Dotting the "I"s

If China is going to push Japan on ownership of small islands, you have to expect that Japan is going to establish control rather than allow China to disrupt the status quo only when China decides to act.

This can't be too unexpected:

Japan may nationalize any unclaimed islands in its waters in a bid to bolster its territorial claims, a government source said Monday.

The government plans to establish a new council aimed at strengthening the administration of Japan’s 400 or so remote islands to ensure it has control over natural resources in the surrounding waters, the source said.

The step might include islands that have no legal owners.

So when do the Japanese start putting robot garrisons on and around the islands?

Honestly, I'd expect everyone with claims in the South China Sea to put troops on their claims to prevent China from quietly disrupting the status quo by picking off islands one at a time at their leisure.

Remember, we have no interest in who owns those islands. We have an interest in making sure the islands are allocated through diplomacy rather than force or bullying by China against our allies.

And we have an interest in making sure that the Law of the Sea isn't twisted by China to deny our Navy access to the exclusive economic zone by saying they are territorial waters contrary to customary law, tradition, and general views of what an EEZ means.

So if China is going to use their new military muscle to bully other nations, China has to expect others to try to preempt Chinese actions, no?

Well Worth the Money

I really do think it is wrong to cut off aid to Egypt because of the coup.

One, can we spare a little nuance to understand that getting rid of the Mursi government was hardly an assault on democracy even though Mursi won an election?

Two, remember that our aid largely goes to the Egyptian military which is the most friendly institution in Egypt.

Three, remember that our aid is the price we pay to keep Israel and Egypt from going to war. Egypt was not a democracy when we started paying that money. It isn't now. So we're to halt the payment for the sin of briefly having the appearance of democracy and then losing it? When Egypt is abiding by the reason for the payments?

Sure, Egypt would lose a war with Israel. But any war would add to our problems in the Middle East and potentially end the use of the Suez Canal which is a convenient shortcut for our already stretched fleet in Central Command.

How many more ships would we need to maintain the same force in CENTCOM if we had to go around Africa or across the Indian Ocean from the Pacific?

And where would our Mediterranean presence come from if not from ships going to and from CENTCOM from our Atlantic ports, lingering for a bit and showing the flag as they transit the sea?

If we want to pressure Egypt, we have influence in the IMF and other bodies. Leave the aid alone unless Egypt overtly turns against us.

New Incentives

Is democracy pushing Prime Minister Maliki to reach out to Sunni Arabs willing to work within the system?

That would be nice (tip to Instapundit):

Earlier this year, according to the Post, Maliki was following the advice of Iran to play the role of “Shiite defender.” In April, for example, security forces raided a Sunni protest, killing at least 50 people.

But provincial elections didn’t go well for Maliki, who faces a reelection battle next year. His party lost control of local governments in Baghdad and Basra.

Lacking the full support of his Shiite base, Maliki has thus reached out to moderate Sunnis. “There will be a political settlement with a segment of the Sunni community,” one of his top advisers says.

And reaching out to Sunni Arabs requires Iraq to refrain from helping Iran in Syria (and generally).

I still wish we had troops in Iraq to help Iraq resist Iranian pressure. But perhaps we helped set up a system that will work without us in the critical early years of democracy.

I never said Iraq would fail without us--just that the odds of success were reduced without us. Let's hope for the best. And given my worries that Maliki's outreach to Kurds was just an effort to avoid a two-front war with radicalized Sunnis, this is a good sign.

Although coming to terms with moderate Sunnis would be useful to pressure those who lean toward reigniting the insurgency and terrorism into quieting down and working within the system.

Not Looking So Bad After All

Our conduct of the Second Battle of Fallujah in fall 2004 is looking better and better.

Syrian troops continue to employ lots of non-precise firepower to smash up rebel held areas in cities--even the capital:

"They (troops) are using tanks and artillery and are trying to break into Qaboun. The shelling is very intense and there is a lot of smoke," said an activist in the area, speaking via Skype on condition of anonymity, fearing retribution.

"This is day 26 of a bombing campaign, and they still haven't been able to break Qaboun," he said.

This is how you level a city and slaughter the inhabitants.

The Greatly Convenient Satan

So when does Iran attack the UAE?

Strategypage addresses Iran's role in Syria and the sanctions that are biting into Iran.

Syria's bad position is indicated by the fact that 5,000 Hezbollah and foreign fighters being paid for by Iran are having a major impact as shock troops for Assad.

