Saturday, February 24, 2018

Burnished Good and Hard

One author thinks that a war between Israel and Hezbollah is probably inevitable. But that neither side wants a war right now. Perhaps Israel really doesn't. And Hezbollah shouldn't want a war. But then the author says that Hezbollah might actually welcome war. The reasoning is wrong although Hezbollah leaders might think it is true.

So Hezbollah might want a new war soon despite heavy losses fighting for Assad in Syria?

Hezbollah, for its part, would also probably like time to recover from a long and hard conflict in Syria. Yet the group’s regional popularity has plummeted, and its anti-Israel credentials, which have been tarnished by years of killing Syrians, need burnishing.

What bothers me about this is the assumption that a little bit of pounding by Israel would not really harm Hezbollah.

This is all part of the notion that using force is counter-productive when used against fanatics. My view is that ineffective use of force against fanatics is ineffective.

Recall that some deep thinkers figured Osama bin Laden suckered us into invading his Taliban sanctuary of Afghanistan where the Taliban shielded him. But we hit hard, destroyed his Taliban patron; sent him into the Pakistani witness protection program; and ultimately killed him, dumping his body into the sea like so much refuse. He planned that?

Saddam, too, seemed to welcome a conflict with America, assuming we'd bomb him or just send troops in but recoil from entering Baghdad for a giant "Blackhawk Down" battle that we couldn't endure. But American forces punched into Baghdad, Saddam was overthrown and hunted down, and ultimately tried and executed by his former victims.

And in both Iraq and Afghanistan, despite their problems today, Iraqis and Afghans fight at our side against common jihadi enemies rather than being state havens for jihadis.

So if a bloodied Hezbollah welcomes a fight with Israel to burnish their credentials, they clearly hope that Israel will cooperate by using ineffective force against Hezbollah.

My hunch is that Israel learned the lesson of doing exactly that in 2006 and will go for the throat in the next war with Hezbollah.

Timing wise, Israel would want to attack before Hezbollah's battered forces can redeploy from Syria and recover from the more than 2,000 KIA they suffered fighting to save Assad.

Will Israel take the shot? The dots paint that picture. But that's the picture I already have in mind, so I might be imagining a few pixels are really a vibrant and textured picture.