This briefing addresses troop numbers in Regional Command East:
Obviously, we have 68,000 Afghan security forces, and we have today just over 29,000 coalition forces.
That's 97,000 troops. Recall that I said that if we assume the high end of population in the area (1o million) and assume a higher than usual number of troops if we want to interdict the border and apply counter-insurgency troop density in the whole region (2.5%), we'd need 250,000 troops. But I might be too cautious. We might only really need 150,000 if the population is lower as the general states, and if we really don't need the extra troops I assumed for border interdiction.
This doesn't count contract security--which is probably concentrated more here because of the supply convoys still coming from Pakistan. Nor does it count local defense forces and unofficial militias that will defend against the Taliban. Still, we're short tens of thousands of troops in the best of circumstances.
Not that Regional Command East's mission was simply a holding action. No, anticipating that one day the east would be the main effort with troops going all in to cover the main population centers to pacify them, we were engaged in shaping operations to prepare for that day. I assume this means stuff like preparing the infrastructure (bases, roads, and other stuff for both our troops and local people); building up Afghan governance and security capabilities; preparing an intelligence map of the area, people, and enemy; and hammering leadership and enemy infrastructure to weaken them before the main effort to come.
I think that we'll need to put more troops in Regional Command East. So far, the command has been spared reductions from the first surge reduction. But that isn't enough. This exchange hints at the issue:
It's Courtney Kube from NBC News. You mentioned in your opening statement that you believe that the inputs are right in your area over the last year of the increase in U.S. troops there and Afghan troops, but we've been hearing more and more that there will be a third or another increase of U.S. troops into RC East next year and maybe into the middle of the year before the surge starts drawing down.
Do you still anticipate that? Do you anticipate that you'll have an increase in troops and perhaps an increase in operations in your area coming early 2012?
GEN. ALLYN: Well, thanks, Courtney. And I know you're well aware that this was really the first full fighting season with all the surge forces on the ground. And I think we can clearly see the impact that it had on denying the insurgents any opportunity to regain lost ground both in the south, the southwest, and also in the areas that we wrested from their control during the summer campaign.
We are obviously still in the process of the early phase of the 2011 reductions, and we are on track to meet that by the middle of next month. And the resources that we have now are -- have us in good shape for both the winter fighting season and heading into the spring campaign. And I'd say any future decision that General Allen or General Scaparrotti make on resources is something that is probably best addressed to them.
One, it isn't his lane to complain in public about troop numbers he's given to carry out his missions. He's had enough so far to carry out his missions. Two, you'd hardly want to telegraph to the enemy that they will face more troops. And three, it isn't his place to step on the message of his commander in chief that we are drawing down by highlighting a pending offensive.
We have several options that we will use. One, we can shift existing forces from the south and southwest which are shifting to the holding phase from the clearing phase. This will involve Afghan and Coalition forces, including those forces whose presence will be available until fall 2012. Two, we are still creating more Afghan security forces. These can either be sent directly to the east or used to replace more experienced troops in other areas of the country that will then be sent to the east. Three, we can raise more local defense forces for static village defense. And four, we can reduce pressure on the border by getting Pakistan to apply more pressure on their side of the border (including more intense drone strikes by our CIA) which means we don't need as much troop strength to interdict the border.
I think we will have the troop strength to carry out our missions and win. But it is more tricky with less froom for error.
And winning will have effects beyond Afghanistan. Once, jihadis said we could fling cruise missiles wouldn't dare stand toe-to-toe with them. And they said they could outlast us. They don't boast of their ability to beat our warriors any more. And after ten years of fighting during which we've increased our effort over time, it is more difficult for them to say that they can outlast us. They may think that 2014 is a magical save date, but we can still pound them down enough so that much lower effort on our part can complete their defeat, relying on local Afghan forces to complete the job we've been doing.
This is the "good" war of "necessity," isn't it? Let's win it.
