The U.S. tactic of using armed Sunni tribesmen in the fight against al-Qaida in Iraq offers short-term gains to weaken the insurgency, but could set the stage for a full-scale sectarian civil war when the Americans begin to draw down their forces.
The danger that these alliances of convenience could backfire becomes all the greater if Iraq's Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish leaders fail to achieve genuine political reconciliation — the key to ending the conflict.
Well ... yeah. That is a risk. But what of the risk of not allowing them to switch sides? Are we to tell all Sunni Arabs that they cannot come over to our side and that it will be a fight to the death? Isn't that far more risky?
And if, after we, the Iraqi government, and the Sunni Arab defectors defeat al Qaeda, the Sunni Arabs revert to opposing the central government, won't the fight be a lot easier for us with it just being the Sunni Arabs versus the government without the jihadis car bombing the country?
Really, it is a risk for the Sunni Arabs that their gunmen will get used to not being hunted by our forces and will refuse to reignite their war with us if their leaders tell them to fight us.
Honestly, people. This development is a good thing. Of course it has risks. We shouldn't entrust them with the keys to the executive washroom on day one. We must watch them closely and weed out those who are untrustworthy. But accepting defections carries far fewer risks than refusing their help!
And try to keep in mind that while some are complaining that this year we have accepted the help of Sunni Arabs when the Iraqi government has had years to grow, many continue to insist that we should have accepted the help of Baathist-led army units back in 2003 when there wasn't even an Iraqi government.
Some people are just permanently worried about any event at all.
