Can't Risk that Moderate Level of Confidence

Our intelligence agencies are pretty sure that Iran stopped their narrowly defined military nuclear programs in 2003. They have only moderate confidence that they haven't been restarted since. Yet our media and permanent foreign policy elites have concluded that Iran is not a threat.

So Iran's Supreme Leader makes an interesting admission when he declines to want ties with America:

Khamenei said restoring ties with the U.S. now would "provide opportunity for security agents to come and go, as well as for espionage."

"It has no benefit for Iranian nation," state radio quoted him as saying at a student group meeting in the central province of Yazd. It would be an "opportunity for U.S. infiltration, traffic of their intelligence agents and espionage of Iran."

People often ask why we are "afraid" to talk to enemies. Will anybody ask this about Iran?

No. Because we know why Iran doesn't want open relations with America. They can't have an inconvenient truth exposed that Iran is still hell bent on getting nukes, now can they?

People in the West are devoting their lives to worrying about carbon footprints when all I really care about are plutonium footprints. Silly me.

But perhaps Ahmadinejad will buy nice carbon offsets to make up for detonating a low-yield nuke or two. Then it will be planet friendly!

The Audacity of Dopes

Why do people who know nothing about defense matters insist on lecturing on defense matters?

Glenn Greenwald (tip to Weekly Standard), a case in point, believes that we spend too much money on defense:

Our military spending exceeds the rest of the world's spending combined, and we spend almost 10 times what the second-place country, China, spends. "Only" about $150 billion of the total U.S. amount is attributable to the two active wars we're fighting, in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, even if one wants to excludes those amounts, the basic picture remains the same. ...

In indisputable sum, we are the world's empire, in a state of permanent war readiness. In American politics and policy, there is no distinction between "peacetime" and "war." We're the most militarized country in the world by far, on permanent war footing, far beyond what anyone could ever remotely argue is necessary for "defense" or a "strong defense," no matter how broad a definition one wants to adopt for those terms.

Let's recount his cluelessness. Stay with me, this will take a bit. Allow me the privilege of simply ignoring the foolish "empire" remark.

One, since 2002 it has formally been the policy of the United States to maintain a margin of superiority that it will discourage potential enemies from even trying to match us:

We know from history that deterrence can fail; and we know from experience that some enemies cannot be deterred. The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy—whether a state or non-state actor—to impose its will on the United States, our allies, or our friends. We will maintain the forces sufficient to support our obligations, and to defend freedom. Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.

If we were talking about any social program this would be called a wise preventative measure that saves money in the long run by forestalling the need to spend much more if we wait to solve a problem after it emerges. Anybody want to wonder if the Twin Towers would be standing today if we had taken bin Laden into captivity in the mid-1990s? We still spend less of our GDP on defense than we did in the Cold War, so this burden is not going to break us.

Second, we spend money to avoid spending lives. Our budget pays for excellent equipment and thorough training that spares both our troops and civilians in the battle area.

Third, a lot of our budget goes to personnel compensation and payments to veterans.

Fourth, we have a significant nuclear force whose purpose is solely to keep conflicts from going nuclear and which do not add to our conventional combat ability. China does not have anywhere near the cost we have. Most countries don't have this cost at all.

Fifth, basing spending comparisons with a starting point of 1998 starts us nearly a decade into the "procurement holiday" where our defense spending declined as our military was reduced in size. We could get away with not buying new equipment because as we cut force levels, the best of the equipment we had could be given to remaining units and we still had plenty of spare equipment in reserve. We actually did judge we were in peacetime and reduced our spending quite a bit. Since 9/11, spending has gone back up. The problem isn't that our country doesn't recognize the difference between peace and war, but that our Left doesn't really believe we are at war. If our enemies don't stop trying to kill us, in what world does it make sense to simply stop fighting those enemies?

Sixth, we are a global superpower. Unlike any other country in the world, we can deploy our military anywhere on the globe to defend our interests and our allies, supply it, and win a war. Even wealthy Europe couldn't spearhead two fairly minor military interventions in the nearby Balkans in the 1990s. Unless you find it acceptable to fight with China east of Hawaii should it come to war rather than off of China's coast, don't talk about the cost of fighting away from our homeland. We saw what terrorists can do to us when they wage war on our soil. Don't think a nation with that capability would do less harm.

