Saturday, August 25, 2012

The PLA Is Dead

China killed the People's Liberation Army:

Over the last three years, without any fanfare, China has changed the names of its armed forces. Gone is the PLA (Peoples Liberation Army) prefix for the navy (PLAN) and air force (PLAAF). It's now just the Chinese Army, Chinese Navy and Chinese Air Force.

I noted this years ago (probably by citing a Strategypage article), but since everyone and their aunt has continued to refer to the Chinese armed forces as the PLA, I doubted that report and didn't follow the change.

But if the patches are showing up, I guess I make the shift official and bury the PLA on this site.

Dereliction of Duty

Governor Huckabee says the Republican Party is "shooting our own soldier" on the battlefield by rejecting Senate candidate Todd Akin?

Oh, please. Akin carried out a green on blue attack against the Republican Party. This is self defense for the GOP.

Patton would have slapped Akin. Hard.

Another Such Victory

The rebels surely suffered a defeat in Aleppo over the last month as the government hammered them, but that doesn't mean that the Assad regime victory in the Battle of Aleppo will contribute to victory in the war.

This article claims the Syrian rebels bit off more than they could chew by trying to capture Aleppo, and that the Syrian government has pounded the rebels:

A MONTH after rebel forces launched a blazing attempt to capture Aleppo, Syria’s second city, they are starting to wilt. The regime claims to have routed them from their main stronghold in the Salaheddin district. Clashes continue in the southwest of the city and around the airport, but the best that rebel commanders can now hope to achieve is to draw the regime into a quagmire.

I won't contest the idea that the rebels took a pounding. Trying to hold ground against a conventional military will do that.

But Assad is the one who bit off more than he could chew:

I think Assad might be biting off more than he can chew. Sure, it is a big and important city with regime defenders to protect, but it is close to Turkey and adds more people to the defense perimeter of Core Syria than I think Assad has the forces to pacify.

Assad had to scrape up so many troops to fight for the city that he had few to hold the rest of the country, which in the east is falling to the rebels in the absence of Syrian security forces.

And now that Assad has knocked down the rebels in Aleppo, Assad has to find the troops to garrison the city of 2+ million people. Where will he get the troops to hold the city? Standard counter-insurgency doctrine says he'll need 40,000+ troops to hold that city. That's a third of the 120,000 ground security forces that Assad was recently judged to have available. Could Assad recruit local defense forces from Aleppo residents to be an effective substitute for all but a fraction of that 40,000?

Given that the rebels are disorganized, even a thorough hammering of the Aleppo rebels won't affect the other rebels in the rest of Syria--aside from the positive effect of sucking Syrian troops into the black hole of Aleppo.

Before long, rebels from the surrounding countryside will reinforce the Aleppo rebels and the fight there will continue.

Truly, another such victory will be the undoing of Assad.

Every Fern is Sacred

It seems like every decade or so, we learn that stomping out every small wild fire just allows fuel to build up for a really big, destructive forest fire (tip to Mad Minerva):

"What kept those forests open before was the natural process of fire," Allen says. Natural fires from lightning burn along the ground, taking out only the shrubs and small trees. But for the last century, the U.S. Forest Service has suppressed almost all fires. They thought fire did more harm than good.

But radical environmentalists insist that every fern is sacred, so we never actually change our destructive practice.

Every Fern is sacred.
Every Fern is great.
If a fern is wasted
Gaea gets quite irate.

But since the practice is all about making sure environmentalists can believe they care more than others about the forest rather than protecting the forest, the policies continue and we can look forward to more of this new normal.

Heck, it's win-win if they can blame this on global climate change rather than man's policies about the forest.

Why Do They Hate Masonry?

What doesn't set jihadis off on waves of death and destruction?

Ever since 9/11, liberals have tried to explain the attack by asking "why do they hate us?' and then providing reasons we need to do something we aren't doing, stop something we are doing, or just stop being us in order to satisfy the grievances of the Moslem world that regrettably inspire a small number of jihadis who kill us, and a larger number that either gets some satisfaction from the killing or is too worried or apathetic to stop the jihadis themselves. The president's Cairo speech was just another aspect of that thinking: see, we really, really respect you! Now stop that whole killing thing, 'kay?

