Who knew that when President Obama said "you didn't built that," he was talking to Wendy Davis?
About her career? And about the husband who helped build it.
Thursday, January 23, 2014
Build More Ford Class Carriers
The immense cost of our Ford class carriers will raise the question of affording these behemoths. We'll need a real carrier debate. Could the Marines save the Fords?
Carrier debates seem to generally be fought be proponents of carriers who tout their effectiveness in power projection missions while critics question their ability to survive in sea control missions. The two sides can make entirely accurate arguments while talking past each other, perhaps not even realizing they are arguing different things altogether.
After getting some doubts about the affordability issue of smaller versus large carriers, I've basically come around to the conclusion that if we are going to have carriers, bigger hulls are more cost effective.
I recently read that the Navy had studied medium carriers with 55 planes versus large carriers with 75 planes and found that the large ships and wings generated twice the sorties at a ship and plane cost only 13% more than the medium ships.
And interesting enough, even a wing of 55 planes on the large carrier generated 40% more sorties than the same wing on a medium carrier.
That's because our carriers are planned to be able to use 2/3 of the wing at the same time. So a big carrier's deck can handle a higher percentage of the smaller wing's planes.
So, yeah, we couldn't build enough smaller carriers at the same price to be more survivable and we'd have less sortie generation capacity.
If we build carriers, they should be big. But that doesn't end the carrier debate. Then the question is, do we need carriers at all?
At that point, the different missions of the big carriers must be evaluated. As I discussed in the first link above, carriers have power projection missions (operating against land targets of a nation that lacks the power to challenge our off-shore fleet) and sea control missions (operations against enemy sea and air assets both on and under the sea and ashore).
If we assume from post-World War II history that we will continue to need carriers for power projection missions against smaller powers that cannot effectively strike our naval power, we absolutely need aircraft carriers.
But if we want these carriers for sea control missions, we have a lot of our money invested in very few hulls. That's where my worries are still in play.
I don't care how many times that carrier defenders say one of our super carriers is tough to target or sink. Our carriers will be hit. And even if they are as difficult to sink as is claimed, they can sure be mission killed a lot easier. If a carrier is put out of action for a couple years or even several months for repairs, it's probably out of the fight for the duration.
And in a network-centric world, the pinnacle of platform-centric warfare--the carrier--makes no sense. Spreading out the firepower over multiple platforms is the way to survive and win a sea control mission.
So the question is now how many big carriers do we need for power projection missions (and to play a supporting role in sea control missions) while building enough missile-armed ships and subs to fight for control of the seas?
Clearly, it would be better to use money for some Fords and their air wings to build more surface warships and submarines.
Recall also that the Navy maintains large amphibious warfare ships, and that the new ships are bigger than World War II fleet carriers and which can function as a stealth fleet of small reserve carriers.
There is some controversy on this, but the new amphibious ships are optimized for aviation operations and lack a well deck to use small amphibious craft as past ships had to move Marines ashore.
Why not build amphibious warfare vessels even larger than America class ships that would be real reserve strike-capable aircraft carriers if needed.
What if we made our amphibious warfare ships based on the Ford hull? Which is the pinnacle of aviation optimized ships.
We did use a big-deck carrier for special forces missions in the initial Afghanistan campaign, in 2001.
And we used a big-deck carrier to carry Army forces in a Haiti mission before that, in 1994.
But build the amphibious warfare Fords without much of the gear needed for the first line fleet carriers but with the ability to add this equipment if we need more strike carriers.
I assume we'd need fewer Ford amphibious warfare vessels than America class because of the greater size of the former.
And as big-deck carriers, we'd save money on needing vertical take-off versions of our fighter and strike aircraft. The Marines could simply use the Navy version of the F-35, for example. [UPDATE: To my surprise, the Marine version is actually cheaper. If there is to be savings, it would be from decreasing Navy costs per unit by buying more. And maybe some savings by having just two types of aircraft to build and support.]
Knowing we have an operational reserve carrier fleet dedicated to moving Marines, we could build fewer of the fleet carriers and put that money into surface combatants and subs to achieve sufficient numbers for our fleet.
Heck, the Fords could supplement amphibious lift if we needed that, since we've shown big carriers can function that way.
For the foreseeable future, we sea-based air power for power projection missions and even sea control against minor naval powers. So we need aircraft carriers. Which should be big.
But for sea control, in a network-centric environment, we need numbers of ships and subs whose individual loss doesn't cripple our combat capability.
Building Fords for both the Navy and Marines (I know they are still Navy ships, but you know what I mean) would mean more Ford hulls in the water than the ten we plan. That would make them cheaper per unit.
But it would mean truncating the America class in favor of Fords.
I realize this thought, if it has merit, would have been better about a decade ago, given that the Marine America class amphibious carriers are coming on line now and that the Marine F-35 is already designed.
But these ship and aircraft building programs will go on for decades. And like the Littoral Combat Ship, any one of them could be put on probation, too, if money continues to be tight.
My thoughts on this may be ill-informed or just lacking key information. I was once a proponent of more but smaller carriers, after all. But when I realized that we couldn't afford many more medium carriers than large ones and that the total sortie capacity would be inferior, I changed my mind. All other things being equal, I'd rather have more hulls to reduce the impact of losses. But all other things are not equal. Bad luck there.
And accepting that big carriers are more cost effective than medium carriers doesn't mean the big ships are any less vulnerable or that their loss isn't as crippling. That problem still exists even if one solution I thought would work really wouldn't solve the problem. So consider this a point of departure just to get a real carrier debate going. We need one.
I want a Navy supreme at sea. I'm just not invested in any particular platform to get that.
Carrier debates seem to generally be fought be proponents of carriers who tout their effectiveness in power projection missions while critics question their ability to survive in sea control missions. The two sides can make entirely accurate arguments while talking past each other, perhaps not even realizing they are arguing different things altogether.
After getting some doubts about the affordability issue of smaller versus large carriers, I've basically come around to the conclusion that if we are going to have carriers, bigger hulls are more cost effective.
I recently read that the Navy had studied medium carriers with 55 planes versus large carriers with 75 planes and found that the large ships and wings generated twice the sorties at a ship and plane cost only 13% more than the medium ships.
And interesting enough, even a wing of 55 planes on the large carrier generated 40% more sorties than the same wing on a medium carrier.
That's because our carriers are planned to be able to use 2/3 of the wing at the same time. So a big carrier's deck can handle a higher percentage of the smaller wing's planes.
So, yeah, we couldn't build enough smaller carriers at the same price to be more survivable and we'd have less sortie generation capacity.
If we build carriers, they should be big. But that doesn't end the carrier debate. Then the question is, do we need carriers at all?
At that point, the different missions of the big carriers must be evaluated. As I discussed in the first link above, carriers have power projection missions (operating against land targets of a nation that lacks the power to challenge our off-shore fleet) and sea control missions (operations against enemy sea and air assets both on and under the sea and ashore).
If we assume from post-World War II history that we will continue to need carriers for power projection missions against smaller powers that cannot effectively strike our naval power, we absolutely need aircraft carriers.
But if we want these carriers for sea control missions, we have a lot of our money invested in very few hulls. That's where my worries are still in play.