And the money to pay these guys and substitute for the lack of an economy to pay for the Syrian government is hurting Iran. Syria is thinking about going back to a highly controlled economy to prioritize their shrinking resources, but that won't make people too happy.

Plus, sanctions on Iran are biting. Which leads to an interesting question.

Sanctions as a means of compelling a nation to do something don't have a good track record of success. The idea of sanctions is that they are an alternative to war.

But if sanctions don't bite enough, the target endures and does not change their behavior. So far Iran is enduring and still going nuclear, supporting terrorism, and backing Assad.

If sanctions hurt enough to make Iran ponder changing course, Iran is more likely to think of sanctions as an act of war rather than an alternative to war. Think Japan after our oil embargo but before Pearl Harbor.

If Iran decides to fight, would they fight America? That would be suicidal.

So how about the United Arab Emirates? The UAE has been a major supporter of Syrian rebels. Yet the UAE isn't as strong as Saudi Arabia. (And let's not speak of taking on the Turks.)

Iran would even have an excuse to go to war with the UAE:

An Iranian news agency says the foreign minister has called on the United Arab Emirates not to deport its nationals.

The Iranian media has reported that the UAE has repatriated an unspecified number of Iranians amid tensions between the two countries linked to Syria's civil war. Shiite Iran backs Syrian President Bashar Assad, a member of a Shiite offshoot sect, while the Sunni-majority UAE and Saudi Arabia support the mostly Sunni rebels.

Would Iran react to sanctions and the expense of Syria by deciding the pain is equivalent to war? And then choose to strike at the UAE rather than the protected Saudis or American directly?

Setting Limits

A recent explosion at a Latakia ammunition storage facility was apparently an Israeli attack that targeted newly arrived Russian anti-ship missiles.

Although that article claims it was an air attack, Strategypage reports that it was an Israeli submarine firing cruise missiles.
Israel has been vigilant about any weapons that might tempt factions in the Syrian war to seek advantage by expanding the war to Israel.

And perhaps the Israeli navy has limits to missions it believes the Israeli air force should carry out.

NOTE: I guess I forgot to go back and link the articles I read. Then I forgot to post it. Darn those layers of editors and fact checkers ...

The Companies You Keep

I noted the Army reorganization. Strategypage comments on the changes. My questions still aren't answered.

The Army's brigades will get bigger again but remain self-contained units as the Army cuts troop strength in the reorganization:

This will increase most brigades to 4,500 troops. Each new brigade will have three infantry or armor battalions (instead of two, as most now do) 18 (instead of 16) 155mm self-propelled artillery vehicles (organized into three batteries instead of two) and more engineer troops (the equivalent of a battalion) for each brigade. The new BCTs (Brigade Combat Teams) will initially consist of 14 infantry (two infantry and one tank battalion), 12 tank (two tank and one infantry battalion) and seven Stryker [brigades]. Three of these 35 brigades will be disbanded over the next few years, but which ones has not been decided yet. By late 2017 the army expects to reduce personnel strength ten percent (to 490,000 troops from the current 547,000).

The battalion breakdown implies that the battalions will return to a triangular structure of three maneuver companies each. Now we call these "heavy" battalions because they are balanced with 2 tank companies and 2 mechanized infantry companies each. If the tank brigades are listed as having tank and [mechanized] infantry battalions, that implies that the tank battalions have 2 tank companies and one mechanized infantry company while the [mechanized] infantry battalion would have 2 mechanized companies and 1 tank company.

The infantry brigades are confusing, however. The "infantry" brigades would include motorized infantry that could have a tank battalion attached. But how do we have paratrooper and air assault brigades with tank battalions? The "infantry" category has to include the paratroopers and airmobile infantry brigades. They can't have tank battalions as part of their organization. Sure, companies or battalions of tanks could be attached to the brigades, to augment them depending on the mission. But I find it hard to believe that they'd simply be part of the brigade structure.

And we won't be keeping the combat strength of our existing brigades if the battalions become triangular. With our current 38 brigades having 2 maneuver battalions and 7 Stryker brigades having 3 maneuver battalions, that is 97 battalions. The reorganization puts us to 32 brigades with 3 battalions each, or 96 battalions. That's close.

I wonder about the surveillance battalion in the brigades that seem way more like glorified forward observers rather than the more traditional "cavalry" recon battalions we used to have at division level or in armored cavalry regiments. Those cavalry units were powerful combined arms units that could fight as well as scout. I'd feel better if the surveillance assets were beefed up to be more like the "cavalry" of pre-Iraq War reorganization.

