Wednesday, October 14, 2020

Peak Russia?

Russia's armed forces today are much better than they were a decade ago. The dismal Russian performance in the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 prompted reforms that have worked. But ambitions to field new advanced armored vehicles and combat aircraft failed, leaving the Russian military with upgraded Soviet-era designs.

The bottom line for now?

As a result of a decade of modernisation and reform, Russia’s armed forces today provide the government with a far more credible tool to use – or threaten to use − if deemed necessary. This surety is based on a better-equipped, better-trained and more professional military, while the ultimate guarantor of Russia’s security continues to be its strategic nuclear arsenal. Its conventional forces, however, have neither the strength in depth, nor the equipment or weapons arsenal, to sustain a war of attrition against a peer rival or an alliance. Should Moscow deploy its conventional military on a large scale, the Dossier argues that it would look to secure a quick decisive outcome with a view to avoiding either a prolonged conflict it fears it would lose, or the risk of having to escalate into the nuclear realm.

I have long argued that we should not over-estimate Russian power that is mostly capable of overwhelming small neighbors. I recently noted the Russian reliance on nuclear weapons for territorial defense because of conventional force weakness given the vast borders of Russia.

Russia will have problems sustaining the progress they have made in weapons if they can't restore their economy under pressure from sanctions over the invasion of Ukraine and from lower energy prices. Without that, can Russia move beyond the Soviet-era research and development that is the foundation of their arsenal?

Can Russia sustain reforms in creating pockets of a more professional military within their force structure?

Russia is a threat because of geography and nukes. But don't panic over Russian bluster.