This author in his observation that Chinese talk of "system of systems" warfare is really just old fashioned joint warfare (or combined arms, at a lower level) gives us a vitally needed reminder that China doesn't have to defeat American forces in battle to defeat America:
Why risk major combat over, say, a Taiwan contingency if you can slow down the U.S. Pacific Fleet and associated joint forces long enough to conquer the island, and hand the U.S. Navy a fait accompli when its task forces arrive on scene?
Exactly. China doesn't need to defeat America to win a war because the most core interest of China in the western Pacific is Taiwan. China needs to defeat Taiwan and only needs to delay America to do that.
Which is what I wrote back in 2005 in my template for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan:
When the war needs to be won quickly before the US and Japan intervene, why make it easier for America and Japan to intervene by essentially deciding for us [by attacking American forces in the western Pacific on day one]? Why give the UN cause to get involved? Absent direct inter-state conflict, our response could be delayed critical days or weeks.
So the [Chinese] plan will be a direct and fast assault on Taiwan to win before any outside power can save Taiwan from conquest. The Chinese will have four main missions for their military in an invasion: One, landing nine army divisions and one Marine division on Taiwanese territory plus dropping three parachute divisions and one air landing division. Two, securing the sea and air lines of supply and reinforcement from China to Taiwan. Three, keeping American forces away from Taiwan long enough to finish the conquest. This will also include non-military measures. Fourth, the Chinese must defeat the Taiwanese army and conquer the island.
As China builds aircraft carriers, an added method of delaying effective American intervention even after America decides to intervene would be to distract our Navy be raising the prospects of a carrier duel:
The final contribution of that first Chinese carrier to delaying our intervention could be to tempt us into taking the time to set up and execute the perfect naval strike mission. Sure, having sovereign pieces of US territory that serve as power projection assets is useful. And the Navy trumpets that mission in budget battles. But the Navy--deep down--wants to exercise sea control and take down another navy that tries to wrest it from us. It would be the best SINKEX, ever.
The Chinese just won't care if they lose that first carrier task force if the end result is that China has control of Taiwan.
Remember, China doesn't have to defeat our Navy (and Air Force). China just needs to hold us off long enough to defeat Taiwan. That's a big difference. And the Chinese don't have such a huge attachment to their carriers as we do for ours. We may feel good to sink a carrier with carrier air strikes after so many decades have passed since the glory days of 1942-1945 in the Pacific.
But China will give us that good feeling if it buys them the time they need to conquer Taiwan. And they'll still have their home-built carriers to build a blue water navy that will be supported by air bases on Taiwan province of the People's Republic of China.
That type of naval warfare is the foundation of modern American naval tradition, dating to the World War II Pacific campaign. Not anti-submarine and convoy warfare. Not submarine warfare. Not power projection in support of landing troops on hostile shores.
In World War II itself the Navy allowed itself to be distracted by the shiny objects, giving the enemy the opportunity to gain its real objective. We overcame that ploy despite falling for the distraction hook, line, and sinker given our superior power and because we had the initiative in the campaign and were invading the Philippines which continued despite the scare.
In and around Taiwan, China will have the initiative and will be invading. Will we resist the shiny object of Chinese carriers and remember that preserving Taiwan is the objective to really defeat China?