And I assume this total doesn't count our Ranger regiment.

But by companies, we lose strength. The current 45 brigades would have 8 maneuver companies each (or 9 in the 7 Stryker brigades), for a total of 367 maneuver companies. The 32 larger brigades will have just 288 maneuver companies. Although if we had real "cavalry" battalions in the brigades we'd be able to add up to 96 more maneuver companies to the new structure, for a total of 384 maneuver companies.

Having fewer maneuver companies not a big deal for high intensity conventional warfare. Firepower is more important and is provided by non-trigger pullers. But this is a significant reduction in terms of counter-insurgency warfare which needs bodies on the ground more than firepower.

Granted, our government fully intends to keep out of counter-insurgencies. But we need the cooperation of enemies to carry out our intent, no?

Sure, we could add Army National Guard infantry companies to our battalions to help with counter-insurgency missions. But the Guard doesn't like to break up their battalions and brigades this way. With a Guard general in the Joint Chiefs of Staff now, the active Army's political power to get that down will decrease.

In many ways, adding Guard companies would be ideal since at the company level Guard units are often superior to active units at the company level because Guard units often serve together for many years, building team work and cohesion. It is at battalion and higher levels that the active Army gets an advantage because of opportunities to train as a unit that the Guard's larger units lack. Guard units are based in company-sized armories while active units have entire divisions or more together on a single base.

I still have a lot of questions and concerns. But we should be better off than we were on September 10, 2001, at least.

Half Right

The idea that we are preparing to fight China without civilian oversight is ridiculous. To equate it with China's actions is even more ridiculous.

So China and America are preparing for war without consulting their people?

Our military's job is to prepare to defend us--without popular votes on that planning, training, and weapons purchases.

But the president announced the ongoing shift. And Congress appropriates the money for the preparations to defend against China's rising military power. The president could order the military to prepare for war against whatever threat he perceives. And Congress could refuse to spend money or direct spending if it is unhappy with our defense preparations.

So put away that silly notion that our military is driving us to war with China behind the public's back.

Second, has the author noticed that our preparations go to defending allies and that we aren't even reflexively defending the status quo, but just insisting that negotiations rather than force resolve the disputes? China is the one making threats and taking actions to militarize disputes (even when so-called "civilian" assets are pushing neighbors around).

Maybe ask if authoritarian China--which uses nationalism to send mobs into the streets against approved foreign devils--is the one preparing for war. Leave us out of your paranoid delusions.

Bombing Is as Bombing Does

If we are truly "double-tapping" with drone strikes to kill "first responders" who are civilian rescue personnel rather than nearby jihadis who respond first to the initial drone strike on a group of jihadis, please contact the White House to register your complaints.

If not, leave me alone with your customary bitching about Americans defending ourselves (and the rest of the non-jihadi world) from murderous SOBs.

If we are doing that, it is wrong. But you know, racism. And Nobel Peace Prize. And stuff.

Tip to Instapundit.

I would like to note that we should have seen this coming.

Terminology Questions

One of the things I've wondered about our Army's new brigade structure is whether they will also be triangular in regard to the companies in the battalions. I also wonder if the "armored" brigades designation for twelve of our brigades means a departure from our current "heavy" brigades.

Our current "heavy" brigade combat teams have two maneuver battalions with 4 companies each, split evenly between tank and mechanized infantry companies. I liked this balance because I've read that experience going back to World War II showed that a balance between infantry and tanks works better than having too many tanks and too few infantrymen.

Is it significant that we will call the larger new brigades "armored" brigades? Does this mean we are abandoning the balanced organization in favor of one that favors tanks? In the past, an armored brigade would have 2 tank battalions and 1 mechanized battalion, each with 3 maneuver companies of their designation. It would be routine for the battalions to swap companies so that each battalion would have 2 tank companies and 1 mechanize company. The companies could swap platoon, too, to create mixed company-sized "teams."

Or is the return to "armored" terminology just a salute to tradition? Or is it just a blanket term for different organizations that might be tank-heavy, balanced, or mechanized infantry-heavy?

After all, we say we will have 14 "infantry" brigades when that clearly has to include paratrooper and air mobile brigades. I assume the infantry brigades will really be motorized infantry (with trucks and lightly armored vehicles), after all, rather than true marching infantry.

There is much to wonder about, including how the Army National Guard's combat units will fit in.

