Before the war in Syria broke out in 2011, a budding personal friendship between Bashar al-Assad, the leader of Syria, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the president of Turkey, augured close economic ties and an open border. That would be only the beginning: Turkey saw Syria as the launching pad for its plans to become the dominant economic force in the Arab world, a region it had largely retreated from after losing its vast Arab provinces with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
But the Syrian uprising forced Turkey to reconsider. Erdoğan severed his ties with Assad and cast his lot with the popular, predominantly Sunni, opposition, making the bet that they would overthrow the minority Alawite-based regime.
Turkey may have given up on seeing Assad as an enemy--or at least accepting that Turkey lost the chance to defeat Assad. But will Assad so easily stop seeing Turkey as an enemy who tried and failed to overthrow Assad?
While Turkey is reaching out to Russia, it is really a tactical move to salvage the situation in Syria. Turkey will remain in NATO, as the article quoted above argues:
Washington needs Ankara as a bulwark against Iran, Russia, and jihadists, while Ankara needs Washington as a protector of last resort against Russian and Iranian maneuvering in its neighborhood.
Turkey definitely needs Assad to accept his victory without remembering that Turkey struck him without killing him, thus earning Assad's retribution. And Turkey has a lot of restive Kurds who Assad could support. So Erdogan needs good relations with Russia to restrain Assad.
And if Turkey has chosen Russian air defense missiles over American advanced fighters, in the short run Turkey may need to choose Russia even if Turkey remains formally in NATO:
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu has reacted to a proposal by a US congressional delegation that visited Ankara on 27 August to abandon the purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defence system in return for Washington unblocking Turkey’s procurement of F-35 fighter jets[.]
But in the long run, Russian-Turkish history of warfare argues against a stable alliance with Russia.
And Turkish Islamism argues against Turkey's membership in NATO eventually (while NATO starts shutting down cooperation with Turkey in sensitive areas to cope with Turkey's nominal membership), even as the European Union pretends to consider Turkey's application to join the EU--hoping Turkey will stop asking and save Europe the embarrassment of turning the Turks down.
I remain convinced that China could be an alternative superpower protector for Turkey. Turkey as a Chinese ally would fit well with China's Belt and Road Initiative that seeks to push Chinese trade routes overland and by sea to the Mediterranean Sea and into Europe.
And if Turkey still wants stealth aircraft, I'm sure China would sell their cheaper (although inferior) stealth planes to Turkey.
Although in the short run, perhaps Turkey can buy time by siding with Assad, Russia, Israel, Iraq, and America in getting Iran out of Syria. Strategypage looks at Syria in their tour of Iran.