What doesn't set these murderous jerks off on an orgy of destruction?

Conservative Islamists blew up the tomb of a 15th century Sufi scholar and burned down a library in the Libyan city of Zlitan, a military official said on Saturday, the latest attacks on sites in the region branded idolatrous by some sects.

They used bombs and bulldozers.

Apparently, these guys didn't get the memo that the Palestinian question needs to be settled first before they settle the dust over tombs and libraries that offend them. Go figure.

I wouldn't mind this mindless urge to destroy if we were clear-headed enough to fight back with confidence. My question has always been why do we hate us? Why can't we stand up for our civilization and values with the self assurance needed to deny the legitimacy of whatever excuse of the day that jihadis throw at us to justify killing us--or blowing up shrines and historic sites?

As I've often asked over the years, what doesn't set these nutballs off? Good grief, just kill the nutballs and don't lose any sleep over it.

And These Are Significant ... How?

Those who say attacking Iran's nuclear facilities would be counter-productive amuse me--in a we're so screwed if our so-called best and brightest believe this rot sort of way. They simultaneously dismiss the problem of Iran's nukes and inflate the ability of Iran to counter-attack. All while denying that Iran has any nuclear ambitions that are really dangerous, anyway. These arguments are, to use a technical term, "stupid."

We have another contestant in the genre. This time from Britain:

First and foremost, war with Iran would be a terrible option for Israel. The Iranian people would probably respond to outside attack by rallying behind their leaders and strengthening a deeply unpopular regime.

Iran would hit back through Hizbollah in Lebanon and by trying to close the Strait of Hormuz, imposing civilian casualties on Israel and a grave burden on the global economy. In Syria, Bashar al-Assad would have the opportunity to pose alongside Iran as a dual victim of a Zionist plot.

The best that Israel’s air force could achieve would be to delay – not derail – Iran’s nuclear ambitions. ...

In fact, the military option might well be wholly counterproductive. The American, British and Israeli governments all share the same assessment of Iran’s intentions: they believe the country’s leaders want the ability to build a nuclear weapon, but have not yet decided whether to actually go ahead and exercise the option.

Let's address the significance of the objections--folly-wise.

Let's see, somehow having an Iran with people who love their Israel-hating rulers would be more dangerous than having an Iran with people who hate their Israel-hating rulers. Why? In what way would Iran's rulers behave differently toward Israel if Iran's people rallied around the flag? The key is the question of whether Iran's rulers hate Israel and whether they have nukes. Would it really be comforting for Israelis to know that the majority of Iran's people really feel really, really awful about how their government nuked Israel?

Plus, I don't accept the premise. Perhaps in the short run there will be some rally around the flag effect. But in time, the people will resume their dislike for all the things they hate about the regime that impoverishes them and oppresses them and kills them. Remember, we had a rally-around-the-flag effect here after 9/11. But by 2004, the Democratic Party no longer rallied around the president; by 2008, a majority of the voters no longer rallied around the president and his party; and by 2012, a majority of the people no longer rally around the war in Afghanistan begun in the aftermath of 9/11.

Second, looking at ways Iran might fight back isn't a reason not to attack Iran--it's a reason to prepare for overt war. Remember, Iran has already killed lots of Americans in Iraq (and British troops, too, who held the Basra region for so long), in Afghanistan, in Lebanon (in the 1980s), and that whole embassy invasion thing. Iran has been at war with the West since they took power.

But what of those counter-attacks?

Hezbollah doesn't seem so eager to fight at Iran's side when Iran is not physically at their side. Hezbollah will be all by themselves if they attack Israel since Assad is busy, Iran is far away, and Hamas is weak. If Hezbollah does fight, Israel will defeat them and Iran will lose another tool.

Will Iran try to close the Strait of Hormuz? Maybe. But closing it hurts them, too. They might not try to close it and simply try to survive and rebuild without further damage. But they might try to close Hormuz. And we will try to keep it open. The last time Iran tried to interfere with traffic in the Persian Gulf, we kept the waterway open. I imagine we can do it again. I imagine that lots of Europeans who didn't care if Iran nukes Israel will care that oil no longer flows to them. Like in the 1980s, European ships will join our fleet.