It Shouldn't Just Be the QRF at War

Establishing quick reaction forces in an arc of crisis in case a new Benghazi-type crisis takes place is great, but it doesn't get to the heart of the problem of waging war without thinking we are at war.

I've written that it is an outrage that we didn't rush forces to Benghazi in the 7 or so hours we had before the crisis ended (and we couldn't know it would end in that time, remember). Talk of not having special forces or armed drones in range--as if that is the only force types we could have used--ignores the many forces we did have in range.

Indeed, having forces nearby an arc of crisis from West Africa to Central Asia is one reason I want a robust Army presence in Europe.

So while this development is good for the narrow purpose of reacting to a single event like Benghazi, it does not address the problem of our military not reacting as if it is at war:

One aftereffect of last September’s attack on American diplomats in Libya (killing the U.S. ambassador) is the establishment of a quick reaction force to deal with any similar attacks in the future. One part of this force will be based in Spain and consist of 500 marines and six V-22 tilt rotor transports. The other part of the force will be based in Djibouti (the northwestern neighbor of Somalia) and consist of 200 army troops using helicopters and fixed wing aircraft to get around. The U.S. Navy has long maintained bases in Spain. The Djibouti base is a joint French-American operation. The new quick reaction force will be available for all manner of disasters and emergencies in Africa.

The fact is, we had special forces that could have been sent. This is an organizational response to a problem of attitude--not a problem of assets. If we had been a nation at war--or just a military at war--on September 11, 2012, we could have sent any company of infantry, Military Police, Marines, Air Force base security troops, or whatever was at hand, and sent them toward the sound of the guns at Benghazi.

It doesn't mean we would have dumped them blind into a Mogadishu-like situation. But it would have been on the way and available if we determined while they were on the move that we could use them to good effect.

So will these forces actually be used in a new crisis? We didn't give the order on September 11, 2012. What will be different the next time?

And if jihadis react to our new capablity by staging multiple crises at the same time, and these specialized rescue forces aren't enough, won't we be back at the same problem I am most worried about? Will our military be ready to send what we have even if they aren't designated as the official embassy rescue force?

Will our civilian leaders give the orders to do so?

Are we at war or aren't we?

PSA

While it is surely acceptable to have sex on a couch, one generally assumes you are not alone.

I only say this because there is some confusion out there on this topic.

I'm late to this, I know. I should read more widely, I'm sure.

And if you must, do it in the privacy of your own home.

I am, however, confused about his punishment that bans him from watching pornography.

Is there really Furniture Porn out there? (Glass Top Credenza would be a great furniture porn star name, you have to admit.)

And under the circumstances, shouldn't the man be encouraged to watch human-on-human action?

You're welcome. I know you come here for high quality (but free, so the value is there) military analysis. But sometimes you don't get that.

The First Clue

A final report on American reconstruction efforts is out. The first clue that the report is worthless is the bipartisan agreement on it.

Our civilian spending in Iraq was wasted. If this isn't damning, I don't know what is:

“For all of the good intentions, it was a program replete with challenges, over-promises, setbacks, and shortcomings,” the Republican chairman of the House Middle East subcommittee, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida, noted in the hearing Thursday.

These efforts have been plagued by waste, too, of much of the $60 billion in US taxpayer money used to fund the rebuilding of Iraq, agreed Rep. Ted Deutch (D) of Florida in a rare moment of robust bipartisan unity.

Damning about the comment, that is. You couldn't get an accurate consensus in Congress about how to pour water out of a boot if the instructions were written on the heel. So this is a flashing warning light about error in analysis.

I've made this point before on this pending report and I'll make it again. Money was ammunition in Iraq (and Afghanistan) and trying to judge those programs the way you'd judge domestic programs (which we don't do, anyway--hello Stimulus 2009!) is just wrong.

Let's have an example of supposed waste:

The widely hailed Sons of Iraq (SOI) program, which paid former Sunni insurgents to lay down their arms beginning in 2007, was one of the Pentagon's most widely funded programs. The US military used what were known as Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to pay chiefs to keep their people off the battlefields.

The CERP contracts amounted to 780 separate agreements calling for the stationing of 100,000 Sunnis across Iraq, for a total of $370 million in CERP funds. The workers were supposed to take jobs “providing security for buildings, checkpoints and battlefield.”

Yet the contracting process “was far from transparent,” SIGIR noted. “Program managers could not tell whether SOI members received their US-funded salaries, and Defense was unable to provide any evaluations of the program’s outcomes.”

