A secret deal between Britain and a notorious Iraqi militia kept the British forces out of a bloody battle in the southern Iraqi city of Basra earlier this year, leaving U.S. and Iraqi forces to fight alone, The Times of London reported Tuesday. The Ministry of Defense denied the allegation.
This is consistent with the "softly, softly" approach the British applied to the south, despite the official denial. The denial may hinge on what "secret deal" means. If you mean a formal signed document, good golly, no! If a wink and nod, well, then the British start looking away, tugging at their collar.
In defense of the Brits, from 2003 through 2007, it wasn't really possible to directly take on Shia thugs in their piece of Iraq when Sunni thugs were slaughtering Shias with glee and the Shia thugs posed as protectors of the Shias. Even our campaigns in 2004 against the Sadrists were very cautious affairs, despite our high kill ratio against the thugs.
And to be fair, the Shia militias weren't totally thug-inhabited and did protect Shias from the Sunni terrorism that exploded in 2006. Tackling those Shia militias openly and violently in an extended campaign would have been an easy way to lose the Shias in that time period.
The Brits at least held the ring in what was an economy-of-force operation until our main efforts in the center, west, and north against the Baathists, Sunni nationalists, and jihadis allowed us to turn to the Iranian/Shia threat. I'm not saying I'm happy the British decided to let us fight in the spring battles alongside the Iraqis while they sat out the war. But the British at least didn't lose the war in the south while we fought and defeated the Sunni Arab threats.
Let's say the British achieved time in their piece.
UPDATE: It gets more complicated. The British were willing to fight, and proposed a plan to subdue Basra:
Under General al-Firaiji’s British-sponsored three-phase plan, the first stage was to have involved an intensive training programme to get the Iraqi Army’s 14 Division, which had been sent to Basra, up to combat-ready levels. The second phase was to involve negotiations with the Iraqi Government to guarantee economic development in Basra. The third phase, fixed for August, was to launch a large-scale operation in Basra, with 14 Division reinforced by Iraqi troops from Baghdad.
The Iraqis turned down the plan and went in on their own plan with American advisors. Apparently, the Iraqis were still upset by a 2006 deal the British made with the Sadrists to pull out the last British unit from Basra without having to fight their way out.
Which makes the original charge easier to believe, actually. But the British had not given up completely. Still, having cut a deal at the expense of the Iraqis, the British lost the trust of the Iraqis. That should be a lesson to us.