Seventh, in regard to China, our military is surely far superior to their military and will remain so for decades, I judge. Although Peking's lack of transparency about defense spending is definitely a worry in the long run. But remember that in 1941, Japan's economy was about a tenth of ours. China's is what? Forty percent of ours? Like Japan in 1941, China today can threaten us just by being able to project power into their own neighborhood. If China can dominate the air over and water around Taiwan only 100 miles from their coast for several weeks, Taiwan could fall and we'd see quite the fallout. It would be a signal event demonstrating our inability to protect allies close to China. The effect on India, Pakistan, Central Asia, South Korea, Japan, Southeast Asia, and Australia could shake our alliances and friendships.

I count our country lucky to be able to afford enough defense spending to actually, you know, defend ourselves from actual and potential enemies. Is that actually "too broad" of a definition? What other country can actually say that they spend enough to protect themselves? I mean what country that doesn't count on us to defend them can say that?

Funny enough, the ranks of those who say we spend too much include many who say we failed to equip or train our troops properly for the war--supposed deficiencies that would cost money to correct. Pick a complaint, people. Do we spend too little or too much? Pick only one.

Hey, for those who think a film critic is qualified to opine on foreign policy, I guess his piece is about par for the course. Heck, it even has color charts!

Give me a break. I won't comment on the costume authenticity of Off-Broadway plays if people like Greenwald will stop offering advice on defense policy.

You've got to know your limitations.

The Taliban Campaign

Since the summer, I've noted the increased jihadi attention to Pakistan and predicted that Pakistan would become the next front--the Taliban Campaign. I also argued that the Pakistanis would need to welcome more of our direct help in their western frontier regions to battle the greater threat.

More analysts are coming to the same conclusion:

"Pakistan should be carefully watched because it could prove to be a significant flashpoint in the coming year," US think tank Strategic Forecasting said in an evaluation of al-Qa'ida's tactics as the Islamist group comes under mounting pressure in Iraq.

With the "rapid spread of Talibanisation" in Pakistan's insurgent northwest, the country would become "especially important if the trend in Iraq continues to go against the jihadis and they are driven from Iraq", the assessment says.

"As the global headquarters for the al-Qa'ida leadership, Pakistan has long been a significant stronghold on the ideological battlefield. If the trend towards radicalisation continues, the country could become the new centre of gravity for the jihadi movement on the physical battlefield."

The Stratfor assessment coincided with reports from Washington suggesting US Special Forces would expand their presence in Pakistan in the new year.

While the issue of Pakistani nuclear weapons makes this campaign appear the most dangerous yet, I don't think the jihadis can draw to an inside straight and seize control of Pakistan.

Indeed, by taking what was once their secure rear area and turning it into an active front, the jihadis may be on their last jihad.

A Dangerous Vote

The United States claims that a Taiwanese referendum planned for March on whether the island democracy should be independent or still claim to be part of one China is dangerous:

Washington has repeatedly criticized the planned vote.

"We think that Taiwan's referendum to apply to the United Nations under the name Taiwan is a provocative policy," Rice said last month. "It unnecessarily raises tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and it promises no real benefits for the people of Taiwan on the international stage."

Perhaps. By this view, a vote for independence will only provoke China to invade Taiwan.

Given that China is building up forces and consistently claims Taiwan, I get the feeling that invading is a matter of calculating the balance of forces and not any Taiwanese declaration. As far as Peking is concenred, Taiwan's de facto independence must be ended regardless of the legal situation.

Further, I've come to think that Taiwan made a mistake not declaring independence between 1992 after the Soviet Union collapsed and 1996 after the Chinese fired missiles over Taiwan but before Chinese arms build ups reached today's point.

If that logic still hold true, might not the Taiwanese one day regret failing to press for independence now? Rather than just wait for China to decide to attack, shouldn't we be looking for an opportune time to have Taiwan declare independence when China cannot effectively respond?

In one sense, that is what Taiwan is doing--sort of--by having a vote on "independence." One thing that isn't considered, however, is the impact of the Taiwanese voting "no" on that question.

Given all the talk of a "yes" vote provoking an invasion, the irony is that a "no" vote might simply provide China with the justification for doing what they have always claimed they will do--absorb Taiwan and make it part of China even if they must use military force. If the Taiwanese vote no, the Chinese could claim to be rescuing the Taiwanese who have declared at the ballot their desire to be part of China.

If the Taiwanese vote on this question, the least dangerous vote for them is a "yes" vote. If the Chinese really want a smooth Olympics, the Chinese will have to quietly accept the declaration for many months--perhaps missing a window to strike while the disruption of the status quo is fresh. Or, if the Chinese aren't planning to attack Taiwan this year, ramping up an invasion as a result of the vote before the Chinese think they are ready might lead to a Chinese military defeat.