Financial controls were weak, the report concludes!

Who cares? The purpose of the program was to get Sunni Arabs to stop fighting us and instead fight al Qaeda. Remember? The program worked and was a key to battlefield victory over al Qaeda and Baathist resistance.

Complaining about inefficiency is like ripping the military for using too much ammunition to kill an enemy.

I despair of getting anything useful about the war--or military matters, generally--from our press. With rare exceptions, they are clueless.

No Good War Goes Unpunished

I haven't been pressing the panic button over our prospects for victory in Afghanistan after we leave. I don't have high objectives for our war there, and think that even with a lack of a central government that we can support sub-state actors to resist the Taliban and keep al Qaeda on their heels. But there is a contrary analysis that shares my assumptions about government capacity.

Stratfor is not optimistic about Afghanistan after we leave:

The United States has stated plans to maintain a sizable military presence through 2014, but its ultimate goal is to leave. Washington understands that the Taliban are the single-most powerful force in Afghanistan but also that there are other factions that could block them. However, the United States is not prepared to plunge into the complexities of Afghan politics. Its failures leading up to this moment have left it with no confidence in its ability to do so -- and with no interest in trying. ...

What matters is the military reality on the ground. Karzai does not have a reliable force, and soon there will be virtually no U.S. presence in the country. The Karzai regime's fate is sealed. What may be open is the degree to which the Taliban control the country after the U.S. exit, and whether the pretense that there is such a thing as a Karzai government is maintained. The United States will make some cosmetic concessions to Karzai, but there will be no strategic adjustment.

First, this is pretty damning when you consider that President Obama ordered two separate surges in order to fight the "good" war in Afghanistan. Now, after many added casualties from tripling our troop strength our president doesn't care if we win? That's cold.

Second, I don't assume that the relatively localized Taliban threat can't be beaten with our continued help after 2014. Yes, government forces are infiltrated by Taliban sympathizers. But that doesn't mean the government troops and police still can't be effective enough to defeat the Taliban. Don't assume the Taliban are so monolithic in contrast. They have fissures and defectors, too.

On the other hand, even I thought that our decision to abandon a post-2011 troop presence in Iraq was a mistake, I didn't assume it doomed Iraq. I'm less sure about that. Although external events in Syria are increasing this problem. We still might have an acceptable outcome, depending on our steps in Iraq, and on Iran and Syria are in the future.

It's a shame. Our president talked like Afghanistan was important; sacrificed troops like Afghanistan was important; but seemingly prepares to walk away now like it just doesn't matter to us.

This nuance stuff is making me sick.

Counting Chickens

Jihadis in Syria struck an open blow against non-jihadi rebels by killing a Free Syria Army commander.

It isn't unusual for rebels to look beyond the rebellion. In the Chinese civil war, Nationalists and Communists worried more about each other than they did the Japanese.

So this could be far-sighted or self-destructive, depending on the breaks.

Eleven Years

The Dignified Rant is eleven years old today.

Eight more years and it can drink in Canada.

UPDATE: Many thanks to Instapundit for the shout out.

UPDATE: Note, I fixed this. As the post address indicates. I was once a math major, I'll note.

It's a Funny War

It is against international norms for us to keep jihadis from killing themselves. Meanwhile, jihadis slaughter children as part of their holy war. And people put COEXIST bumper stickers on their cars here?

Behold a brave blow against the Infidels:

Islamic militants attacked a boarding school before dawn Saturday, dousing a dormitory in fuel and lighting it ablaze as students slept, survivors said. At least 30 people were killed in the deadliest attack yet on schools in Nigeria's embattled northeast.

Authorities blamed the violence on Boko Haram, a radical group whose name means "Western education is sacrilege." The militants have been behind a series of recent attacks on schools in the region, including one in which gunmen opened fire on children taking exams in a classroom.

Strategypage has more on the Nigerian scum who think slaughtering children is a God-given mission.

Meanwhile, we force feed jihadis on a hunger strike at Guantanamo Bay and we're to be condemned for this:

A U.S. federal judge ruled Monday that she lacks the authority to halt the force-feeding of prisoners on hunger strike at Guantanamo Bay, while pointedly noting that the practice appears to violate international law and that President Barack Obama can resolve the issue.

I don't get it. Why don't we let them die? When so many jihadis aspire to murder us--or at least kill us in a suicide attack--isn't a jihadi suicide that takes nobody else down progress in the war?