I don't care how many times that carrier defenders say one of our super carriers is tough to target or sink. Our carriers will be hit. And even if they are as difficult to sink as is claimed, they can sure be mission killed a lot easier. If a carrier is put out of action for a couple years or even several months for repairs, it's probably out of the fight for the duration.
And in a network-centric world, the pinnacle of platform-centric warfare--the carrier--makes no sense. Spreading out the firepower over multiple platforms is the way to survive and win a sea control mission.
So the question is now how many big carriers do we need for power projection missions (and to play a supporting role in sea control missions) while building enough missile-armed ships and subs to fight for control of the seas?
Clearly, it would be better to use money for some Fords and their air wings to build more surface warships and submarines.
Recall also that the Navy maintains large amphibious warfare ships, and that the new ships are bigger than World War II fleet carriers and which can function as a stealth fleet of small reserve carriers.
There is some controversy on this, but the new amphibious ships are optimized for aviation operations and lack a well deck to use small amphibious craft as past ships had to move Marines ashore.
Why not build amphibious warfare vessels even larger than America class ships that would be real reserve strike-capable aircraft carriers if needed.
What if we made our amphibious warfare ships based on the Ford hull? Which is the pinnacle of aviation optimized ships.
We did use a big-deck carrier for special forces missions in the initial Afghanistan campaign, in 2001.
And we used a big-deck carrier to carry Army forces in a Haiti mission before that, in 1994.
But build the amphibious warfare Fords without much of the gear needed for the first line fleet carriers but with the ability to add this equipment if we need more strike carriers.
I assume we'd need fewer Ford amphibious warfare vessels than America class because of the greater size of the former.
And as big-deck carriers, we'd save money on needing vertical take-off versions of our fighter and strike aircraft. The Marines could simply use the Navy version of the F-35, for example. [UPDATE: To my surprise, the Marine version is actually cheaper. If there is to be savings, it would be from decreasing Navy costs per unit by buying more. And maybe some savings by having just two types of aircraft to build and support.]
Knowing we have an operational reserve carrier fleet dedicated to moving Marines, we could build fewer of the fleet carriers and put that money into surface combatants and subs to achieve sufficient numbers for our fleet.
Heck, the Fords could supplement amphibious lift if we needed that, since we've shown big carriers can function that way.
For the foreseeable future, we sea-based air power for power projection missions and even sea control against minor naval powers. So we need aircraft carriers. Which should be big.
But for sea control, in a network-centric environment, we need numbers of ships and subs whose individual loss doesn't cripple our combat capability.
Building Fords for both the Navy and Marines (I know they are still Navy ships, but you know what I mean) would mean more Ford hulls in the water than the ten we plan. That would make them cheaper per unit.
But it would mean truncating the America class in favor of Fords.
I realize this thought, if it has merit, would have been better about a decade ago, given that the Marine America class amphibious carriers are coming on line now and that the Marine F-35 is already designed.
But these ship and aircraft building programs will go on for decades. And like the Littoral Combat Ship, any one of them could be put on probation, too, if money continues to be tight.
My thoughts on this may be ill-informed or just lacking key information. I was once a proponent of more but smaller carriers, after all. But when I realized that we couldn't afford many more medium carriers than large ones and that the total sortie capacity would be inferior, I changed my mind. All other things being equal, I'd rather have more hulls to reduce the impact of losses. But all other things are not equal. Bad luck there.
And accepting that big carriers are more cost effective than medium carriers doesn't mean the big ships are any less vulnerable or that their loss isn't as crippling. That problem still exists even if one solution I thought would work really wouldn't solve the problem. So consider this a point of departure just to get a real carrier debate going. We need one.
I want a Navy supreme at sea. I'm just not invested in any particular platform to get that.
Wednesday, January 22, 2014
Marching Orders
Like I said, the Russians are not amused by unrest in the Ukraine.
Russia has issued instructions:
How much clearer can thenew insect overlords Russians be to the Kiev politicians who sold out Ukraine to Moscow?
Ukraine is dead. Long live the Ukraine.
Russia has issued instructions:
Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has warned that protests in Ukraine are "getting out of control".
He described violent clashes between anti-government protesters and police as "scary" and accused EU politicians of stirring up the situation.
How much clearer can the
Ukraine is dead. Long live the Ukraine.
Double Secret Probation
Well, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) probation isn't secret. But if the Navy wants to double their numbers allowed, the class will have to prove it doesn't suck.
The LCS has to prove its worth:
I'm not so much against the LCS. As long as the LCS has varied and affordable mission modules turning them into real warships, it could be capable enough. And while not cheap, it isn't as expensive as the Aegis destroyers that are the backbone of the surface fleet. It's a new class. Give it time to work through teething problems. That's normal.
By biggest gripe is the idea that this is a ship that can fight in the littorals where it is exposed to shore-based assets. This ship isn't cheap enough or resistant to damage enough to fight a war of attrition against missiles, artillery, rockets, aircraft, mines, and small boats fighting in coastal waters.
And I have a gripe about making the "class" in two radically different forms.
The Navy has time to make the case for the LCS. Can they make the LCS good enough for the mission envisioned in the littorals or will the Navy scale back their littoral ambitions to make the ship's missions consistent with its capabilities (and price)?
The LCS has to prove its worth:
Defense News is reporting that the Navy and Pentagon have come to an uneasy compromise of sorts re: LCS. The program would be put on probation, but ship buys would continue to a total of 26-28, which would be until FY 2017 or so. Before any more ships could be bought, the ship would need to pass evaluation by the Pentagon’s independent DOT&E testing office, which has been critical of the ship.
I'm not so much against the LCS. As long as the LCS has varied and affordable mission modules turning them into real warships, it could be capable enough. And while not cheap, it isn't as expensive as the Aegis destroyers that are the backbone of the surface fleet. It's a new class. Give it time to work through teething problems. That's normal.
By biggest gripe is the idea that this is a ship that can fight in the littorals where it is exposed to shore-based assets. This ship isn't cheap enough or resistant to damage enough to fight a war of attrition against missiles, artillery, rockets, aircraft, mines, and small boats fighting in coastal waters.
And I have a gripe about making the "class" in two radically different forms.
The Navy has time to make the case for the LCS. Can they make the LCS good enough for the mission envisioned in the littorals or will the Navy scale back their littoral ambitions to make the ship's missions consistent with its capabilities (and price)?
It Was Never Easy for Wendy
Wendy Davis touted her brave life struggle of adversity, which we now know consisted of letting her second husband pay for her law school education, divorcing him after the last student loan check cleared, and then letting him take responsibility for their daughter. Let's just say that the Life of Julia was a bigger profile in courage.
Wow. The Great Progressive Hope, Wendy Davis, isn't actually a profile in courage? What is it with these people (tip to Instapundit)?
Huh? What's next in her life story? A cookbook of her mother's favorite Native American recipes and a stirring recounting of how her ancestors toiled in the Texas coal mines?
Or was she born a poor Black child?
Ms. Davis thought she was somebody when she got her name in Emily's list. But she's no progressive hero. She's a jerk.
Seriously, though. What is it with progressives who seem to need to have figuratively been born a poor Black child?
Stolen Valor addresses people who pretend to be combat veterans.
Is this Wendy Davis failure to be "tighter" about her life story worthy of inspiring Stolen Victimhood?