Don't forget that Iran's military is very weak in the air and at sea, where sanctions have a bigger effect than on ground troops. If Iran's screeching and fling poo don't scare us off, we will prevail and smash Iran's attempts to close the strait.

And so what if Iran and Syria pose as victims of a Zionist plot? Don't they do that every day? Assad tried that early in the crisis and the people didn't respond by rallying around the flag.

You do recall that Israel in 2007 bombed Syria's reactor under construction with North Korean assistance, right? Yet in 2011, that horrible memory of being under Israeli attack didn't stop Syrians from revolting against their rulers. Huh.

Further, so what if the attack only buys time? Of course it only buys time! Who in the world ever claimed that it would be the perfect solution that solved the problem of nuts with nukes for the rest of eternity?

But we need that time! Heck, maybe in a few years, after that rally-around-the-flag effect has worn off, Iranians will revolt and we might actually support that revolt rather than reach out to the dangerous mullahs who rule Iran.

The last objection, that Iran hasn't actually made the decision to possess a nuclear bomb rather than just the ability to rapidly build a nuclear bomb is just idiotic.

One, if the decision is real rather than subterfuge to keep us from attacking until Iran can build a bomb, doesn't that undermine the idea that Iran wants nukes to deter us? After all, nukes only deter an American attack if the nukes exist. Having "the ability to build a nuclear weapon" rather than having an actual nuclear weapon arguably reduces deterrence rather than strengthens it, no?

And if Iran doesn't really worry that we will complete our decades-long preparations to invade them and have a go at them, but wants nukes for other reasons, what is the difference between having the capability to build nukes quickly and having some nukes?

Iran will still have the prestige of being a nuclear power that will intimidate enemies and either inspire those neighbors to slowly slide into Iran's orbit or seek nuclear weapons on their own. Welcome to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. How counter-productive is failing to stop Iran when you consider that?

Then there is the problem of whether or not having a nuke or two will lead Iran to make good on their rulers' vision of a world without Israel, who they famously believe is a "one-nuke state" vulnerable to destruction by only a single well-placed nuclear explosion.

In the end, the objections are just an excuse to do nothing.

Oh, the writer has one last attempt to appear non-idiotic. He says that if we detect Iran making an effort to turn capabilities into hardware, our calculations would change and he implies we would have the option of attacking.

Right. Our record on that isn't very good. And gathering the will and assets to do the job would take time--perhaps too much time to stop that decision to build hardware. Or does the British author think America should keep sufficient military forces poised around Iran in perpetuity in order to keep that option alive?

In the end, I'd bet that we would fail to detect Iran's crossing of the nuclear threshold in time to stop them. And once Iran has nukes, you can bet the calculations will change again--sorry, chaps, it is too late to do anything at all about Iran's nukes. Blood shame.

Iran under the mullahs with nukes is a problem the world should not try to justify, explain, or blow up into a problem too great to be solved. We should destroy the Iranian regime and if we can't do that, we must delay their possession of nuclear weapons capabilities for as long as possible.

Friday, August 24, 2012

Stay Hopey My Friends

What with recent news that President Obama thinks he is usually the most interesting man in any given room; and that the White House has its own home brewery (Please, we all know he is a wine and soft cheese kind of guy who has discovered beer in time for the election campaign), I thought that a parody of the Dos Equis Most Interesting Man in the World beer commercial would be in order.

But the Republicans already did:



Pretty funny, actually.

Well, Then, It's Settled

If Assad is on board the idea that he won't use chemical weapons against the rebellion, what will he do to change the losing course he is on?

We warn the Syrians not to use or move chemical weapons. Russia guarantees that Assad won't use or move chemical weapons. And now Britain warns Assad not to use chemical weapons:

Mr Cameron and Mr Obama both agreed "that the use - or threat - of chemical weapons was completely unacceptable and would force them to revisit their approach so far", said the spokesman.

So we have a consensus. No chemical weapons. Like I've said, I don't think Assad could salvage his position by using chemical weapons. And he'd just beg for a UN-blessed intervention. But you never can tell if Assad thinks otherwise. But if his only hope for significant help isn't to be alienated, Assad has to fulfill that Russian guarantee.

