So there is nothing to see:
“The points were not, as has been insinuated by some, edited to minimize the role of extremists, diminish terrorist affiliations, or play down that this was an attack,” this official said.
The official said “legitimate intelligence and legal issues” were considered for the talking points as in most cases when “explaining classified assessments publicly.”
See? There were perfectly reasonable reasons to water down the intelligence findings.
Huh. So it is the job of the intelligence community not to provide what they think to their bosses but to formulate a plausible lie that the administration can knowingly or unknowingly pass along to the American people? Shouldn't the intelligence agencies let the administration know what the truth was--to the best of their ability at the time--and let the administration then deal with the other issues and how they should affect what they go on talk shows to explain to the public?
Or is the intelligence community saying they couldn't trust the Obama administration to handle the truth without divulging sources and methods? Even if the comforting explanation is true, how comforting is that?
But enough people aren't just going to move along in the belief there is nothing to see:
The CIA removed references to al Qaeda in the talking points it drafted for United States Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice in what critics say is part of a broad pattern of politicization of intelligence under the Obama administration.
Current and former intelligence and policy officials say that the politicization in the case of Benghazi appears to have involved policies that were designed to minimize the threat posed by Islamist terrorists in general and the al Qaeda terrorist group in particular prior to the Nov. 6 presidential election.
Decades ago, I read a book in which the American intelligence agent confronted a French agent about why the French agent was feeding paranoid drivel to his bosses in Paris about American plots to undermine France.
The French agent replied that he knew what he was passing along was ridiculous. As to the "why" part, the agent explained that to survive in Paris it was better to be wrong in the same way as your bosses rather than being right when they are wrong.
The intelligence bureaucracy decided that it was better to be wrong in the same way that their boss for the next 4+ years was wrong.