Or, if China attacks prior to the Olympics, at least their claim to be speaking for Taiwanese will be obviously false and the Taiwanese may have a stronger sense of freedom that will boost their morale and ability to hold out until we can help or even defeat the Chinese. On the downside, there might be a smaller chance that the United States and Japan will intervene if the Chinese strike quickly.

Interesting times.

Kiss My Largess

European elites want a European Union that can defend itself and rise to superpower status. While many spoke of a nuanced soft superpower, others spoke of a common foreign policy and an EU military structure separate from NATO. Either objective seems to grow less likely as time goes on. The Europeans simply won't spend the money to create the military they need to match their boundless ambition. And the fruitless European talks with Iran the last four years over their nuclear programs don't exactly strike me as an example of soft power defending European interests. Still, many here would welcome a stronger EU to check our power.

If the Euros can't out power us softly or with hard power, these people uncomfortable with American power will settle for Europeans directing American soft and hard power. Their fallback position is to make America the ideal European Union that cannot be built. You see, Europeans want American leadership again. But funny enough, they want us to lead them to where they already want to go:

Of course, the America that the world wants back is not the one that preemptively invades potential enemies, bullies allies or disdains international law. The demand is for an America that rallies other nations prone to sitting on the fence while international crises are boiling out of control; for a superpower that comes up with innovative initiatives to tackle the great challenges of the day, such as climate change, nuclear proliferation and violent Islamist fundamentalism. The demand is for an America that enforces the rules that facilitate international commerce and works effectively to stabilize an accident-prone global economy. Naturally, the world also wants a superpower willing to foot the bill with a largess that no other nation can match.

Of course not? Can't have America being America. Pity that an America of that high-minded largess didn't exist in 1917, 1941, and the entire Cold War era to preserve Western civilization when Europeans were too bloodthirsty smashing Europe apart from within or too exhausted to defend it from external threats. Good grief. The absolute nerve of this position is enraging.

Preemptively invading potential enemies? The Afghanistan Campaign followed 9/11 and was blessed by NATO. In regard to Iraq, we were already at war with Iraq having violated the terms of the ceasefire. And the United Nations has repeatedly blessed our presence there. Who did we preemptively invade without any cause or recent history ? Cuba? Venezuela? Iran? North Korea? Syria? Sudan? China? Anybody??

We bully allies? Our allies leave Iraq when they want if they came to help at all, refuse to fight in Afghanistan, restrict themselves to nonmilitary help, and routinely scold us in public. We never insist on help, never retaliate, and instead express gratitude for help freely given. In what possible way do we bully allies? If they feel guilty and uncomfortable as we bear the burden of our common defense, that isn't our problem now is it?

And what international "law" do we violate? We abide by our treaty commitments and international agreements. We do not feel obligated to abide by treaties and agreements we have not ratified or signed. International law is not the same as domestic law. The world can insist that their agreements amongst themselves without our concurrence amounts to international "law" but that is hogwash.

So the world wants us to rally fence sitters to solve the crises of the day? That's what we've tried to do regarding nuclear proliferation, Islamo-fascism, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan. Where has that gotten us? We've led. Damn few enough have followed. And where we've talked, we've gotten a North Korea and Iran which pretend not to have nuclear ambitions and Euros pretend to believe them. Which leads to the next silly statement by Naim.

Naim says Europe wants "innovative initiatives to tackle the great challenges of the day." No, Europe doesn't want "innovative" solutions to any of the problems cited--Europe and the Europeans at heart want stale collectivized conventional wisdom solutions to these problems. They're just mad we don't go a long with their lame ideas.

As for bolstering commerce, what the heck do they think we do? And I'm not even talking about the stabilizing impact of our Navy. We allow the world to export to us with hardly a complaint while other countries protect themselves from our exports. Will China absorb the world's production? Will Germany? France? Hah!

And then there's this bit: "Naturally, the world also wants a superpower willing to foot the bill with a largess that no other nation can match. "

Naturally! Naturally? I nearly spewed my drink when I read that. I see, we should do what the Euros want and be friggin' grateful that we're allowed to pay for it. Oh thank you sirs, we are unworthy!

Like I said, the Euros know that Euros won't pay for that type of a superpower so they want America to be the EU that the EU can never be. As an American, I naturally tell the Euros at heart (and not all Europeans are Euros just as truly as America has Euros at heart) to take a long walk off a short pier.

What these Euros and Euros at heart want is a powerful America directed by the sophisticated policies of a Brussels elite. Tamed by nuance, we should do what Euros want in the world yet remain strong enough to be unleashed to save the Euros from their feeble state when real enemies threaten them.