But as I've been arguing for a while, Assad can't win the way he is fighting. Something dramatic needs to happen. The rebels are having enough success that I don't think they suddenly collapse from poor morale. Indeed, the danger is far higher that there will be a collapse of the army under the stress of constant combat for a year and a half now.

And I can't imagine a political settlement at this point.

Assad simply needs a better troop-to-population ratio. So either he needs a lot more troops--several hundred thousand--from some source; or he needs to try to control fewer people. I don't see any other militarily feasible answer to his basic problem.

In theory, he could conscript every able-bodied male from the Alawite and allied communities, but he couldn't keep that many people under arms for long without destroying the economy. Counter-insurgencies aren't fast. And training that many people quickly would be tough--even for basic duties like holding strongpoints or patrolling roads.

Iran couldn't possibly send that many.

Russia couldn't possibly send that many.

And the Sunni world is far more likely to send recruits for the rebels. And couldn't possibly send that many, in any case.

I just don't see any alternative but to contract his perimeter. At worst, with what he has, he could retreat to a Rump Alawite state in the coastal mountain region.

Or add a buffer zone to the east encompassing the region from Aleppo to Homs.

Perhaps a southern buffer in the northwestern part of Lebanon would be considered.

Or even my original Core Syria idea of a truncated Syria that extends from Idlib down to the Israeli and Jordanian borders along that main Aleppo to Jordan highway, including Damascus, in order to retain the UN seat as Syria. But that would require more troops than Assad has now. Perhaps a combination of the above sources of security forces could expand Assad's ground forces enough to hold that. But I doubt it now.

I freely admit that such a contraction could be a disaster, in practice. South Vietnam couldn't pull it off in 1975. But it might be the only choice Assad has left.

Settling the question of chemical weapons use is comforting, but it doesn't settle the question of how does Assad possibly win this fight.

UPDATE: Oh, and I meant to also ask what Russia has promised Assad in exchange for making Russia's guarantee valid. I'm thinking the Security Council veto, money, fuel, arms, marines and ships in Tartus, and a paratrooper regiment along the border with Turkey--however short that border might be at the end of the day.

I don't think Russia would have made the guarantee without Assad's pledge not to use chemical weapons since there is no way that Russia could effectively intervene to stop Western intervention if chemical weapons use prompts intervention.

Thursday, August 23, 2012

The Russian Guarantee

Russia, which has warned the West against intervening in Syria, has denied that President Obama's trigger for intervention is valid:

Russia is working closely with the Syrian government to ensure that its arsenal of chemical weapons remains under firm control and has won promises that the weapons of mass destruction will not be used or moved, Moscow's point man on Syria told The Associated Press on Thursday.

Interesting. Russia guarantees the security of Syrian chemical arms?

Will Russia deploy paratroopers to physically make good on that guarantee?

Will Assad not need to even move chemical arms within whatever defense perimeter Assad decides to hold?

Do we believe the Russian guarantee?

Do we want Russia to be the guarantor of Syria's chemical weapons if it means Russian troops are put on the ground there?

That's an interesting guarantee that Russia has made. What does it mean in practice?

UPDATE: Russia says they have Assad's guarantee that he will not use chemical weapons against the rebels:

Russia is working closely with the Syrian government to ensure that its arsenal of chemical weapons remains under firm control and has won promises that the weapons of mass destruction will not be used or moved, Moscow's point man on Syria told The Associated Press on Thursday.

How closely are they working? Are Russians providing physical security? Are they really promising not to move chemical weapons?

As a matter of curiosity, did we know that Russia had Assad's guarantee before we warned Assad not to use or move his chemical weapons? That's mostly a rhetorical question. I assume Russia really wants to provide President Obama some "space" to get that second-term "flexibility" that President Obama promised the Russians.

NOTE: My apologies for the update that repeated the initial article link and quote. Wow. Clearly I had another article in mind. Bad day to quit sniffing glue, obviously.

Seeing How Isolated Iran Is

We're told that attacking Iran's nuclear infrastructure risks the great global coalition we've assembled to punish Iran through economic sanctions and demonstrate to Iran how "isolated" Iran is. I don't think that word means what they think it means:

Israel on Thursday warned UN chief Ban Ki-moon and other world leaders not to fall into an Iranian propaganda "trap" when they attend a summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Tehran next week. ...