Wow. The Great Progressive Hope, Wendy Davis, isn't actually a profile in courage? What is it with these people (tip to Instapundit)?
[The] Dallas Morning News published a story by reporter Wayne Slater on Saturday that pointed out discrepancies between the stories Davis has told about her past and the facts. She got her first divorce, it turns out, not at 19 as she repeatedly said and even testified in federal court, but at 21. She went on to graduate from Texas Christian University and Harvard Law School, but she paid for the latter with help from her second husband. Then, on the day after he paid off her final loan, she walked out on the marriage and agreed that he would get custody of their 14-year-old daughter.
Huh? What's next in her life story? A cookbook of her mother's favorite Native American recipes and a stirring recounting of how her ancestors toiled in the Texas coal mines?
Or was she born a poor Black child?
Ms. Davis thought she was somebody when she got her name in Emily's list. But she's no progressive hero. She's a jerk.
Seriously, though. What is it with progressives who seem to need to have figuratively been born a poor Black child?
Stolen Valor addresses people who pretend to be combat veterans.
Is this Wendy Davis failure to be "tighter" about her life story worthy of inspiring Stolen Victimhood?
Tuesday, January 21, 2014
In Case Skiing and Bomb Vests is an Olympics Event
Just in case terrorism hits the Sochi olympics in Russia, we're going to put a couple warships in the Black Sea.
This doesn't say what we'll put there, however:
I'd think Georgia and Turkey would be likely places for our forces to stand in readiness.
I wonder if we'll have an amphibious ship with helicopters and Marines as part of the Black Sea force?
Technically, the press release doesn't say warships. But what else would make sense if the contingency is to rescue, secure, and evacuate Americans in an emergency?
This doesn't say what we'll put there, however:
Air and naval assets, to include two Navy ships in the Black Sea, will be available if requested for all manner of contingencies in support of -- and in consultation with -- the Russian government.
I'd think Georgia and Turkey would be likely places for our forces to stand in readiness.
I wonder if we'll have an amphibious ship with helicopters and Marines as part of the Black Sea force?
Technically, the press release doesn't say warships. But what else would make sense if the contingency is to rescue, secure, and evacuate Americans in an emergency?
Now They're Just Rubbing Our Nose in It
Assad's people add insult to injury over playing President Obama for a fool in the chemical weapons deal.
That's an interesting word choice by Assad's foreign minister:
A "red line." That's nice. Unlike our president's erasable "red line" over Syrian chemical weapons use.
The top diplomat of a small country at war with most of its people and which has lost control of most of its territory just b**ch slapped the most powerful country in the world over our powerlessness to do anything.
And this is called "restoring our reputation in the world."
Or it's "smart diplomacy." I lose track, sometimes.
That's an interesting word choice by Assad's foreign minister:
"The issues of the president and the regime are red lines for us and for the Syrian people," the official SANA news agency quoted Walid Muallem as saying shortly before his delegation arrived in the Swiss city of Montreux for the talks.
"Nobody can touch the presidency."
A "red line." That's nice. Unlike our president's erasable "red line" over Syrian chemical weapons use.
The top diplomat of a small country at war with most of its people and which has lost control of most of its territory just b**ch slapped the most powerful country in the world over our powerlessness to do anything.
And this is called "restoring our reputation in the world."
Or it's "smart diplomacy." I lose track, sometimes.
Second Time as Farce
Can China command their economy to grow?
I've long held that China's massive economic growth isn't all that miraculous given that it rides the simple expedient of moving peasants into urban factories. The Soviet Union had pretty impressive growth, too, until they stagnated.
The most inefficient factory worker is going to produce far more GDP than the most efficient peasant farmer. As that simple input dries up, economic growth will slow. And as pay for those jobs increases, China is starting to lose their low-cost manufacturing jobs that gave those migrating peasants a factory to work in.
So that path to continued high growth rates is going away. Although China has the advantage over the Soviet Union of producing goods the world wants, so it isn't an exact comparison.
Apparently, China's leadership has noted the success of moving peasants into factories but forgotten that you need low-wage manufacturing jobs for those former peasants to do for that migration to make sense.
I'm late to this, but the last couple days I've been catching up on magazines piling up under a chair. My Internet was dead all day Saturday, and even today I kept taking a crack at whittling the pile down. I really need to do better about keeping up with the magazines I do get.
Anyway, a US Naval Institute Proceedings issue from September 2013 has an article that says:
Yes, China benefited from lots of people moving from rural areas to cities to take jobs in factories looking for workers and desperate to take anyone.
China can't replicate that leap in GDP by sending people from rural areas to cities and hoping they find jobs not now in existence.
Are the Chinese so deep into state capitalism that they have forgotten that Leninism relied on urban workers upset enough about their lot in life to be led into revolution?
Is China, whose Communist Party altered Marxism by relying on peasants to support their movement, just moving the most conservative people--the peasants, as Marx called them--out of their rural homes and making 250 million proto-revolutionaries waiting for a vanguard to lead them against the Chinese Communist Party?
Could that vanguard be from the increasingly nationalistic leaning military that stops thinking of itself as a defender of the Chinese Communist Party?
Mind you, I'm not saying our leadership is wiser. After noting how people who own homes and have college degrees are more productive citizens, our government made it easier to get both--neglecting that the stability may have been provided by the determination to get both rather than the papers showing a degree or mortgage. And that worked out swell.
Let's see how China's more massive program works.
I've long held that China's massive economic growth isn't all that miraculous given that it rides the simple expedient of moving peasants into urban factories. The Soviet Union had pretty impressive growth, too, until they stagnated.
The most inefficient factory worker is going to produce far more GDP than the most efficient peasant farmer. As that simple input dries up, economic growth will slow. And as pay for those jobs increases, China is starting to lose their low-cost manufacturing jobs that gave those migrating peasants a factory to work in.
So that path to continued high growth rates is going away. Although China has the advantage over the Soviet Union of producing goods the world wants, so it isn't an exact comparison.
Apparently, China's leadership has noted the success of moving peasants into factories but forgotten that you need low-wage manufacturing jobs for those former peasants to do for that migration to make sense.
I'm late to this, but the last couple days I've been catching up on magazines piling up under a chair. My Internet was dead all day Saturday, and even today I kept taking a crack at whittling the pile down. I really need to do better about keeping up with the magazines I do get.
Anyway, a US Naval Institute Proceedings issue from September 2013 has an article that says:
In July, the Chinese government announced an initiative to move 250 million (not a misprint!) people from rural areas to cities over the next two decades. The relocation project has the ham-handed appearance associated with other grand social-engineering projects of China's past, such as the disastrous "Great Leap Forward."
I seems obvious that Chinese authorities have not made any effort to generate sufficient jobs for those they want to move. The country is already bedeviled by tens of millions of unemployed, constantly seeking temporary work.
Yes, China benefited from lots of people moving from rural areas to cities to take jobs in factories looking for workers and desperate to take anyone.
China can't replicate that leap in GDP by sending people from rural areas to cities and hoping they find jobs not now in existence.
Are the Chinese so deep into state capitalism that they have forgotten that Leninism relied on urban workers upset enough about their lot in life to be led into revolution?