Screw that idea. We're Americans, damn it. Should we ever cease to be Americans the world will be in deep trouble. These Euro-worshippers can shave extra close and kiss my largess, thank you very much.

Any Good Soldier

I have not been eager to create a constabulary corps to fight insurgencies. I think it is folly to create a specific force unsuitable for the higher end of the conflict spectrum when I contend any good soldier can fight insurgents if properly led. Make sure we have certain specific counter-insurgency (COIN) units and leaders who understand COIN, and we can use forces primarily intended for conventional high intensity warfare in COIN.

When reading A Better War, a 1999 book by Lewis Sorley that focuses on the post-Tet Vietnam War, I was struck by the demonstration of my position. After years of big unit operations under Westmoreland, Abrams turned our efforts on a dime after he took command in June 1968:

"The tactics changed within fifteen minutes of Abrams's taking command," affirmed General Fred Weyand, who was in a position to know. ...

What Weyand saw was a dramatic shift in concept of the nature and conduct of the war, in the appropriate measrues of merit, and in the tactics to be applied. ...

[Abrams understood that the] "object was not destruction but control, and in this case particularly control of the population.

There was no retraining of our forces. No creation of new COIN units. Just a determination to use our existing soldiers trained and experienced in the big unit fight for COIN to protect the people while still fighting the big units. It worked.

And of course, it worked in Iraq without bringing in a new army. When instructed to secure the population instead of relying on Iraqi forces to do the job, our forces secured the population.

Stop creating a problem where there is none. We have good soldiers and Marines. Lead them and tell them how to fight and they will fight that way. Our troops are disciplined enough to kill or protect. Just make sure those doing the leading know what the hell they are talking about.

Risky Business

One of the things that amazes me in the commentary on the Iraq War is that so many anti-war people who now worry that incorporating lightly armed former insurgents into the security forces as Concerned Local Citizens is a mistake because they might turn their guns on the government are often also those who claim that it was a mistake not to incorporate former Iraqi army units under their Baathist officers in the new Iraqi military after we captured Baghdad in April 2003.

There is a world of difference between 2003 and 2007, as Strategypage summarizes:

As the surge forces proceeded to clear entire towns and neighborhoods of terrorist groups, the Sunni Arab civilians were offered a deal. If they would establish a local security force, and stop future terrorist operations, the U.S. would provide weapons, training and cash. If the local guard force could not do the job, the U.S. and Iraqi troops would be back, and that could be very bad for the neighborhoods. This had been tried before in Sunni Arab areas, but not with complete success. This time around, there was a widespread attitude change among the Sunni Arabs. The feeling was that the whole terror campaign had been a failure, and the only way out now was to turn on the terrorists. It was always obvious that the Americans could go anywhere and kill terrorists. But now the Iraqi army and police, made up largely of Kurds and Shia Arabs, was also able to fight. This was something new, and the Sunni Arabs didn't want to be on the receiving end of more counter-terrorist operations carried out by Kurdish and Shia Arab troops.

Now, the Iraqi government is strong enough to absorb former enemies without as much risk of defeat. Security forces are much larger, more experienced, and better trained than ever. Recall that in spring 2004, half the Iraqi security forces evaporated in the face of the enemy attacks. This last year, Iraqi forces have fought well despite the horrible toll terrorism was taking on civilians and Iraqi soldiers alike.

Now, the Sunni Arabs risk expulsion from Iraq if they turn on the government and fight after being absorbed into the security system. We have databases of biometric data and have put the new local defense force members into that database. Should they turn on the government, we can track them down more easily.

Could the Concerned Local Citizens turn on the government? Sure. But it is better that they have defected and are likely to remain out of the enemy column. In 2003, the Sunni Arabs still assumed they'd regain control of Iraq from the Shias, who the Sunnis considered inept rubes. This year, the Sunnis worry they could be driven from Iraq completely by the Shias and Kurds.

I'm far more confident that these people will remain on our side than I was that "former" Baathists would have stayed loyal in spring 2004 if made part of the army.

Or are you saying we can only kill our enemies and not talk to them and accept their surrender?

Welcome Wagon

I went to the University of Michigan and live in Ann Arbor. So when the idea of conservative women comes up, I may believe in them in theory but in practice I don't see them.

Fortunately, I have what may be an unhealthy attraction to liberal women. I admit that may partly be the result of the "if you can't be with the one you love, love the one you're with" view of life. Hard to say.

So it will be nice to welcome Mad Minerva to Blogger in the new year. Make her feel welcome.

