Assad has no choice but to use air power, but it isn't enough, as I wrote recently:
For an air force with a couple hundred helicopters and nearly 600 combat aircraft, 20 attacks per day is not much. A surge to 60 isn't much. I'm assuming that "attacks" means "sorties"--that is, one flight by one aircraft. We'd typically have planes flying multiple times in a single day, at least for a short period of time until planes and pilots start to wear out.
This level of effort in the air isn't enough to replace loss of ground power. Although to be fair, no amount is. Air power is great and can have a great impact on the ground, but it requires ground troops to exploit. In the end, air power makes ground power more effective and does not replace ground power (well, except for being able to replace ground artillery units).
I didn't think Assad could sustain air power usage because of maintenance and supply issues. Assad has kept it up, but by using air power rather sparingly.
I also wondered if he could trust his pilots not to defect.
That, too, is limiting Assad's use of air power:
A former Syrian air force general who was also the country's first astronaut said Tuesday that only about one-third of Syria's fighter pilots are carrying out the daily bombing raids of rebel strongholds because President Bashar Assad's regime cannot count on the loyalty of the rest.
One other thing I wonder about is how much fuel are the planes being given? I noted that the air strikes were all in the west. If Assad could benefit by air power, I assumed it would be by striking in the east to keep rebels off balance there--to let garrisons there endure--while Assad concentrated ground power in the west, using artillery rather than air power in the west.
Is part of the reason that air power is only being used in the west because Assad won't risk giving pilots enough fuel to fly to the eastern part of the country because the pilots might use that fuel to fly to Turkey and escape?
But this limited use of air power won't compensate for lack of ground power. Never have so few owed so little to so few.