Is China, whose Communist Party altered Marxism by relying on peasants to support their movement, just moving the most conservative people--the peasants, as Marx called them--out of their rural homes and making 250 million proto-revolutionaries waiting for a vanguard to lead them against the Chinese Communist Party?
Could that vanguard be from the increasingly nationalistic leaning military that stops thinking of itself as a defender of the Chinese Communist Party?
Mind you, I'm not saying our leadership is wiser. After noting how people who own homes and have college degrees are more productive citizens, our government made it easier to get both--neglecting that the stability may have been provided by the determination to get both rather than the papers showing a degree or mortgage. And that worked out swell.
Let's see how China's more massive program works.
Monday, January 20, 2014
Yes, We Fight Evil
My contempt for our anti-military left did not recede today. We fight jihadi enemies of such cartoon-level of basic evil that Hollywood would struggle to portray them as evil as they are without running afoul of viewing standards. Yet some can watch Lone Survivor and be upset that our troops are portrayed as human good guys and the enemy as evil.
Seriously, Lone Survivor would have to descend into depths of Hell that would put off viewers to match what our enemies do:
You know, I'm sorry our enemies aren't conveniently blond Norwegian Nazis who work for an oil company. Really, I am.
One, if they were our Left wouldn't toss around the term Nazi about opponents of their policies so freely if they actually had a clue about what actual Nazis were.
And two, maybe our Left could get behind the war against jihadi monsters who in a perfect world would inhabit only body count lists.
Seriously, if you can't be firmly against jihadis whose crimes against Christians, Hindus, Jews, different kinds of Moslems, and even the same kind of Moslems who don't go along with the whole jihadi thing, who can you sign up to be against?
If you can't have even a speck of gratitude and respect for the men and women who volunteer to go off to fight these monsters, there is something wrong with your moral compass.
Are Tea Party members really the only people that these people on the Left think are evil? Is advocating lower tax rates and lower spending actually more brutal than head chopping and throwing acid in the faces of little girls going to school?
Seriously, you sons of bitches?!!
For some on the Left, our volunteers who stand between us--and other "brown people" as one quoted critic alleges we delight in killing in Afghanistan--and jihadi thugs who would kill, maim, and subjugate them, are just as bad as the enemy if only we weren't too jingoistic about making movies to notice.
Ah, to think that Afghanistan was once the "good war."
I knew that facade wouldn't last longer than the Iraq War.
Leaving me to ask--again--why do we hate us?
Seriously, Lone Survivor would have to descend into depths of Hell that would put off viewers to match what our enemies do:
Let’s talk reality: When the film shows jihadists storming into a village and lopping off a man’s head, it understates their atrocities. I don’t know what has to be done to penetrate the thick skulls of the willfully ignorant, but the Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies are evil to a degree Americans (obviously) have trouble comprehending. I’ve relayed this litany before, but it bears repeating. Here’s a (partial) list of al-Qaeda actions in my unit’s area of operations between 2007–2008: Decapitating women and children, recording the murders up-close, and shrieking “Allah Akhbar” as they sawed off each innocent head; shooting an infant in the face with an AK-47 as a warning against collaboration with Americans; raping women to “dishonor” them, then strapping bombs on their bodies as the only way they could redeem themselves; and putting bombs in unwitting children’s backpacks then remotely detonating them at family events. Let’s also not forget the years-long suicide-bombing campaigns where civilians weren’t collateral damage – they were the target.
You know, I'm sorry our enemies aren't conveniently blond Norwegian Nazis who work for an oil company. Really, I am.
One, if they were our Left wouldn't toss around the term Nazi about opponents of their policies so freely if they actually had a clue about what actual Nazis were.
And two, maybe our Left could get behind the war against jihadi monsters who in a perfect world would inhabit only body count lists.
Seriously, if you can't be firmly against jihadis whose crimes against Christians, Hindus, Jews, different kinds of Moslems, and even the same kind of Moslems who don't go along with the whole jihadi thing, who can you sign up to be against?
If you can't have even a speck of gratitude and respect for the men and women who volunteer to go off to fight these monsters, there is something wrong with your moral compass.
Are Tea Party members really the only people that these people on the Left think are evil? Is advocating lower tax rates and lower spending actually more brutal than head chopping and throwing acid in the faces of little girls going to school?
Seriously, you sons of bitches?!!
For some on the Left, our volunteers who stand between us--and other "brown people" as one quoted critic alleges we delight in killing in Afghanistan--and jihadi thugs who would kill, maim, and subjugate them, are just as bad as the enemy if only we weren't too jingoistic about making movies to notice.
Ah, to think that Afghanistan was once the "good war."
I knew that facade wouldn't last longer than the Iraq War.
Leaving me to ask--again--why do we hate us?
The Terminology Will Be Tough
The Russians are back in Ukraine, it seems. What do you call it when a leadership agrees to foreign control and the people reject that status? Is it really a revolution? Or a war of independence?
Ukraine's parliament passed a bill that they didn't read, using shady procedures to ram it through (Putincare?) in order to shut down protests over Ukraine's decision to join Russia rather than the European Union.
Now, after the bill is a law, the Ukrainians are finding out what was in the bill (tip to Instapundit). Ukrainians don't like the law and according to the article, are fighting "pitched battles" with the police in Kiev:
When protesting is made the equivalent of revolting, what incentive is there for the people to hold back?
Ukraine's parliament passed a bill that they didn't read, using shady procedures to ram it through (Putincare?) in order to shut down protests over Ukraine's decision to join Russia rather than the European Union.
Now, after the bill is a law, the Ukrainians are finding out what was in the bill (tip to Instapundit). Ukrainians don't like the law and according to the article, are fighting "pitched battles" with the police in Kiev:
The list of new crimes enumerated in the documents that some Ukrainians are calling “The Law on Dictatorship” is long and targets all segments of Ukraine’s protesting population. For example, participants in the collective driving protest movement “AutoMaidan” now face a two-year suspension of their licenses and confiscation of their vehicles for driving a car that “moves in a column of more than five.”
The new laws also take a page from recent Putin initiatives and target civil society organizations. Now NGOs that receive foreign funding must register as “foreign agents” within three months or be dissolved. ... Those that are branded as “extremist” will be closed.
Defamation has been re-criminalized and “extremist activity”—which is poorly and broadly defined—can be punished by large fines and up to three years in prison. Online media outlets that have flourished throughout the protests will now have to contend with requirements to register themselves as “information agencies” and a very real possibility that the state will order internet providers to block their websites.
When protesting is made the equivalent of revolting, what incentive is there for the people to hold back?
The Japanese Were Supposed to Be Thrilled About Caroline
Ambassador Kennedy disapproves of Japanese hunting and eating dolphins (tip to Instapundit).
She says it is inhumane.
The Japanese protest her disapproval:
Are the Japanese as thrilled with getting Caroline Kennedy now as they once were?
Kennedy does understand she is our ambassador and not a PETA representative, doesn't she?
The really sad thing is, if we sent her to Iran as our ambassador, she'd probably wear a burqa with pride and not say a word of criticism of her host country practices.
She says it is inhumane.
The Japanese protest her disapproval:
A Japanese government spokesman defended an annual dolphin hunt Monday, a day after U.S. Ambassador Caroline Kennedy tweeted that she was deeply concerned by the inhumanity of the practice.