The Most Important Fraction

Counter-insurgency (COIN) is a form of war. Asserting that winning COIN is not mostly fighting doesn't mean that fighting is not necessary. That is where war critics often stumble, trying to insist that we don't need to fight a COIN campaign, but instead just build and talk our way to victory.

In a related matter, one of the complaints I had of the oil spot strategy was that it seemed to ignore the enemy forces in its focus on protecting the population. I was always on board with that protecting the people aspect, but never thought we could ignore the enemy outside the protected zones:

It is not sufficient to just build walls and patrol secured areas as the spot activists want. For if the enemy roams free outside the oil spots, they will eventually hit the "secure" areas and then infiltrate them as the feeling of security is eroded by attacks on the enclaves.

The calculus of security is not merely dependent on one variable--beefing up our defenses. A good result includes reducing the enemy capacity to attack. Atomize the enemy and make them expend effort avoiding our attacks, and even partially trained defenders can handle the reduced threat. But let the enemy spend all its time planning and be free to mass when they want to strike, and we ensure that even American troops won't be sufficient to stop determined attacks from succeeding on occasion and providing propaganda victories for the enemy. Oil spots will shrink and be absorbed into the sands of Iraq with this strategy.

Reading A Better War, a 1999 book by Lewis Sorley that focuses on the post-Tet Vietnam War, reminds us of the importance of military security for the population:

George Jacobson, an "old hand" who altogether served eighteen years in Vietnam and was a mainstay of the pacification program in these later years, often observed that "there's no question that pacification is either 90 percent or 10 percent security, depending on which expert you talk to. But there isn't any expert that will doubt that it's the first 10 percent or the first 90 percent. You just can't conduct pacification in the face of an NVA division."

That sums it up pretty well. Security may not be enough but is is necessary. And the only way to keep at bay those enemy divisions--whether real or figurative--is to hammer them away from the people you want to protect. When we sought to protect Baghdad, we didn't stop at the city limits. We hit the belts and regions around and the border itself to stop the forces from hitting Baghdad with a defense in depth. And we chased the enemy down outside Baghdad. We still pursue them.

Don't get confused about statements that COIN isn't mostly military force. That is a true statement. But security is the first part of successful COIN. And security includes atomizing the enemy and making them worry about surviving.

Near Historic Idiocy

On Saturday, with the New England Patriots playing for a perfect regular season, I sent Mister up to bed later than his usual time but before the game was over. Mister mildly protested, but he went up. When the Patriots scored to close the gap, I ran up to tell him as he got out of the shower. Not long after, I went up to tell him that the Patriots had scored again to go ahead.

I went down and after about ten seconds, I had a blinding revelation--I was being an idiot. I went upstairs and told Mister to come down and watch the rest of the game. He was thrilled.

Brady is a former Michigan player and this could be a record unmatched since 1972. And I was sending Mister to bed? During vacation?

So I redeemed my error in time for Mister to see this historic event in the sports world. To his credit, Mister had accepted bedtime easily though in retrospect I would have expected him to protest. He's a good kid. And he saw a moment in sports history. And I avoided a bad decision I would have regretted.

Approaching Victory

General Petraeus summarize trends in Iraq that I've discussed over the years. Let's look at them:

U.S. forces will thin out through the year, rather than abruptly handing control to Iraqis. First Iraqi politicians must work out "fundamental" governance issues, Petraeus said, and continue expanding the Iraqi security forces. The country's police and army added about 100,000 members this year and benefited from a 70,000-member, Sunni-majority U.S.-funded Concerned Local Citizens groups.

Iraq's forces needed time to get bigger, better equipped, and better trained. We have bought that time. Even as we reduce American troop levels, overall troop strength will be higher after the surge. And I was emphatic in urging the creation of local defense forces as the first line of defense for the government against the terrorists and insurgents. Related to this, I tried to emphasize that getting enemies to defect is part of beating an insurgency. If you say we can't trust enemies to give up, you are really saying we have to kill every one of them. Or you're saying the enemy should win.

It's unrealistic for U.S. forces to wait for car bombs and suicide vests to disappear before beginning to wind down, he said.

Since fall 2003, I've argued for this point. We don't need to kill the last enemy. We need to make sure the Iraqi government can do that. Some enemies will not flee or surrender. They must be killed to restore peace.

"The question is 'Are they reducing in number and effectiveness over time?'" he said. "I think the answer to that has been yes."

This is the process of atomizing the enemy so that they are weak enough to be handled by green and developing government security forces. Those that parrot the truism that insurgency is not primarily a military mission neglect that it is still war and that we must still kill the enemy.