Where's the pro-choice cadre in this? Don't those jihadis have a right to do whatever they want with their own bodies? Including starving themselves to death? Shoot, couldn't we help them kill themselves if we call it a 70th trimester abortion?

It's a funny war. Whether it is receding, or not.

Fun With Maps

Mad Minerva a while back noted the origins of the boundaries that plague the Arab world today.

Which is fine. But both the Arab League and the African Union refuse to even discuss the idea of changing borders short of violence to correct those European mistakes in cartography divorced from tribe, ethnicity, and religion. What price was paid just to get South Sudan? And who in their right mind wants to defend the integrity of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)?

In theory, I'm fine with redrawing their maps.

I opposed it in Iraq because at the time it would have provided Sunni Arab terrorists with a victory by giving them Anbar as a sanctuary. After our battlefield victory, I'm more open to peaceful break up in Iraq, if Iraqis want that.

I've supported it in Syria because it would provide a clear defeat for Assad yet prevent the escape of Assad's chemical arsenal in a more chaotic total defeat--if the latter problem is too great for us to solve otherwise.

I couldn't care less if there is Yemen or North Yemen and South Yemen. You guys decide.

When revolt against Khaddafi spread, I fully expected Libya to divide into east and west (with each reaching out to control what was south of them), with Khaddafi left in the west and the rebels holding the east, roughly lining up with the old pre-Libya regions.

What I didn't expect was that we'd turn a no-fly zone into becoming the rebel air force to defeat Khaddafi completely. Let me tell you, the Russians were caught by surprise by that bait and switch.

So if a peace plan divides Syria up, so what? I'm fine as long as we continue to work against Assad in his rump satrap after chemical weapons are secured.

I did not know this (or forgot it, just as likely):

Applying the principles of self-determination to the Middle East has been contemplated, but never fully realized. President Wilson’s Fourteen Points included a specific reference to self-rule for the Ottoman Empire’s non-Turkish minorities. It was never implemented. After expelling the British-installed Hashemite ruler of Damascus in 1920, France created five separate Levantine states based on the old Ottoman vilayets (“provinces”): Greater Lebanon, an Alawite mountain state, a Druze mountain state, the State of Aleppo, and the State of Damascus. Concerned that a rising Germany was making inroads into its colonies, however, France acquiesced to a unified Syria in 1936, ending the short-lived experiment.

Yeah, seeking a strongman to control the various constituencies instead of self-determination worked swell. To be fair, I guess it worked well enough in the short run.

Funny enough, the Baath parties of Syria and Iraq have been little more than Nazi Party clones masked in Arab nationalism.

Even funnier, the European Union is trying to become a new Ottoman empire to control their own feared nationalities.

Face Plant

Hey! Let's get the hopes of rebels in Syria raised by promising weapons that haven't been cleared by Congress yet!

After 4-1/2 years, the White House has no concept of foreign policy, does it?

Congressional committees are holding up a plan to send U.S. weapons to rebels fighting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad because of fears that such deliveries will not be decisive and the arms might end up in the hands of Islamist militants, five U.S. national security sources said. ...

None of the military aid that the United States announced weeks ago has arrived in Syria, according to an official from an Arab country and Syrian opposition sources.

The Obama administration didn't clear this with the committees first before announcing that we'd help the rebels? Which gives Assad notice about smashing up the rebels first?

Good God, I lamented that the announcement wasn't timed to coincide with arms reaching the rebels. Now we find that the announcement didn't even coincide with getting Congress on board?

In what world does the White House pretend to lecture anybody about competence?

The Midas Touch

So our president in 2009 gave a speech in Cairo reaching out to the Islamic world. President Obama believed President Bush had alienated too many in the Islamic world and wanted to change that.

He sure did. Now both sides in the Egyptian crisis denounce President Obama (tip to Instapundit):

As rival camps of Egyptians protest for and against the toppling of President Mohamed Morsi, there is a rare point of agreement: America is to blame.

Anti-Americanism, which has long been an undercurrent here, is erupting again as Egyptians battle over the future of their country. Each side accuses the United States of backing the other and alleges conspiracies in which the Obama administration is secretly fostering dissent in an attempt to weaken Egypt.

But if you believe our past foreign policy alienated the world and so doing the opposite would get the opposite results, Egypt might cause you to question your paradigm, no?

Wow. I really don't understand this whole nuance thing, at all.