Are the Japanese as thrilled with getting Caroline Kennedy now as they once were?
Kennedy does understand she is our ambassador and not a PETA representative, doesn't she?
The really sad thing is, if we sent her to Iran as our ambassador, she'd probably wear a burqa with pride and not say a word of criticism of her host country practices.
Mass Produce Ship System Modules
If we build modular ships in two sizes, for a high-low mix of capabilities to get the numbers we need in the fleet, let's build the mission modules to fit in standard shipping containers.
This Proceedings article has a reasonable proposal:
Other than calling them Leviathan and Cerberus, which make me cringe and think I have to make a saving roll before using them, I like the proposal.
And I have to say the "leviathan" has too much humor associated with it ever since I read a Dave Barry column (so old that it doesn't have a web signature) about male egos and a proposal to market condoms in different sizes. I believe Barry wrote that the sizes would be large, jumbo, and leviathan. But you may not have that terminology issue.
Anyway.
I especially like the proposal to move toward 20-foot equivalent units for the system modules that would make up the payload of the ships.
If the fleet itself used these modules, the unit-cost of the modules would go down, and if there are extra modules, we could use the exact same modules used for Navy large and smaller (but not small--these hulls have to traverse oceans, remember) hulls, we'd have cheaper versions to use to create what I called Modularized Auxiliary Cruisers.
Of course, containerized system modules the Navy ships wouldn't use would still be needed. Many of the ship's systems common to any type of warship would be built into the hull, I assume. And those intrinsic ship systems would need to be modularized to turn a container ship into a warship capable of using the other common mission modules usable on either Navy ships or Modularized Auxiliary Cruisers.
Pity Proceedings didn't take my article when I submitted it five years or so, ago. I think it would have contributed to the debate. But the editors sat on it for over a year before rejecting it after I prodded them to give me a yes or a no. Perhaps unfairly, I've always assumed that the long decision time was because the article had merit but there was some worry that such a Modularized Auxiliary Cruiser would, in the eyes of Congress which votes for the money, become an alternative to conventional warships rather than a supplement for conventional warships.
But making all our warships use mission modules would reduce that threat. Indeed, if the smaller hulls are built in large enough numbers, it might be cheaper to just put minimal system modules on that hull to carry out the peacetime missions I envisioned for a Modularized Auxiliary Cruiser.
If that's the case, the Modularized Auxiliary Cruiser truly would be just a wartime expedient to put more hulls in the water. I'm fine with that, too. Heck, if the war is with China, there should be a lot of container ships looking for work once a blockade of China kicks in.
This Proceedings article has a reasonable proposal:
The Navy must leverage modular plug-and-play operation systems in two different-sized, moderately armed and manned baseline hulls. The larger hull would fill the Graham/Bosworth role of “carrier of large objects” with reconfigurable holds and flight decks, while the smaller hulls would fill the “scout fighter” role. Neither term, however, fits today’s parlance well. In fact, because of the concepts presented here, naming the variants so that they meet both traditional and future naming convention and concepts proved exceptionally difficult.
For the sake of simplicity, we chose a more mythic naming concept of Leviathan and Cerberus — Leviathan for the large and capacious ship, Cerberus for the smaller but equally multimission craft. But, to press the concept farther, the modular systems and interfaces would be designed so that the Leviathan class could carry any or all of the Cerberus -class modules, while the Cerberus class would only be limited by the volume and size of modules. True reconfiguration, true modularity. Not only following the CNO’s dictum that “we must decouple the platform and the payload” but moving toward the 20-foot equivalent unit that transformed break-bulk cargo ships to modern container ships, a concept of truly universal and interchangeable platforms and payloads.
Other than calling them Leviathan and Cerberus, which make me cringe and think I have to make a saving roll before using them, I like the proposal.
And I have to say the "leviathan" has too much humor associated with it ever since I read a Dave Barry column (so old that it doesn't have a web signature) about male egos and a proposal to market condoms in different sizes. I believe Barry wrote that the sizes would be large, jumbo, and leviathan. But you may not have that terminology issue.
Anyway.
I especially like the proposal to move toward 20-foot equivalent units for the system modules that would make up the payload of the ships.
If the fleet itself used these modules, the unit-cost of the modules would go down, and if there are extra modules, we could use the exact same modules used for Navy large and smaller (but not small--these hulls have to traverse oceans, remember) hulls, we'd have cheaper versions to use to create what I called Modularized Auxiliary Cruisers.
Of course, containerized system modules the Navy ships wouldn't use would still be needed. Many of the ship's systems common to any type of warship would be built into the hull, I assume. And those intrinsic ship systems would need to be modularized to turn a container ship into a warship capable of using the other common mission modules usable on either Navy ships or Modularized Auxiliary Cruisers.
Pity Proceedings didn't take my article when I submitted it five years or so, ago. I think it would have contributed to the debate. But the editors sat on it for over a year before rejecting it after I prodded them to give me a yes or a no. Perhaps unfairly, I've always assumed that the long decision time was because the article had merit but there was some worry that such a Modularized Auxiliary Cruiser would, in the eyes of Congress which votes for the money, become an alternative to conventional warships rather than a supplement for conventional warships.
But making all our warships use mission modules would reduce that threat. Indeed, if the smaller hulls are built in large enough numbers, it might be cheaper to just put minimal system modules on that hull to carry out the peacetime missions I envisioned for a Modularized Auxiliary Cruiser.
If that's the case, the Modularized Auxiliary Cruiser truly would be just a wartime expedient to put more hulls in the water. I'm fine with that, too. Heck, if the war is with China, there should be a lot of container ships looking for work once a blockade of China kicks in.
Speaking of Hillary (!)
Reset!
Huh. Just what was Mitt Romney thinking, anyway?
In a jaw-dropping revelation on NBC’s Meet the Press, House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers (R-Michigan) has stated that he believes the fugitive Edward Snowden had assistance from Russian spies when he stole vast amounts of sensitive U.S. security data and fled to Russia.
Rogers told MTP host David Gregory: “Let me just say this: I believe there’s a reason he [Snowden] ended up in the hands, the loving arms, of an FSB [successor to the KGB] agent in Moscow. I don’t think that’s a coincidence.” Rogers added that some of the methods Snowden used in lifting National Security Agency secrets were “beyond his technical capabilities.”
Huh. Just what was Mitt Romney thinking, anyway?
Sunday, January 19, 2014
When Everyone Wants to Lead from Behind
Britain, and to a lesser extent France, used to be the nations of Europe that could carry out an independent--if smaller--military expedition. Along with Britain's history with us fighting wars, that military capability made Britain a unique ally whose status in our thinking has been described as a "special relationship." The military capability is fading away. And that common military history will recede into the past.
Robert Gates is absolutely right:
The fact is, despite attempts to dress it up as efficiency, European military power is fading away. Individual European states are becoming largely incapable of independent military action and can only be plugged into an American expedition as small tribal auxiliaries to our forces.
Not that this isn't valuable. NATO remains very useful. NATO keeps these potential forces capable of operating with us be maintaining common standards in equipment and procedures. And NATO Europe is still important as an asset to defend and as a springboard to project power into an arc of crisis from West Africa to Central Asia.