The Non-Aligned Movement has 119 state members, as well as the Palestinian Authority.

Among top-level delegates who will be attending the summit are Egypt's President Mohamed Morsi, Cuban leader Raul Castro and India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

Fifty-one nations and the UN plus others will attend.

Yeah, wouldn't want to spoil that hard-won "isolation" by eliminating Iran's nuclear threat by attacking Iran.

UPDATE: Iran has high hopes:

The Islamic Republic's three-year tenure of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which starts on Sunday, is a chance for Tehran to elevate its international standing as the United States seeks to cripple its economy and isolate it diplomatically over its nuclear program.

Yeah, smart diplomacy sure has demonstrated to Iran that the world is united to stop Iran's nuclear drive.

Unintended Consequences

Has anyone noticed that the UN Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS, or less charitably, LOST), which we supposedly need to ratify to endorse international law concerning the seas, is the very reason that the South China Sea has become a hot spot that could trigger a major power war from a number of angles?

[China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Taiwan] each claim parts of the territory based on what is known as UNCLOS, or the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which says nations can claim an Exclusive Economic Zone extending 200 nautical miles into the waters surrounding their coastlines. They may also make further claims based on the continental shelf extending from their shores.


Since a lot of natural resources lie under the sea bed, controlling the seas above those resources--which the Law of the Sea allows, is now important. Important enough to go to war over.

Remember, as I've noted before, LOST says nothing about how to determine ownership of the islands that form the basis of those 200 nautical mile economic zones.

The UN. Is there anything it can't make worse?

Fighting Nonstate Actors

This opinion piece from the Strategic Studies Institute wants the Army to focus on post-Westphalian conditions for fighting nonstate actors:

Moreover, nation-states, their proxies, and nonstate actors who perpetrate unconventional, undeclared, asymmetric conflicts throughout the global community can and do take de facto political control of geographical and human portions of traditional nation-states. When they do, they create quasi-states within the state. Whether or not motives are political, commercial, or ideological — or to control or to replace governments — is irrelevant. The fact is that these activities make a joke of traditional sovereignty. At the same time, law and security depend completely on the whim of terrorist, insurgent, criminal, or gang leaders. This makes a joke out of citizen (human) rights, and the notion of democracy. Inadvertent or deliberate, any and all of these actions compel radical change and define both insurgency and war.

In general, I have to agree that we need a new approach to fighting these nonstate actors. Indeed, the issue of essentially privatized warfare (at only 99 cents, it is a virtual steal, if I do say so) is part of this new environment that denies states a monopoly on lawful use of military force.

But one thing that I believe is overstated is the focus on the nonstate actors. Yes, we need new ways to combat them. But do not forget that nonstate actors generally only become serious threats when they have state sponsors. Take down those old-fashioned Westphalian states and the nonstate actors that rely on them for sanctuary, training, weapons, money, and intelligence, are far weaker than they are with state support.

And conventional armed forces are really good at hammering conventional states.

By all means, explore how we can fight nonstate actors in a post-Westphalian world with military and non-military means. And look out how we can use nonstate assets to fight these nonstate actors as well as their state sponsors.

But don't neglect the aspect of simply destroying the regime that supports nonstate actors who would make a joke of human rights, democracy, and sovereignty.

Let the Man Do His Job

Our military goes to war with the objectives and forces that our civilian leaders provide them. That's the way it is supposed to be. So why is there a conservative complaint that Marine Lieutenant General Dunford, the likely choice to lead the Afghanistan campaign, has voiced support for the president's strategy there?

I don't quite understand this:

Insiders like Korb don't expect Dunford to make any major changes to the current NATO and U.S. strategy, which calls for building a huge Afghan national security force and handing more and more territory to them between now and the end of 2014. "This means the status is going to hold," Korb says.

But, as with most issues these days, conservatives scoffed at the pick.

"He's a lousy pick if our goal is victory, but a good pick if you're sitting in the Oval Office and want a yes man," says Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute.

What the Hell? I expect any general to support the president publicly and provide honest advice in private. If a general can't do that, they can resign and exercise their right as a private citizen to express their dissent.

