For all the talk in the West of so-called revolutionary methods of "hybrid warfare," Russian lack of conventional means of warfare explains their methods:
The new doctrine takes for granted that Russia has to fight a poor mans’ war because there is no alternative. Many of these new doctrinal principles are those employed by successful irregular forces in the past. The Russians stress the rapid integration of any available resources into the Russian led war effort. The Russian journal articles make it clear that Russia only went into Syria with the understanding that the Russians would be in charge, even if that meant annoying the Iranians at times. ... The new Russian doctrine points out the importance of adapting and doing so quickly.
This emphasis on using what is available and adapting quickly has had a good effect on Russian leadership:
Russia has come to call this use of superior command and control and discipline “management superiority” and that is an accurate term. The Russian commanders were allowed to do whatever worked to get the job done. If this resulted in some bad publicity because of dead civilians or other battlefield indiscretions the Russian government would criticize in private and praise in public (and quickly and quietly transfer home officers who were not up to the job). This made it possible for Russian commanders to be more flexible and innovative than Russian officers have been allowed to be since World War II. As a result this new doctrine is very popular with most Russian officers and troops.
I've long worried that our officers aren't allowed to take risks and adapt quickly out of fear of making a career-ending mistake. Mistakes should not have that effect. Good people make mistakes and zero mistakes can simply indicate somebody who doesn't do anything of note. I honestly don't know if the "zero-defect" mentality is still a problem.
Also, with fewer resources the Russians have stopped talking about the advantages of an all-volunteer force and so talk more about the need to keep casualties low among conscripts (and their mothers) who may not want to die for Putin's adventures.
There is no mention in the Strategypage post about the silly Russian "lessons" of tank usage in Syria.
Anyway, stop that talk of Russian "hybrid warfare" and start talking about "poor mans' war." As I wrote about Russia's flimsily concealed war in Ukraine:
I think Russia is fighting this way not to muddy the waters and prevent us from having a clear reason to intervene, but because Russia is incapable of invading and imposing their will rapidly.
Does anybody think that Russia would not have just sent in the heavy brigades and paratroopers to seize the region from Kharkov to Mariupol if they had the military capacity? Do it fast, like Hungary or Czechoslovakia or Georgia, and the world gets over the affront fairly easily, no?
Necessity has shaped Russia's wars since 2014. Not novel genius. But God help us, their officer corps may be getting better because of it.