But when Britain joins the rest of Europe in wanting to "lead from behind" by reducing military capabilities to the extent that they can only help somebody else who takes the lead, it is a sad day for the West. Prime Minister Cameron can pretend it is otherwise, but Gates got it right. We could once count on Britain as a significant force at our side. Now they are just another European state.
With their quality, the British are surely at the higher end of that class, but they are still in the same class as others who can only hold the door while we walk through carrying the load.
Robert Gates is absolutely right:
Britain's military cuts mean it will no longer be a full partner alongside United States forces, former US defence secretary Robert Gates said Thursday.
Gates, who served under US presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush, said Britain no longer had the complete spectrum of capabilities, meaning its relationship with the US military was shifting.
Prime Minister David Cameron said Gates had "got it wrong" and said Britain remained a "first-class player" globally.
The fact is, despite attempts to dress it up as efficiency, European military power is fading away. Individual European states are becoming largely incapable of independent military action and can only be plugged into an American expedition as small tribal auxiliaries to our forces.
Not that this isn't valuable. NATO remains very useful. NATO keeps these potential forces capable of operating with us be maintaining common standards in equipment and procedures. And NATO Europe is still important as an asset to defend and as a springboard to project power into an arc of crisis from West Africa to Central Asia.
But when Britain joins the rest of Europe in wanting to "lead from behind" by reducing military capabilities to the extent that they can only help somebody else who takes the lead, it is a sad day for the West. Prime Minister Cameron can pretend it is otherwise, but Gates got it right. We could once count on Britain as a significant force at our side. Now they are just another European state.
With their quality, the British are surely at the higher end of that class, but they are still in the same class as others who can only hold the door while we walk through carrying the load.
The Army We Will Have
The Army could shrink to 32 brigades under an active force end strength of 420,000 troops. Is this possible?
Can we sustain the brigade count with fewer troops?
On the one hand, I'll say that I'm disturbed at the end strength slide. But I'm pleased by other reports that say that end strength has to go down because we are stressing readiness and training over numbers. That's far better than maintaining numbers at the expense of readiness and training--or even more modern equipment, to a degree.
But can we field 32 brigades?
In 2000, our Army fielded 32 brigades or armored cavalry regiments under an active component strength of about 480,000. This end strength was short by about 40,000 to fully man the force on paper.
Army end strength has gone up as have the brigades. Before expanding the Army (aside from mobilized reservists) the Army reorganized the existing force to add 10 more brigades. We transferred Army jobs to civilians and got rid of Cold War-era units (like the large number of separate artillery brigades, for example).
So under the official cap of 480,000 we had 42 brigades and regiments in the active force.
Most of the new style brigade combat teams had two line (maneuver) battalions plus a small and light "recon" battalion. The line battalions had 4 companies each.
Our new brigades will go back to having 3 line battalions. I don't know what the company count will be in each one. Stryker brigades had 3 companies and so will continue to have three. Will the other brigades retain 4-company battalions or go back to the traditional triangular organization?
I'll ignore that for now.
In 2000, our 480,000 troops manned 32 brigades, or 15,000 troops per brigade.
But we really needed 520,000 to man the force structure. That would have been 16,250 troops per brigade.
If 480,000 troops supported 42 redesigned (and self-contained) brigades during war, that's about 11,500 troops to man and support 1 brigade, after reorganizing the Army away from the 2000 organization.
With 420,000 troops, we'll have 32 brigades. That is about 13,000 per brigade.
This is all aside from the tens of thousands of reservists mobilized each year to support the war effort. That's been dropping, but overall the military has over 40,000 from all service reserves on active duty right now.
Back to the Army. While I shuddered when I saw the 420,000 figure, after looking at my admittedly rough math, I think we will be okay in manning 32 brigades with 420,000 troops, given what we did in reorganizing the Army over the last decade.
Of course, whether 32 brigades is sufficient is another question. The Bush administration was hammered for not having a larger Army.
Obviously, you go to war with the Army you have at that moment and not the Army you wish you had built in the past.
Right now we wish to build an Army of 32 brigades. And that's the Army we will have when we have a future crisis that may require us to go to war.
So don't wonder how we got an Army we have rather than the Army we wish we had.
Can we sustain the brigade count with fewer troops?
"We're on a glide path, and the monies are laid out to give us a 420,000 Army by 2019," said Lt. Gen. James O. Barclay III, the Army's deputy chief of staff, G-8. "That doesn't mean we're set on going to 420, we've got some decision points built in, coming into the '16, '17 timeframe, so we're taking a hard look at what is the right set."
What leadership is looking at with regard to manning is how the Army will look across the force; from the brigade combat teams, enablers, the engineer forces, reconnaissance and clearance forces and how the mix is worked, Barclay said. He added BCTs will come down to 32 made up of three battalions.
On the one hand, I'll say that I'm disturbed at the end strength slide. But I'm pleased by other reports that say that end strength has to go down because we are stressing readiness and training over numbers. That's far better than maintaining numbers at the expense of readiness and training--or even more modern equipment, to a degree.
But can we field 32 brigades?
In 2000, our Army fielded 32 brigades or armored cavalry regiments under an active component strength of about 480,000. This end strength was short by about 40,000 to fully man the force on paper.
Army end strength has gone up as have the brigades. Before expanding the Army (aside from mobilized reservists) the Army reorganized the existing force to add 10 more brigades. We transferred Army jobs to civilians and got rid of Cold War-era units (like the large number of separate artillery brigades, for example).
So under the official cap of 480,000 we had 42 brigades and regiments in the active force.
Most of the new style brigade combat teams had two line (maneuver) battalions plus a small and light "recon" battalion. The line battalions had 4 companies each.
Our new brigades will go back to having 3 line battalions. I don't know what the company count will be in each one. Stryker brigades had 3 companies and so will continue to have three. Will the other brigades retain 4-company battalions or go back to the traditional triangular organization?
I'll ignore that for now.
In 2000, our 480,000 troops manned 32 brigades, or 15,000 troops per brigade.
But we really needed 520,000 to man the force structure. That would have been 16,250 troops per brigade.
If 480,000 troops supported 42 redesigned (and self-contained) brigades during war, that's about 11,500 troops to man and support 1 brigade, after reorganizing the Army away from the 2000 organization.
With 420,000 troops, we'll have 32 brigades. That is about 13,000 per brigade.
This is all aside from the tens of thousands of reservists mobilized each year to support the war effort. That's been dropping, but overall the military has over 40,000 from all service reserves on active duty right now.
Back to the Army. While I shuddered when I saw the 420,000 figure, after looking at my admittedly rough math, I think we will be okay in manning 32 brigades with 420,000 troops, given what we did in reorganizing the Army over the last decade.
Of course, whether 32 brigades is sufficient is another question. The Bush administration was hammered for not having a larger Army.
Obviously, you go to war with the Army you have at that moment and not the Army you wish you had built in the past.
Right now we wish to build an Army of 32 brigades. And that's the Army we will have when we have a future crisis that may require us to go to war.
So don't wonder how we got an Army we have rather than the Army we wish we had.
Kill as Many as Possible, Guys
Iraqi special forces and local Sunni Arab militias are beginning a counter-attack at Ramadi, backed by air power.
