Wednesday, October 21, 2020

System Buffering to Play the Same Old Movie?

This analyst sees Russian actions in Belarus, the Caucasus, and Kyrgyzstan as reflecting an impulse--not necessarily a broad plan--to restore strategic depth against potential invaders:

Russian President Vladimir Putin described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe in history. Though it may not be true of all of history, it is certainly true of modern Russian history, because it cost Russia what it needs most: strategic depth. Until 1989, Russia’s western border was effectively in central Germany. The Caucasus shielded Russia from the south. Central Asia was a vast buffer against South Asia and potentially China. The Russian heartland, in other words, was secure from every direction.

On the surface, Russia needs those buffers even more now given the weakness of Russian conventional forces.

Russia was weak enough that from the west enemies were able to march into the heart of Russia (and the Soviet Union) in the Moscow region on two occasions--Napoleon and Hitler--in the last two hundred years. The buffer of territory paid off.

In the Cold War, Russia wanted to avoid using that buffer defensively--the price of defeating Hitler was insanely high--and instead use it as a launching pad to destroy potential threats with offensive action.

If I may be so bold, trying to rebuild a buffer in the west to repel an enemy is not the best strategy. Instead of wanting to attack or defend, why not recognize that times change and maybe making enduring peace with potential threats from the west rather than making a self-fulfilling prophecy is the better course of action than whatever the Hell Russia is doing now.

America has incentive to make that flip reality.

After all, how can Russia possibly build a butter zone to protect their Far East conquests from a rising China? There is no space to trade for time. Russia needs combat troops out there rather than bizarrely threatening NATO.