Two historical examples help suggest the effect of the sustained cuts to American seapower that began with the Cold War’s end and have continued to today. First, the experience of Habsburg Spain, an empire that neglected consistently to fund its naval forces, and paid the price in its loss to a distinctly inferior power. Second, the experience of the Soviet Union, an empire that saw its naval power grow from 1945 until 1980, followed by an increase in its ability to shape international events.
The existence of Spanish and Soviet navies weren't the only factors and hanging your hat on those factors alone is wrong.
Spain didn't decline because their navy weakened. Spain's navy weakened because Spain declined as a power with the financial ability to support an empire and a navy.
And the USSR didn't gain global influence because of the growth of their navy. They gained influence because of their ability to attack and potentially crush NATO in Europe. Controlling western Europe was an objective with global implications.
Seriously, you wouldn't argue that Russia is weaker now because they lack a blue water navy. Russia's blue water navy withered away because Russia lost the ability to pay for it.
And you wouldn't argue that Spain gained an empire because of a having navy. They were able to buy a navy because they built an empire that they looted to pay for it.
Having a Navy that can control the seas and project and sustain American land and air power overseas is obviously the foundation of American power that needs to travel far from North America to confront potential enemies.
And note too that the decline of the American navy starting in the 1970s was a product of mass retirements of ships built for World War II. We had a hot war dividend that simply wasn't going to be replaced in even a dangeous cold war.
Yet the further decline of the American Navy--after the 1980s build up aiming for a 600-ship fleet--after winning the Cold War was more than matched in effects by the loss of any potential rival to dominate the seas. Even as our Navy declined, rather than signaling America's decline it was accompanied by the rise of absolute American naval superiority that led the Navy to think more about projecting power ashore from the green and brown waters close to shore rather than think about the blue waters whose control was taken as a given.
The rise of Chinese naval power means that a smaller Navy no longer provides more security at sea than the larger Navy did when the Soviet navy challenged NATO for control of the north Atlantic.
So of course, the Navy--as does the rest of the American military that needed less for more relative advantage in the absence of a peer global or regional rival--now needs to be stronger. And there is a consensus on the broad goal if not the details or scope.
But I don't think these historical examples are sound examples of anything other than states rising and building a navy and then declining and losing a navy. The navies ultimately were effects and not causes of national power.
