After decades of reforms and transformations, and all the hype about hybrid warfare, it seems the Russian military is increasingly falling back on the good old tank-heavy model of the Soviet military created during the Cold War. The overall pattern of operations in Syria and the Donbas region of Ukraine has been principally based on the concept of infantry assault with tanks in the front, artillery behind and attached aircraft overhead. Of course, there were variations, apparently enforced on the military commanders by overruling political considerations.
In the Donbas, the Russians pretended and continue to pretend they are not involved in the fray, while servicemen that are spotted in the region or occasionally taken prisoner are claimed to be “volunteers” that do not represent the Russian state. [emphasis added]
On the first part, I've wondered if our brigade-based Army was made for the ease of rotating units through Iraq (and later Afghanistan).
Years ago I advised a two-brigade division to ease deployments but urged retaining the division for the firepower and other support it can give component brigades (and for expansion to a 3-brigade division for high intensity combat). See "The Path of the Future Army."
Is the Russian focus on heavy forces--with large units, too--a sign America should rebuild our divisions with subordinate combat brigades using divisional support units and end reliance on the independent brigade combat teams with their own support units? (Mind you, we could still have some independent brigade combat teams as part of a division-centric force.)
I've long been wary of the impulse to lighten the Army for strategic mobility.
And of course, on the second part, I'm always happy to see the demotion of the "hybrid war" craze that annoyed me.
