The failed surges in 2006 to control Baghdad and our so-far successful Baghdad push illustrate my point that we didn't need more troops as much as we needed a new strategy.
In 2006:
The worsening sectarian violence after the al-Askariya Mosque bombing led General Casey to conduct two operations aimed at restoring stability in Baghdad. Dubbed Operations Together Forward I and II, they involved surges of fewer than 10,000 additional U.S. troops and a relatively small number of Iraqis into the capital to conduct clearing operations. Inadequate planning and preparation for the movement of the Iraqi battalions into Baghdad led to the refusal of many of those units to show up. The plans, moreover, relied on Iraqi forces to hold cleared neighborhoods on their own, while U.S. forces moved on to other troubled areas.
And in 2007:
Generals Petraeus and Odierno allocated only two of the additional Army brigades to the capital. The other three Army brigades and the equivalent of a Marine regiment they deployed in the surrounding areas, known as the "Baghdad belt." There, under the guise of Operation Phantom Thunder, they are now working to disrupt the car-bomb and suicide-bomb networks that have been supporting al Qaeda's counter-surge since January.
Like 2006, in 2007 we have basically added only two new brigades to the city. But we are operating differently. That is the key in Baghdad:
More important, previous clearing operations in Iraq were not part of a coherent plan to establish security in a wide area, but rather reactions to violence in particular places. Thus, U.S. commanders made no extensive efforts to contain the accelerants to violence--vehicle-bomb factories, insurgent safe houses, training grounds, smuggling routes, and weapons caches--located outside the cities being cleared. By contrast, the current strategy aims to establish security across greater Baghdad, and Petraeus and Odierno have added a phase between the preparation phase and the major clearing. This is Operation Phantom Thunder, which aims to disrupt enemy networks for many miles beyond the capital, as far away as Baquba and Falluja. What's more, Phantom Thunder is striking the enemy in almost all of its major bases at once--something Coalition forces have never before attempted in Iraq.
So far, Major General Fil describes real progress:
There are 474 -- they're called mahalas, which is roughly equivalent to a neighborhood -- here in Baghdad, in the city. And we track our operations in each one of these neighborhoods.
As you may be aware, our strategy involves one of -- starting with disruption and then we go through clearance, controlling, retention and then finally it gets transitioned to pure Iraqi security forces.
Several months ago, in April, we were at about 41 percent in disruption, 35 percent in clearing, and we had -- some 19 percent of them were in what we call control, which is where we have our security forces there and we're denying that space to enemy forces.
That has come up significantly, and now we're at -- about 15, 16 percent of these are in the disruption phase. Thirty-six of them -- 36 percent of them, which is 191 of these actual mahalas, are in clear, which means we're in there with our forces and the Iraqi security forces in active operations. And 41, 42 percent of them, about 195 of the mahalas, are in control.
And then there are actually a little over 7 percent of them, 34 of the mahalas, that have actually transitioned into the retain pace. So control and retain together is about 48 and something percent. These numbers are fluid, and as we progress, you would expect the number of disruption to be reduced, the number of clearance to be raised as they go from clear to control. That would be raised, and then, eventually, they'll end up in retention.
The number of clearance of forces remains relative constant because that's as much work as we are confident in doing with the forces we have available. Even though we've increased some of our forces over time recently, the clearance forces remain relatively constant, and those additional forces have gone into the hold phase, the control and retain phase.
I admit that the additional numbers help us operate around Baghdad to help extend the defense perimeter without stripping other areas of US forces. I would have taken risks in other areas by leaving them in Iraqi hands with minimal US help.
But we did not just do the same with more, so one worry has been laid to rest. This commitment of US troops to the belt may yet be the key to winning sooner.
Though I fear the advantage of more troops has been gained at the price of a critical loss of will to finish this war. That is, while we sped up the Baghdad clock, the effect may have been to speed up the Washington clock even more.