I may not be happy that we have set a deadline for our operations. I understand the need to reduce troops over time and turn over fighting responsibility to Afghans. That's Counterinsurgency 101.

But Dunford's duty is to do the best he can with the objectives he has and the troops he is given for those objectives. I have no reason to think that Dunford cannot do that.

And I sure don't expect him to have established a reputation for undermining civilian leadership. I may not have much respect for the commander-in-chief, but he is the commander-in-chief.

If conservatives want to complain about President Obama's policies, feel free--it is a target-rich environment, as the expression goes. Criticism of military strategy is obviously open, too. But don't complain about the general in charge for obeying his lawful orders.

There are worse things than having a lousy commander-in-chief. Like having an officer corps that feels free to advocate its own policies against the will of civilian leadership.

Being a Conservative for a Day

Tom Friedman focuses the awesome power of his big brain on what conservatives need to do (tip to National Review Online):

America today desperately needs a serious, thoughtful, credible 21st-century “conservative” opposition to President Obama, and we don’t have that, even though the voices are out there.

That's funny. Tom Friedman thinks that Republicans can run from being reasonably benighted despots and become reasonably enlightened autocrats in service of progress?

His concern for conservatives is touching.

Hey, you know what we really need? A truly "liberal" party.

I'll say it again because it is true (and because I really like saying it): I'm not saying you can't drown in a pool of Tom Friedman's wisdom, but you would have to be drunk and face down to do so.

Wednesday, August 22, 2012

Are You Kidding Me?

I'm hearing criticism and outrage from the left that former Navy SEALs and intelligence officers are slamming the president for leaking intelligence about how our special operators work in the field. Even the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff criticised them.

This outrage by our Democratic friends is outrageous. Former military personnel have every right to comment on political issues. General Dempsey, on the other hand, should stay out of political issues and has no right to criticize civilians for voicing opinions about our president. If Dempsey wants to explain why they are wrong, I welcome his view. But otherwise, he is the one stepping outside his lane.

Further, in what is the most annoying part of this episode,I can hardly believe the left is slamming the former SEALS and intelligence agents given the way that the anti-war side celebrated former intelligence officers who criticized the Iraq War and said we couldn't win, former military officers who said we could not win, and even a serving American military officer who criticized the Iraq War.

My God, getting a former soldier to condemn the war was the freaking Holy Grail of the anti-war left, and they didn't even care if the so-called soldier ever served in Iraq--or was even a soldier!

Gosh, it seems like only yesteradministration when dissent was patriotic.

You don't like what those citizens who used to be Navy SEALs are saying? Criticize them. Note that in the post on the former officers I specifically affirmed their right to express their opinion even as I wrote how they got their criticisms wrong.

But demand they shut up and salute their former commander-in-chief like good sailors? Bite me.

UPDATE: Victor Hanson has thoughts.

Not That There's Anything Wrong With That ...

Vice President Biden shared a bit too much:

Joe Biden: “I’ve known eight presidents, and three of them intimately.”

I'm going to go with both Bushes and the Johnson ...

How Will This Play Out?

Are Syria's threats about their civil war spilling over in the region being played out in Lebanon? And what will the end game be? Would Assad try to add pieces of Lebanon to his new and shrunken realm?

The Russians themselves warned that outside intervention would lead to a wider war.

Lebanon has seen some fighting spill over from Syria, and it might be intensifying:

The death toll from fighting between Sunni Muslims and Alawites in Tripoli climbed to at least 10 [NOTE: and over 100 wounded] overnight, medical sources said on Wednesday, in clashes that the city's residents described as some of the heaviest since Lebanon's civil war.

There is suspicion that this spill over isn't just happening as a natural consequence of fighting in Syria:

As Syria’s civil war drags on, the recent arrest of a former Lebanese government minister allied with the Syrian leadership on charges that he planned a campaign of bombings and assassinations has led many in Lebanon to conclude that President Bashar al-Assad is trying to push this fragile country into a sectarian war.

Lebanon is somewhat of a mess of divided loyalties:


I got that map from Juan Cole's site, which I don't find particularly useful (and notice how he doesn't get much attention now that Bush is gone--who knows, perhaps he isn't as bad now that he isn't trying to hammer Bush).