Extremist militias could pose a long-term threat to the country, Petraeus said, but the most significant enemy for now is al Qaida.

"It is the enemy that carries out the most horrific attacks, that causes the greatest damage to infrastructure and that seems most intent on reigniting ethno-sectarian violence," Petraeus said.

Petraeus confirms the threat of the jihadis as the most prolific murderers but knows they can't actually take over Iraq. He knows that thugs among the majority Shias are the more potent potential threat to the government itself.

As fresh military units cycle into the country next year, Petraeus said they'll use "graduate-level warfare" that combines force, education, public relations, politics and economics to pinch terrorist operations. Deploying troops should be prepared for unconventional Gangs of New York-style work, as al Qaida becomes a Mafia-like organization that strong-arms its way into profitable Iraqi businesses to fund itself.

Before the surge started, I said this surge would be the last phase of the war where we'd dominate in combat. Our forces will recede from the day-to-day fight as we turn over combat duties to Iraqi security forces that have grown significantly this last year. Actually, we are well ahead of where I thought we'd be by the end of the year. We will need to move on--even while combat takes place--to supporting the rule of law by bolstering courts and fighting corruption and crime as our primary job.

We are winning. We must make sure we stick with our reduced sacrifices long enough to finalize the victory. Well, as much as any victory can be "finalized," of course. New threats always seem to arise. That's the way it goes.

He's Dead, Jamal

Remember how the execution of Saddam last year was supposed to cripple attempts to reconcile the Sunnis with their loss of power and prevent our victory in the war?

Well, these AP reporters sure remember and they continue to peddle this line:

Footage of Saddam's Dec. 30 execution, filmed on a mobile phone and showing the former Iraqi leader being taunted just before he was hanged, was leaked to the media and shown across the world. It provoked an outcry, particularly among many of Iraq's Sunni Arabs, and sparked a horrific day of violence that left 80 people dead from bombings and other attacks.

Iraq then plunged into its bloodiest cycle of violence since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, and American officials at the time feared the country was on the brink of civil war. The violence forced them to rethink their strategy and about 30,000 more troops were added.

Jamal Salman, a 35-year-old Sunni in Baghdad, said that "we had wished that Saddam's death would be part of the solution but it became part of a problem."

Part of the problem? There are some cause and effect problems here. Violence increased after Saddam's death? And the surge was then formulated after the post-election violence increase? Good grief! Signs of a new strategy in the form of the surge were evident long before Saddam's exectuion. And the surge in violence predated Saddam's execution and was largely committed by al Qaeda--not Saddam's followers--with their own surge of car bombs targetting Shias.

The authors at least mention that violence has since declined dramatically. Yet that is the most important part of the story and not the faux outrage of Baathists that their mass murderer leader was taunted at his execution.

In the end, the execution of Saddam was justice in action despite the Sadrist taunts. And the taunts were a fleeting embarassment submerged in the history since then of accumulating victory and increasing Sunni Arab acceptance of their defeat.

Be glad the vile monster is still dead. The world is better for it.

Wounded Inaction

The press at the end of the year is happy to discuss how this has been the year with the most American troops killed in action in Iraq. They are probably saddened that recent declines prevented them from celebrating the 4,000th KIA this year, too.

Overall, our casualties in Iraq have declined significantly since the summer. This month, 20 American troops were killed in action in Iraq. This is a record low considering that this many died in February 2004, which was a shorter month.

What is really amazing, however, is the dramatic drop in troops wounded in action. This month, only 36 American troops were wounded in action! This is just stunning. Even last month, 199 were WIA. The month before we lost 297 WIA. In September, we suffered 361 WIA. In August, 565. And yet this month we have suffered 36 WIA. Consider that in April 2004 and November 2004, during the two assaults on Fallujah, we suffered 1,213 and 1,431 WIA, respectively.

When we have suffered only 36 WIA in addition to 20 KIA in December, combat is really reduced both in scope and in the ability of the enemy to fight back when we engage them. I hadn't noticed this trend before, and it is just amazing.

May this trend continue.

UPDATE: My mistake. There is clearly a lag in reporting WIA. December saw 207 WIA. This is consistent with the usual ratio of killed to wounded.

Where the Grass is Greener

We continue to be distracted from the bigger trends in the war. The murder of Bhutto is a discreet event that is easier to discuss than the wider trend. While she is certainly a symbol of democracy and might have been important in restoring democracy in Pakistan, her corruption when she was a politician is one reason that democracy is not a part of Pakistan's civic life right now.

