But I have a couple quibbles.
One, even if American support for Turkey over their objectives in Idlib could gain points with Erdogan, that will be spitting in the ocean given that our problem with Turkey is that Erdogan is taking Turkey in an Islamist direction. Other than making a futile gesture against the use of chemical weapons in Idlib by Assad, we have no interests worth risking war over in that province.
Two, I disagree with this assessment of Russian interest in the Mediterranean Sea:
Russia had no obvious strategic interest in Syria, and the attempts to divine some were dubious at best. Baffled onlookers posited that Russia wanted to control oil pipelines and place a major naval force in Syria. But Russia has plenty of oil of its own; what it needs are higher oil prices. Russia’s dream is to have a naval force in the Mediterranean, but that dream could easily become a nightmare, since any force it placed in the Mediterranean would have to be supplied through the Bosporus, which the Turks could block at will.
The real reason Russia intervened in Syria was to show its own public that it could act like a great power.
I do agree about the real reason for intervening. It looked good and demonstrated Russia would go the extra mile for a client. Which might have looked like more of a contrast when America seemed like a risky ally to count on (see Iraq under siege by ISIL then).
But Russia has an interest in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Even if it is at risk in wartime.
Assuming Russian paranoia about the West is real rather than feigned to excuse aggression, Russia likely sees the eastern Mediterranean Sea as a potential launching site for sea-based nuclear attacks on Russia itself--as the Soviet Union saw the region where American carriers and subs roamed during the Cold War.
So just having forces in the eastern Mediterranean Sea in the opening days of a general war will be worthwhile.
Plus, not everything has to be judged by the standards of all-out war. In peacetime, having a naval and air presence in the eastern Mediterranean Sea helps Russia promote its interests in the region and occupies American forces otherwise free to operate in other regions.
And as I've said, bases in Syria help justify the conquest of Crimea and the cost of a continuing war against Ukraine, by helping Russia project power from the Black Sea to the eastern Mediterranean Sea, bolstered by forward bases in Syria.
But it is true that by essentially siding with Iran to allow Iran to participate in the Idlib offensive is a real problem for Russian interests regarding Israel, America, Iran, and Turkey.
But Russia is clearly taking hits in those areas to keep bases in Syria. Obviously the bases must be important to Russia.
And of course, if Russia is stiff-arming Turkey, it increases chances Turkey will look to China as a major ally in place of America and NATO, or the one-time candidate (but long-time enemy) Russia.
Finally, I disagree that America has proven itself "bad at counter-insurgency." In only five years we crushed well-financed and well-armed insurgents and terrorists in Iraq despite outside support to those enemies from Syria, Iran, and the wider Sunni jihadi world.
Don't believe me? Well believe President Obama when he commented on our late 2011 withdrawal of troops from Iraq (in the last update):
Now, Iraq is not a perfect place. It has many challenges ahead. But we're leaving behind a sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq, with a representative government that was elected by its people. We're building a new partnership between our nations.
But the accuracy of that COIN point is moot because I don't think we have any interest in occupying western Syria and waging a counter-insurgency there. Let Israel and Turkey who have much higher interests in western Syria worry about Assad, I say.
I do wonder if the Assad offensive into Idlib is truly the final act in the war in the west. If rebels accept a step down the escalation ladder and go insurgent, the war will go on.
