So, huh:
Meanwhile, the IDF continues to prepare for the complex challenge posed by the northern front. On Feb. 3, the media got a glimpse into the Paratrooper Corps training, as they prepare to fight deep behind enemy lines without supplies or munitions, relying entirely on local infrastructures. It was a very obvious hint. In the next round of fighting, Israel will not make do with a convoluted and symbolic ground operation like it did in the second Lebanon war, where losses exceeded effectiveness. By showing its troops preparing for the next round, Israel was sending the message that next time, Hezbollah, the Bashar al-Assad regime and their Iranian backers will find the IDF ready and roaring to go, deep inside Lebanon. They have learned the lessons of the last encounter and are prepared to take advantage of the “depth command” (dealing with operations deep into enemy territory) and ranked commando capacities, which Israel has spent years developing.
That certainly fits my view. I think if you follow links that I've been saying this since at least as early as 2010. And I certainly noted during the 2006 war that the air focus was a huge mistake.
I just don't believe the Israelis think that a bigger and better air assault on Lebanon as they did in 2006 is an option.
And I've mentioned the airborne angle to aid a deep large raid.
Although I strongly believe it would be a mistake for Israel to strike Lebanese infrastructure in a misguided effort to compel the weak Lebanese government to control Hezbollah, as the article raises. If Israel goes in hard and fast, Israel doesn't need Lebanon to do the job because Israel is doing the job. So don't make Lebanon part of the enemy.
And while the author says neither side wants war, the fact is the timing for Israel to hit Hezbollah in Lebanon is when Hezbollah is no longer fighting in Syria--thus maximizing the damage to Hezbollah--but before Hezbollah can redeploy their expeditionary force back home and recover from the war. We might be there now.
I think this is the first time I've seen anyone write about the scale and scope of what Israel will do if there is a war in a way I have.
UPDATE: Apparently, Israel shot down an Iranian drone inside Israel, launched airstrikes on "at least" 12 Iranian and Syrian targets inside Syria (including the location the drone was launched from), and lost--by fire?--a two-seater F-16 during "massive" Syrian air defense fire.
I'm just going to say knocking back Iran in Syria would be a logical prelude to a big operation to hammer Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Or it could just be an operation that stands alone. I might be connecting dots that have no relation.
UPDATE: Yes, Syria shot down the F-16. The first loss of an advanced warplane to enemy fire in 36 years. Although the F-16 is a good fighter, it is an old design, first flying in 1974.
UPDATE: Hmm:
Netanyahu says Saturday that he informed Putin of Israel's intention to continue defending itself against any aggression and to prevent Iran from establishing a presence "in Syria or anywhere else."
"Anywhere else?" Lebanon is basically what that refers to. Although it could include Gaza.
Israel and Russia have an interesting relationship. A lot of Israelis came from the Soviet Union so their is that link.
And while Russia backs Assad, Israel has never challenged Assad's rule and had an understanding that before the civil war long kept their border quiet. So Israel would likely not really object to Russia's limited military presence in Syria. Russia surely wants a quiet Syria hosting their bases.
And Israel and Russia have a common goal of blocking Iranian influence in Syria and the region.
Netanyahu also spoke to our secretary of state, the article says.
Is this just reassurance that the Israeli strike is a one-off? Or is it consultation prior to Israel starting an operation to hammer Hezbollah, Iran's proxy in Lebanon?
UPDATE: Israel didn't let Syria have the last word by shooting down the F-16 and launched heavy attacks on Iranian and Syrian forces inside Syria.
So this might have been the reason for those discussions with America and Russia.
UPDATE: I don't think there was a second strike. The last article seemed to be saying that the Israelis struck after the F-16 was shot down--which I thought happened following the Israeli strike prompted by the drone incident. But I've seen nothing else so there must have been some confusion in the writing (or in my reading). So one air strike.
UPDATE: It sure sounds like Israel is leaning forward on the idea of a big land operation as the logical result of the situation.
But the article also has language that implies a reliance on air power (although it could mean air and land power). And it suggests covert action instead of fighting in order to destroy missile production facilities in Lebanon.
Just hard to say from where I sit. Hints at invasion could be to support lesser goals. Or expressing lesser goals could be to conceal real intentions. Or it could be that people are simply reacting with no real defined end point guiding actions.
UPDATE: Perhaps I'm reading too much into this, but did Russia essentially green light an Israeli operation in Lebanon by emphasizing that Israel should leave Syria alone to avoid Russian troops?
Russia's foreign ministry appeared to criticise Israel's actions by calling for restraint and respecting Syria's sovereignty.
"It is absolutely unacceptable to create threats to the lives and security of Russian servicemen who are in Syria at the invitation of its legitimate government," it said.
That may not have been the entirety of the statement. And I may be parsing too much even if that is representative of the entirety.
UPDATE: And as long as I'm reading into things:
[Former US ambassador to Israel Ben] Shapiro called Tillerson not stopping in Israel a "mistake" and tweeted it's "yet another blow to Tillerson's credibility as an authoritative voice for US policy."
Is Tillerson avoiding Israel to avoid looking like America green-lighted an Israeli attack?
UPDATE: Why can big news be so unclear? My initial impression of two Israeli strikes is accurate despite a later correction that I was wrong:
First, the Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) penetrated Israeli airspace and then it was detected and destroyed by Israel forces. Second, Israel attacked the caravan from which the UAV was piloted at the T-4 airbase deep in Syrian territory. Third, the Israeli F-16 was downed over Israeli territory by an outdated Syrian SA-5 missile. And finally, Israel launched an extensive strike that focused on Syrian air defenses and Iranian forces in Syria.
So there you go.