The trend is that the jihadis in Iraq are losing and the jihadis are turning on Pakistan as their primary target. As part of this shift of attention, the Iranians are shifting their resources east:

While the government has backed off on support for anti-American terrorism in Iraq, support for the Taliban in Afghanistan is another matter. Iran appears to have accepted defeat in Iraq, but still believed the Taliban had a shot in Afghanistan. This is not popular in Iran, because people remember the years of anti-Taliban propaganda, which simply reminded everyone of the widespread atrocities the Taliban committed against Shia Afghans.

The Taliban in Afghanistan will surely welcome this increased support but the Taliban are looking further east as well. The last jihad is being waged right now and the murder of Bhutto is just part of this crisis and not the entire crisis.

The Middle Kingdom

While discussions of Chinese power focus on statistics of their economy, few focus on the statistics of distance from China to areas of vital interest to us. South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Australia, Thailand, Russia, and India are all close to China and Chinese power does not need to match ours to threaten us in real ways.

This article nicely summarizes a lot of the issues surrounding China's rise in light of recent revisions to China's GDP numbers. Basically, China's economy is less than half of ours rather than being over 80% of our economy.

The result? One, they can't afford to challenge us as once thought; two, they have powerful neighbors to pen them in; and three, they have lots of dirt poor or aging citizens that are a potential source of financial and political instability. Overall, China is far from overtaking America as the global power.

I've raised these issues time and again. Yet while I am not an alarmist over China's potential to match us as a global power (and even accept that China could evolve into a friend, as remote a possibility as that seems right now), I've also emphasized that China does not need to be a global peer competitor to harm our interests. Remember, neither Germany nor Japan were global powers when they threatened our interests in World War II.

This is the Pacific Century, and the Middle Kingdom is for once an apt description of China after centuries of Chinese pretensions to that title. If China can dominate east Asia and the western Pacific, they may cow Japan, South Korea, and Australia along with the rest of the region by using that power to smash and occupy Taiwan despite our greater power and alliances.

China could perhaps decisively harm our interests just by being a bad neighbor.

Can You Hear Me Now?

The Left is disappointed in Congress:

It's a painful irony for Democrats: In the space of a year, the Iraq war that was the source of party's resurgence in Congress became the measure of its impotence.

There is no irony. There was a translation problem. The problem is, after the Democrats campaigned last year with an explicit message that they were not going to undermine the Iraq War, once in power the Leftist leaders of Congress worked on the assumption that the public elected them to undermine the Iraq War. The Leftist leaders understood, as did their nutroots support, that they truly did want American defeat but prior to the election couldn't admit that to the patriotic public of all political stripes who aren't eager for American defeat against montstrous enemies.

The problem for the Left is that although the public did indeed react to the escalating violence in the Iraq War by electing enough Democrats to swing Congress, the public was never pro-defeat. Sure, the Left is disappointed by the failure of Congress to legislate defeat, but the broader pool of Democrats would rather win than lose the war. Independents and Republicans feel that way more so.

So when Congress relentlessly tried but failed to lose the war over the summer rather than change the war, the non-Left wasn't comfortable. Indeed, as the administration changed the war as the public wanted, Congress refused to admit that any change was happening. Worse, Congress persisted in promoting defeat even as evidence of accumulating success rolled out, so the non-left annoyance with Congress deepened.

At some level, the leaders of Congress understood that the public did not want defeat because Congressional majority leaders refused to speak in terms of winning or losing. Instead they trotted out terms designed to disguise retreat or promoted policies designed to indirectly force retreat. If these leaders truly believed they had a mandate to run away and lose, wouldn't they have simply advocated retreat openly?

Congress claimed a mandate for losing in Iraq that they did not publicly claim to want prior to the elections, and the public did not reward them in the opinion polls this last year for pursuing our defeat after the election.

Like so much about the war, the "reality-based community" leaders saw in our 2006 elections what they wanted to see and heard what they wanted to hear. We're not up to four bars yet, but as we win the war and the opinion polls continue to turn around, will the reality of what our people want finally sink in?

Ah, Nuance at Last!

France could teach our State Department some lessons in dialogue:

France "will have no more contact with Syria... until we have proof of Syrian willingness to let Lebanon appoint a president by consensus," Sarkozy told journalists following talks in Cairo with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

Former colonial power France "wants a president for Lebanon," Sarkozy said. "It's time to provide proof (of goodwill), it's time for Syria to show it."

"It's time for Syria to prove with facts what it has not stopped saying in speeches," Sarkozy said. "We are now waiting for acts on Syria's part and not speeches."

