But conflict could take place anyway. And one path is that Chinese military leaders might have very different ideas than China's civilian leaders:
“Neither China nor the U.S. wants even a small war in the South China Sea,” Corr writes. “Both countries prefer to keep their naval forces afloat and their sailors alive.”
But hostile Chinese officers, who feel the U.S. is in terminal decline, think they can get what they want. Fanell believes they might move against a U.S. Navy vessel passing through the South China Sea. “The confrontation would be designed to bloody the nose of the U.S. and remind the region that it is now China’s navy and air force that rule the region,” he warns. He thinks Beijing “will actively seek a near-term military confrontation in the South China Sea.” [emphasis added]
Again with that "bloody nose" nonsense:
I thoroughly oppose the concept of a "bloody nose" strike on North Korea to warn them of future pain if they don't agree to abandoning their nuclear plans.
This is nonsense. Everyday life without American precision munitions hitting is a constant bleeding out on the pavement. Small strikes would add nothing to the national pain.
As a rule, if you strike a king, kill him. So if we lead a strike on North Korea's nuclear arsenal the strike should be planned to destroy the nuclear infrastructure in its entirety. We might be wrong on our ability to achieve that, but we should plan on doing that as best we can, if we choose that route.
On the bright side it would just alert us without delivering a decisive blow, as I think such a notion would fail in regard to North Korea.
But I digress (as I can!).
Could more aggressive and nationalistic military leaders who believe their civilian leaders are too cautious to exploit what their military leaders see as an advantage initiate a war to drag their reluctant and blind (in the military view) civilian leaders along?
That's been my worry for a long time.
And my worry recently gained traction when I read about the split between civilians and military elites in China (quoting an author's article):
While the majority—the overwhelming majority—of Chinese economists and demographers have been deeply concerned about the PRC’s future prospects since at least 2005, most Chinese international relations experts, especially those in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), are super-optimistic, with a surprisingly large proportion evidently entirely unaware of the economists’ urgent warnings and the reasons they issue those warnings.
Who can pull the trigger that sends China to war? And what do those leaders who can pull the trigger believe?
And how do we react if they pull the trigger in ways that don't give the Chinese military leaders exactly what they want yet defend our interests and our allies?
I draw comfort that the vast Pacific provides enough distance to prevent either America or China from inflicting a decisive blow on the other's military in an initial attack, which hopefully dissuades both from thinking a war between such giants could be quick or glorious.
