A Limited Strike on North Korea is Risky

This author notes the risks of a limited conventional strike on North Korean nukes to send a message.

He is correct that the results could be too limited and the risks too great to pilots by limiting the range of targets to only nuclear targets. I've noted my opposition to the "bloody nose" concept.

And of course, unless the strike is over very rapidly and combined with very active Chinese assurances to Kim Jong-Un that the attack is over, the North Koreans may not perceive our intent for a limited attack that doesn't attempt to change the regime. Any limited attack might look an awful lot like the first stage of invasion while the bombs are falling around you.

You might find it useful to consider my North Korea options post, which includes the attack option.

It occurs to me that if a large contingent of Chinese diplomats is sent to Pyongyang they could act essentially as human shields to the regime. Their presence could be part of Chinese assurances to Kim that any American-led strike campaign is truly limited because America would not risk killing Chinese diplomats.

Even with Chinese assurances, a limited strike is risky in regard to bombing damage and pilot risk.

But let me add that a more thorough strike campaign on North Korea would be less risky if China can provide concrete reassurance to North Korea that regime change will not be allowed.

If North Korea's leaders believe China, of course. Then the risk level goes back up.

Have a super sparkly day.

UPDATE: Former secretary of state Kissinger believes that when the choice is a stark one between attacking North Korea and not attacking (to deal with in other ways), that the temptation to attack will be strong.

I'm not so sure about that assumption. The temptation to do something may be strong. But the perils of the choice will be extensive and pointed out. Which could roll back that temptation.

Given that nobody ever gets in trouble for the consequences of doing nothing--which is a decision itself but one that is generally not recognized as a choice--I think the "safest" choice is doing nothing.

And I can't say that is necessarily wrong.

He also believes the decision to attack must be accompanied by a large number of nations--at least in Asia--backing us.

Any choice is dangerous, as I note in the options post. That's because the real danger stems from the evil North Korean regime's decision to get nuclear weapon.

Honestly, I can't even say what choice is best or worst. So I suggest that we get the backing of nations for any choice we make--whether it is an active choice to do something or a passive choice to do nothing kinetic.

If I have to guess what we'll do, I'd say it would be to wage an economic and diplomatic (to gain support for the economic measures and to encourage China to overthrow the North Korean government) war on North Korea, while building up missile defenses and the ability to quickly attack if we see preparations to launch missiles.