I assumed that the Baathists could not resist the vast majority of the population that hated them once we put them on top.
The amount of money and arms within Iraq available to the enemy was one reason this war has gone on so long. The Baathist minority could resist out of all proportion to its numerical strength because of these resources. But even with that money and weaponry, by January 2004 the enemy Baathist dead enders were dwindling in strength. Their leader Saddam had been captured and by February 2004, we suffered only 20 military deaths.
The real problem was the intervention by Syria and Iran. In spring 2004, the jihadis supported by Syria in the center and west and the Shia militias supported by Iran in the south launched a counter-attack. We held off that Tet, and have again ground down the Sunni Arabs while gutting the Shia death squads. I never believed we'd let Syria and Iran get away with such outrages and so didn't think Damascus and Tehran would dare try to fight us in Iraq.
And because of this, our fight drags on.
Tony Blair bolsters my long-held belief:
One of the most infuriating problems in Iraq seems to generate precious little fury.
In a kind of malicious chemistry experiment, hostile powers are adding accelerants to Iraq's frothing chaos. Iran smuggles the advanced explosive devices that kill and maim American soldiers. Syria allows the transit of suicide bombers who kill Iraqis in markets and mosques, feeding sectarian rage.
This is not a complete explanation for the difficulties in Iraq. Poor governance and political paralysis would exist if Iran and Syria meddled or not. But without these outside influences, Tony Blair told me recently, the situation in Iraq would be "very nearly manageable."
Dealing with Iran and Syria is a big question. But for the lack of support at home, striking these two countries would make sense. But our current political situation means we'd have little support to do what is necessary to stop them from backing the terrorists and thugs in Iraq. Which means that we need more time to defeat our enemies than we would without foreign support. The clocks in Iraq and Washington started out at different speeds a long time ago.
Still, assuming we defeat the enemies inside Iraq, the fight against Syrian- and Iranian-sponsored killers could yet unite Sunnis and Shias, Arabs and Kurds, and forge a stronger Iraq:
This trend will lead to victory over the enemy and may well solidify a national Iraqi identity first forged in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. We shall see if the artificiality of Iraq is any more significant than the artificiality of any other country that relies on lines drawn on maps to describe itself.
A common foreign enemy can provide a way to move beyond past hatreds within Iraq. And the signs of this renewed unity are apparent if you look beyond the explosion of the day.
UPDATE: And remember, if the South had won our Civil War, our history would be very different. But because we won, we began speaking of the United States of America rather than these United States of America. We became a country due to that bloody struggle and not a collection of near-independent states. Recall, too, that even thirty years later, the Spanish-American War was viewed as a war that could cement northern and southern unity against the Spanish enemy.