Indeed, one of the reasons I wondered about Assad creating an Alawite Rump Syria plus a buffer to the east is the example of Lebanon. Eastern Lebanon was grafted on to the core Christian coastal zone to give the state some depth.

But Syria never accepted that eastern Lebanon was part of Lebanon. Remember that Syria's occupation zone in Lebanon--originally sanctioned to end the civil war there--ran through much of the non-Christian areas of Lebanon:


Would Assad try to add some north-south depth by annexing northeast Lebanon? Say from a point south of Tripoli on the coast to encompass Christian areas and then inland to Balabakk and then east to the border to incorporate the good road lading to Homs? Would the annexation be informal as Syria's occupation of portions of Lebanon was before? Or done through proxies?

Much depends on how far Assad wants to retreat, what he thinks he needs to rule after that retreat, and what Russia is prepared to do in support.

It's quite possible that Assad really intends to fight for all of Syria and win or lose that battle. But I can't see how he could pull that off successfully.

I admit my speculation on a Core Syria (which no longer seems defensible given the erosion of Assad's security forces), a Rump Alawite Syria, and a Rump + Buffer Syria (and now a Rump/Buffer plus Southern Buffer Syria) is purely a map exercise without analysis of whether any of those are viable as a state. But they have the advantage from Assad's point of view of leaving his people in charge at the end of the day. And if Assad can keep Russian (and Iranian, and to a lesser extent, Chinese) support, he might have no choice but to try one of them.

Assad Must Be Desperate

The risk of defecting pilots, the difficulty of maintaining aircraft, the availability of artillery assets, and the risk of provoking a Western no-fly zone were all reasons I thought Assad wouldn't risk his air force in the fight. But he is committing his planes to battle:

Its forces stretched thin on multiple fronts, President Bashar Assad's regime has significantly increased its use of air power against Syrian rebels in recent weeks, causing a spike in civilian casualties.

The aircraft have been lower tech trainers fitted with weapons, which eases the maintenance hurdle.

But if Assad can't keep his ground forces creaking along, he certainly can't maintain an aerial tempo for long. This will be another resource that he depletes. Perhaps Assad thinks he can't use this weapon long enough to provoke a Western no-fly zone so it is simply a free asset to take some pressure off his worn out ground forces.

Ultimately, if Assad wants to keep using his air power, he will need Russian support to keep the West from imposing a no-fly zone; and he will need Russian help to keep the planes flying. That could mean sending in contractor pilots and maintenance personnel in addition to arms, and target information from satellites and intelligence.

Is Russia all-in for Assad?

Commandeer-in-Chief

President Obama says that the choice is our defense budget or a tax increase:

President Obama said Monday the “the only thing” allowing the sequestration to proceed is Republicans’ unwillingness to raise certain taxes[.]

I guess our president doesn't think he'll need to order our SEAL teams into action again.

Well, There You Go

Do we really know what China's amphibious lift capabilities are?

My views on a Chinese invasion of Taiwan rely on China using amphibious lift assets drawn from the civilian fleet and older warships allocated for use as assault ships crammed with light infantry. Critics of China's ability to invade Taiwan focus on the lack of formal amphibious warfare assets and I believe this is terribly United States Marine Core-centric. We are unique in history in having such robust organized amphibious warfare capability and others don't need (and haven't needed) that narrowly focused capability to invade if they are willing to endure the higher casualties (or can gain surprise by landing at undefended points).

My Jane's email update highlights this capability:

The Chinese military launched a 36,000-tonne 'Bohai Sea Green Pearl' ferry vessel on 8 August at Yantai Port in Shandong Province. The vessel has a dual design that allows it to serve as a civilian transport ship and as an 'amphibious augmentation platform' allowing troop and heavy equipment transport. According to Chinese media, the platform is Asia's largest, most advanced and most luxurious commercial cruise ship and was developed as part of a civilian-military integration strategic development project intended to enhance passenger transport in Bohai Bay while reinforcing strategic maritime delivery capabilities for continental Chinese military forces[.]

Don't underestimate the ability of the Chinese to hit Taiwan. Remember, China doesn't have to defeat our Navy and Air Force in order to conquer Taiwan. China just needs to conquer Taiwan before we can intervene in force sufficient to be decisive.