Al Qaeda gunmen holding Ramadi are under attack:
As long as the al Qaeda types have conveniently massed in one spot, we should be interested in helping the Iraqis kill as many of them as possible.
It isn't too late to recover from our unforced error of leaving Iraq in 2011.
Al Qaeda gunmen holding Ramadi are under attack:
Iraqi tribesmen backed by police special forces and helicopter gunships assaulted al Qaeda-linked militants in the eastern and southern outskirts of the city of Ramadi on Sunday, police and local officials said.
They said the ground forces retook a police station in al-Hamthiya on the eastern outskirts of the city after helicopters fired missiles and machineguns at militant hideouts in the area.
As long as the al Qaeda types have conveniently massed in one spot, we should be interested in helping the Iraqis kill as many of them as possible.
It isn't too late to recover from our unforced error of leaving Iraq in 2011.
The Lion of Myanmar
Do read Jonah Goldberg's G-file turned into a column today.
Normally you have to get this stuff by his email. For the web they scrubbed the mustard off the margins and removed the girl-on-girl action. But otherwise, this is the G-file.
And sign up for his G-file. Jonah is a serious analyst who has a sense of humor about any topic he approaches. That's a welcome combination these days.
I aspire to that degree of difficulty, truth be told. On good days, I think I approach it.
And to generalize on an unrelated point in the piece, I keep blogging on military and foreign policy because I remain frustrated at the level of bovine dullness that our journalism class brings to the subjects of war, the military, and foreign policy. Yes, Jonah included this video clip:
That's how I feel every day since 9/11. With few exceptions, after more than a dozen years of war, the vast majority of reporters cover their subjects with a lack of expertise that would be unacceptable to someone on the fashion or Hollywood page.
And here's a tidbit:
Yes. Which is why I always get a special thrill that Bruce Springsteen's "Born in the USA" became a refrain for Patriotic Americans despite the rest of the lyrics which nobody can understand anyway because the Bruce mumbles through the song.
But the left-wing critics misunderstand Americans who join the military. We didn't need jingoistic movies to enlist. Just duty. When I was in Army basic training, we were taken to see the movie, Hamburger Hill. Not exactly a recruiting film.
One of our drill sergeants, a Vietnam veteran, told us to remember that movie because that was what it was really like. Luckily, I never had to verify that. But the point is that it seems that for a certain segment of our population, any war movie that doesn't involve American soldiers losing or being tried for war crimes at the end of the movie is just pro-war propaganda.
Anyway. I digress. (As I can!)
G-files usually cover a lot of ground. You can subscribe through a link in the editor's note at the link.
You're welcome.
Normally you have to get this stuff by his email. For the web they scrubbed the mustard off the margins and removed the girl-on-girl action. But otherwise, this is the G-file.
And sign up for his G-file. Jonah is a serious analyst who has a sense of humor about any topic he approaches. That's a welcome combination these days.
I aspire to that degree of difficulty, truth be told. On good days, I think I approach it.
And to generalize on an unrelated point in the piece, I keep blogging on military and foreign policy because I remain frustrated at the level of bovine dullness that our journalism class brings to the subjects of war, the military, and foreign policy. Yes, Jonah included this video clip:
That's how I feel every day since 9/11. With few exceptions, after more than a dozen years of war, the vast majority of reporters cover their subjects with a lack of expertise that would be unacceptable to someone on the fashion or Hollywood page.
And here's a tidbit:
Most of these people freaking out over the alleged propagandistic nature of Lone Survivor have absolutely no problem with propagandistic movies that sell a different message (Though it does vex them that anti-war, anti-American movies don’t do very well at the box office.) That’s what’s so damning and annoying about the hatred for Lone Survivor. I’m okay with people calling it unsophisticated or even propagandistic, I guess. What bothers me is the anti-Americanism behind the complaint. Yes, Peter Berg could have made a more nuanced and better movie. Fine. But that’s not what offends so many of the critics. What offends them is that the movie celebrates the American military and the rightness of their cause.
Yes. Which is why I always get a special thrill that Bruce Springsteen's "Born in the USA" became a refrain for Patriotic Americans despite the rest of the lyrics which nobody can understand anyway because the Bruce mumbles through the song.
But the left-wing critics misunderstand Americans who join the military. We didn't need jingoistic movies to enlist. Just duty. When I was in Army basic training, we were taken to see the movie, Hamburger Hill. Not exactly a recruiting film.
One of our drill sergeants, a Vietnam veteran, told us to remember that movie because that was what it was really like. Luckily, I never had to verify that. But the point is that it seems that for a certain segment of our population, any war movie that doesn't involve American soldiers losing or being tried for war crimes at the end of the movie is just pro-war propaganda.
Anyway. I digress. (As I can!)
G-files usually cover a lot of ground. You can subscribe through a link in the editor's note at the link.
You're welcome.
Recon?
A man crawling into a water treatment plant via a pipe gets stuck. Officials are puzzled. Might I suggest this was a recon mission gone awry?
Maybe this was just some sort of Jack Ass-style idiocy:
He had to climb a fence with three layers of barbed wire on top. Why? It's a mystery:
Unless Asef Mohamed worked for Governor Chris Christie and Manalapan township officials had supported one of the governor's rivals in the last election, I might want to look into the terrorism angle.
And by all means, do look into ways to tighten up that security. Because no matter what Mr, Mohamed was up to, terrorists just might think that poisoning a community's water supply might be a good trick to pull off.
Maybe this was just some sort of Jack Ass-style idiocy:
Rescuers have freed a man who had been stuck for hours in a pipe at a water treatment plant in New Jersey.
He had to climb a fence with three layers of barbed wire on top. Why? It's a mystery:
United Water officials said they have no idea why Mohamed did it, but are now looking at ways to tighten up security, Putney reported.
Unless Asef Mohamed worked for Governor Chris Christie and Manalapan township officials had supported one of the governor's rivals in the last election, I might want to look into the terrorism angle.
And by all means, do look into ways to tighten up that security. Because no matter what Mr, Mohamed was up to, terrorists just might think that poisoning a community's water supply might be a good trick to pull off.
Only Obama Can Go to Iran?
Our delusions about relations with Iran are not restricted to the nuclear issue. Some think so highly of our diplomatic abilities that they think we can make Iran a security partner.
No, restoring relations with Iran is not like President Nixon restoring relations with China. And just becomes some leftish professors have been on this kick for a while doesn't mean that it has any basis in reality. Yet it makes perfect sense that our "professor" president thinks he can achieve an outreach to Iran if he just tries a little harder.
Obama administration objectives for Iran are just delusional:
The authors note, as I have, that Nixon went to China successfully because we had the common enemy of the Soviet Union. We wanted to divert Soviet resources to coping with China; and China--having fought border clashes with their former ally--needed help to keep Soviet forces from invading China's industrial north.
If President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry believe they can "go to China," who, pray tell, is the notional Soviet Union that provides incentive for both of us to work with each other?
The simple fact is, there is no foreign threat to move Iran from thinking of us as the "great Satan." Vague notions that we will unite against "instability" in the region, or some such rot, won't cut it.
And the Saudis might have some fears that they get to play the role of Soviet threat. That would explain their search for alternatives to US protection.
But there is no uniting threat to end the hostility between America and Iran, which is based on the Iranian support of terrorism in the region, world, and even here.
