an edge.
Sure, I'll say--and have said--that our nukes should not be in Erdogan's Turkey where there is a risk Turkey could seize them to at least pretend to have an instant nuclear deterrent.
But until Russia openly faces the fact that China and not NATO is the threat to Russian territorial integrity--and there is some recent hope for that--America definitely needs nukes in Europe to prevent Russia from using nuclear blackmail on Europeans.