This is dialogue. I once had hope that Rice would tame the State Department and get them to promote American foreign policy as set forth by the administration. Instead, State Department goes on promoting State Department foreign policy. State never needs proof of foreign goodwill--everlasting hope of good will is enough for Foggy Bottom.

State still needs an America Desk.

Border Integrity

The Iraqis and Iranians seem to have accepted the Algiers Accord that settles the Iraqi border along the Shatt al-Arab in Iran's favor over previous agreements:

Iraqi President Jalal Talabani's office said on Thursday the Algiers Treaty was "valid and not void," after telling journalists on Monday it had been "voided by the current government."

The treaty was signed in 1975 by Saddam Hussein, Iraq's then vice president, and Iran's former Shah and defined the border between the two neighbors.

Talabani's earlier remarks threatened to reopen a border dispute that caused the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war.

But Talabani's latest comments were welcomed by Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki.

I earlier wondered if Iraqi acceptance of this agreement was granted at the price of Iran calling off their dogs and therefore in effect admitting defeat in Iraq. Are the Iraqis just trying to remind the Iranians to keep their bargain?

Let's Talk Inept Wartime Decisions

Mistakes in war are normal. I don't think we've made terrible or irreversible mistakes in Iraq despite constant but ignorant claims of ineptitude.

I recently commented that once we win in Iraq, I won't mind all the books that will claim we could have done better if we hadn't made some specific mistake. When you win, such debates can be enlightening or just entertaining depending on the distance from the events in question.

We still debate World War II, for example (tip to Strategypage email updates). This article disputes the idea that capturing Iwo Jima at such a high cost still saved lives by providing an emergency landing strip closer to Japan:

[O]nly 2,148 B-29 crewmen were killed in combat, including those stationed in India and China as well as theMarianas. “The emergency landing theory,” Burrell notes, “claims that an additional 24,761 airmen from the Marianas alone would have died without the use of Iwo Jima. In other words, the theory claims that over eleven times the number of airmen actually lost in combat were saved simply by offering an alternative landing field between [the Marianas] and Tokyo.”

What, then, if Nimitz had heeded King’s admonition that Iwo Jimawas a“sink hole” not worth the effort? Earlier in the war American forces had bypassed the Japanese fortresses at Rabaul on New Britain and Truk in the Caroline archipelago, successfully neutralizing each through a combination of air strikes and a naval blockade. The same could have been done with Iwo Jima.

Had Iwo Jima been bypassed, the Pacific War would have ended at much the same time and in much the same way as it did. True, the American photo album would have been somewhat impoverished, for it would not have included the famous Joe Rosenthal shot of the dramatic flag-raising ceremony onMount Suribachi. But more substantively, the three marine divisions used in the capture of Iwo Jima would have been available to support the invasion of Okinawa. (Although originally scheduled for that assignment, the horrific battle for Iwo Jima left them too badly damaged to do so.) Moreover, the successful defensive tactics employed by Lt. Gen. Tadamichi Kuribayashi, the commander of Iwo Jima’s garrison, would not have been available as an example to be emulated by Okinawa’s commander, Lt. Gen. Mitsuru Ushijima, who used them to advantage in the actual struggle for that island.

The battle for Iwo Jima, although a high point for American valor, was a low point for American strategy.

If my point isn't obvious enough, have you noticed any Congressional interest in impeaching Franklin Roosevelt or opening an inquiry into the military decisions and intelligence that led to the invasion of Iwo Jima?

War is not perfection. Even the simplest of maneuvers is done as if moving through water. That is true even in a desert.

The World's Most Powerful X

A German magazine is under a bit of fire for describing the Koran as the world's most powerful book:

The folks at Der Spiegel, Germany’s leading weekly newsmagazine, displayed a remarkable lack of judgment and timing in picking "The Koran: The World’s Most Powerful Book" as their cover story right before Christmas. While it is certainly true that the world’s most dangerous terrorists as well as their growing base of radical sympathizers feel inspired by the Koran’s radical interpretations, this does not necessarily turn it into the world’s "most powerful" book.

I can understand why there is some opposition to this. I don't know why, since we could also describe MOAB as the world's most powerful conventional bomb without people getting their panties in a twist.

Perhaps "most powerful" isn't really the best phrase. But Der Spiegel was probably wary of saying "most dangerous." Don't want to piss off those who might think the latter phrase is insulting. They'll kill you for that offense.

Like many things (including box cutters), in the right hands either can do good. But in the wrong hands? Well, innocent people will die in large numbers.