Saturday, December 03, 2011

Which Way for the Anabasis?

At the end of the day, our supply lines to Afghanistan will almost certainly remain open. But it is why I have always been uncomfortable about having too many troops in Afghanistan. It would be different if we had a supply line through a friendly Iran, but we don't. In the aftermath of the latest incident with Pakistani forces, Stratfor looks at Afghanistan and our supply lines:

Days after the Pakistanis closed their borders to the passage of fuel and supplies for the NATO-led war effort in Afghanistan, for very different reasons the Russians threatened to close the alternative Russia-controlled Northern Distribution Network (NDN). The dual threats are significant even if they don't materialize. If both routes are cut, supplying Western forces operating in Afghanistan becomes impossible. Simply raising the possibility of cutting supply lines forces NATO and the United States to recalculate their position in Afghanistan.

It probably won't be a problem, they say. But losing the supply lines is possible.

They are also more pessimistic about our ability to win the war than I am. As long as we don't consider establishing a strong central government part of victory, I am optimistic we can leave safely in time. Which is why I shifted uneasily in my seat as we surged forces in 2009 and 2010. I didn't think we had to have the last surge increment to win, which is why I haven't complained about the end of that surge (except for the optics of a too rapid withdrawal that might look like retreat). And since our military knows more about logistics than I ever will and were content with accepting the risk, I supported the last surge.

But I will breathe easier with the extra troops out. I'll breathe easier when we are down to pre-surge levels of maybe 20,000 US forces who will linger on after 2014 as training wheels for the new Afghan security structure we've built.

But just in case, which direction do we march if we have to pull an Anabaasis?