And to point out the obvious, in foreign policy matters at least, President Obama is no Nixon. And Kerry is no Kissinger. Heck, Kerry isn't even an Albright.
Iran is our enemy. The only questions are how long it takes the Obama administration to realize this basic fact; and how much damage to our interests and our allies is inflicted before we realize that basic fact.
No, restoring relations with Iran is not like President Nixon restoring relations with China. And just becomes some leftish professors have been on this kick for a while doesn't mean that it has any basis in reality. Yet it makes perfect sense that our "professor" president thinks he can achieve an outreach to Iran if he just tries a little harder.
Obama administration objectives for Iran are just delusional:
A great deal of diplomatic attention over the next few months will be focused on whether the temporary nuclear deal with Iran can be transformed into a full-blown accord. President Obama has staked the success of his foreign policy on this bold gamble. But discussion about the nuclear deal has diverted attention from an even riskier bet that Obama has placed: the idea that Iran can become a cooperative partner in regional security.
Although they won’t say so publicly, Mr. Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry surely dream of a “Nixon to China” masterstroke. They are quietly pursuing a strategic realignment that, they believe, will end decades of semi-open warfare between Iran and the United States and their respective allies.
The authors note, as I have, that Nixon went to China successfully because we had the common enemy of the Soviet Union. We wanted to divert Soviet resources to coping with China; and China--having fought border clashes with their former ally--needed help to keep Soviet forces from invading China's industrial north.
If President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry believe they can "go to China," who, pray tell, is the notional Soviet Union that provides incentive for both of us to work with each other?
The simple fact is, there is no foreign threat to move Iran from thinking of us as the "great Satan." Vague notions that we will unite against "instability" in the region, or some such rot, won't cut it.
And the Saudis might have some fears that they get to play the role of Soviet threat. That would explain their search for alternatives to US protection.
But there is no uniting threat to end the hostility between America and Iran, which is based on the Iranian support of terrorism in the region, world, and even here.
And to point out the obvious, in foreign policy matters at least, President Obama is no Nixon. And Kerry is no Kissinger. Heck, Kerry isn't even an Albright.
Iran is our enemy. The only questions are how long it takes the Obama administration to realize this basic fact; and how much damage to our interests and our allies is inflicted before we realize that basic fact.
Saturday, January 18, 2014
Kerry Reports for Russian Duty
I mentioned that it was sheer idiocy for Kerry to be proposing a ceasefire in Syria. Syria wants a ceasefire, of course.
I noted that it was idiotic for Secretary of State Kerry to be discussing with Russia's foreign minister a ceasefire around Aleppo, Syria.
Now, Syria is proposing to their friend and ally Russia a ceasefire around Aleppo:
Why would Syria, if they are winning their war, want a ceasefire to rescue rebels busy fighting amongst themselves?
In fact, Syria would like to pry apart the rebels by making some resent that they fight while others have a ceasefire; and to free up Syrian ground forces to face those still fighting on other fronts. Have no doubt, if Assad makes gains elsewhere, he'll return to the Aleppo front to resume fighting when he can.
And a ceasefire helps relieve some of the pressure on Assad's battered ground forces who are fighting month after month with casualties that have crippled morale in much of the force.
Russia, which helped Assad by getting that ridiculous chemical weapons agreement, will no doubt work on this, too. After all, Russia is working hard to support their ally Assad any way they can:
And look at what our "reset" partners in Moscow are doing:
No "unbelievably small" actions for the Russians, no sir. Russia has people on the ground helping Assad's troops fight.
And remember, our village idiot of a diplomat just told Asssad he can't kill people with chemical weapons. No chemical weapons in those shipments. So it is all kosher with Kerry.
We, on the other hand, refrain from helping rebels with more than minimal aid while talks go on, revealing a fatal weakness of our diplomatic style: We don't talk to win. We talk to talk, mistaking the process as an objective all alone.
Russia is not as idiotic as our foreign policy brain trust. They want to win. If they need faux chemical disarmament, ceasefires, a Security Council veto, arms shipments, or Russian personnel on the ground, Russia will do it. They may be paranoid pains in the butt. But they are paranoid pains in the butt who know how to be an ally.
I don't know if Kerry will get his coveted Nobel Peace Prize. But he sure is earning that Hero of the Soviet Union medal--or whatever Putin calls it these days.
I noted that it was idiotic for Secretary of State Kerry to be discussing with Russia's foreign minister a ceasefire around Aleppo, Syria.
Now, Syria is proposing to their friend and ally Russia a ceasefire around Aleppo:
Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualem said on Friday he had handed Russia plans for a ceasefire with rebel forces in Syria's biggest city, Aleppo, and was ready to exchange lists on a possible prisoner swap.
Why would Syria, if they are winning their war, want a ceasefire to rescue rebels busy fighting amongst themselves?
In fact, Syria would like to pry apart the rebels by making some resent that they fight while others have a ceasefire; and to free up Syrian ground forces to face those still fighting on other fronts. Have no doubt, if Assad makes gains elsewhere, he'll return to the Aleppo front to resume fighting when he can.
And a ceasefire helps relieve some of the pressure on Assad's battered ground forces who are fighting month after month with casualties that have crippled morale in much of the force.
Russia, which helped Assad by getting that ridiculous chemical weapons agreement, will no doubt work on this, too. After all, Russia is working hard to support their ally Assad any way they can:
In recent weeks Russia has stepped up supplies of military gear to Syria, including armored vehicles, drones and guided bombs, boosting President Bashar al-Assad just as rebel infighting has weakened the insurgency against him, sources with knowledge of the deliveries say.
Moscow, which is trying to raise its diplomatic and economic influence in the Middle East, has been a major provider of conventional weapons to Syria, giving Assad crucial support during the three-year civil war and blocking wider Western attempts to punish him with sanctions for the use of force against civilians.
And look at what our "reset" partners in Moscow are doing:
Dozens of Antonov 124s (Russian transport planes) have been bringing in armored vehicles, surveillance equipment, radars, electronic warfare systems, spare parts for helicopters, and various weapons including guided bombs for planes," a Middle East security source said.
"Russian advisers and intelligence experts have been running observation UAVs around the clock to help Syrian forces track rebel positions, analyze their capabilities, and carry out precision artillery and air force strikes against them," said the source, who declined to be identified.
No "unbelievably small" actions for the Russians, no sir. Russia has people on the ground helping Assad's troops fight.
And remember, our village idiot of a diplomat just told Asssad he can't kill people with chemical weapons. No chemical weapons in those shipments. So it is all kosher with Kerry.
We, on the other hand, refrain from helping rebels with more than minimal aid while talks go on, revealing a fatal weakness of our diplomatic style: We don't talk to win. We talk to talk, mistaking the process as an objective all alone.
Russia is not as idiotic as our foreign policy brain trust. They want to win. If they need faux chemical disarmament, ceasefires, a Security Council veto, arms shipments, or Russian personnel on the ground, Russia will do it. They may be paranoid pains in the butt. But they are paranoid pains in the butt who know how to be an ally.
I don't know if Kerry will get his coveted Nobel Peace Prize. But he sure is earning that Hero of the Soviet Union medal--or whatever Putin calls it these days.
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