Friday, March 07, 2014

Army Force Structure

I'm calling a do-over for this post. I'll leave the original as a lesson in how incorrect conclusions can be made from a few data points even if the logic is oh so perfect.

Anyway (8 MAR 14):

It appears that our active component Army is going back to its pre-9/11 force structure of 32 brigades (my memory is we had 33, prior to 9/11, but I could be wrong--but the 32 will be stronger than even 33 older ones). But I think this force can be adequately manned unlike the pre-9/11 force that did not have enough people to fill out the tables of organization and equipment.

This is what a briefing on the Army budget states:

Besides the drawdown in personnel, the Army is taking other actions to reorganize, to realign and to restructure forces to be able to live within affordable limits. The brigade combat team reorganization enhances brigade combat power by adding a third maneuver battalion to 47 BCTs, brigade combat teams, while it reduces the total number of brigade combat teams to 60 across the total force.

I believe this reflects going to 32 active component combat brigade combat teams (BCT) and staying level at 28 National Guard combat brigades. We peaked at 45 active BCTs during the Iraq War with our National Guard reorganized to 28 BCTs from its previous 8 divisions and 18 separate brigades.

Thirty of our bigger pre-9/11 active component brigades were tied to divisions for support. Now, with more supporting units directly attached, they are all capable of independent action (which is why they are called "BCTs" and not just "brigades"). They had gone down to 2 line (or maneuver) battalions with 4 rather than 3 line companies, each; and will now all, I assume, go up to 3 battalions.

We have 7 Stryker brigades, give or take 1--all but one in the active component. These BCTs already have 3 battalions (of 3 companies, each), so don't need a third battalion restored, obviously. Assuming all active brigades with 2 battalions get a third battalion, that should account for 27 of the added battalions. That leaves 20 National Guard brigades to get a third battalion. Which means only 7 will retain just two battalions. Give or take 1. Assuming we retain all the Stryker brigades while we reduce the Army. I think that is safe to assume since they are new and we emphasis strategic mobility to reach distant theaters from the United States, yet found our lighter infantry units too tactically immobile once in the theater.

And unless I'm wrong and some active BCTs stay at 2 battalions to fill out more National Guard BCTs. But I doubt that.

We added brigades last decade by making them smaller, moving to self-contained brigade combat teams rather than relying on the division to supply all arms and support functions; and most importantly by deactivating Cold War era units (like a bunch of separate artillery brigades) deemed unnecessary for the current wars; and shifted some support tasks (and even some security tasks) to civilian workers or contractors so these functions wouldn't fall under the end strength cap. Both of these measures freed of soldiers under the existing end strength to fill out units and allow for expansion.

We've eaten in to that manpower savings by adding new units, like UAV outfits. But since Army General Odierno has said we need 450,000 to fully man our planned force structure, I'll go with him on this. Even though the Army is smaller than pre-9/11 in manpower, we can adequately staff roughly the same number of combat brigades. So you'll hear no complaints from me on this, other than a caution that even an adequately staffed Army of 32 BCTs could be too small just as the pre-9/11 Army was too small for the wars that followed.

That will still be the case if we have to go to war again against a reasonably powerful land power. I know we deem that possibility is close enough to zero to feel secure in the choice. Others with reasonably powerful land power may disagree.

But given the reality of post-war budgeting, it could have been a lot worse. Let's hope this just isn't another step to an even smaller Army. Now that would be something I would complain about bitterly.
/END DO-OVER--ORIGINAL POST FOLLOWS/

I wrote that I'm not necessarily worried about our Army end strength being reduced to levels lower than they've been since we entered World War II. Force structure is my worry.

It appears that our active component Army is going back to its pre-9/11 force structure of 32 brigades. But I think this force can be adequately manned unlike the pre-9/11 force that did not have enough people to fill out the tables of organization and equipment.

This is what a briefing on the Army budget states:

Besides the drawdown in personnel, the Army is taking other actions to reorganize, to realign and to restructure forces to be able to live within affordable limits. The brigade combat team reorganization enhances brigade combat power by adding a third maneuver battalion to 47 BCTs, brigade combat teams, while it reduces the total number of brigade combat teams to 60 across the total force.

I believe this reflects going to 32 active combat brigade combat teams and 28 National Guard combat brigades. We peaked at 45 active brigades during the Iraq War with our National Guard reorganized to 28 combat brigades from its previous 8 divisions and 18 separate brigades.

Thirty of our bigger pre-9/11 brigades were tied to divisions for support. Now they are all capable of independent action. They had gone down to 2 line (or maneuver)battalions and will now go up to 3 battalions.

Some will go to 3. I assume that all 32 active brigades will go to 3 line battalions. That would mean 15 National Guard brigades would get a third battalion. This active/Guard allocation makes sense since pre-9/11 we kept 15 separate National Guard brigades at a higher state of readiness for more rapid mobilization (enhanced readiness brigades) while the remainder of the Guard was more of a strategic reserve in case of "the big one."

Which makes me wonder if we are going back to tiered readiness in the Guard. Switching from 8 divisions and 18 separate brigades--with only 15 ERBs ready to go reasonably quickly--to 28 brigades was supposed to put all of the fewer total National Guard brigades in good shape for mobilization. That is the implication of enlarging just over half of the Guard brigades, to me.

I also assume that we are maintaining the non-Stryker organization of having each battalion composed of 4 line companies (rather than the traditional triangular organization that has each battalion with 3 line companies as Stryker units still have). So that makes each brigade combat team stronger than the pre-9/11 structure.

And for reorganization reasons I went over in the first link, I think this means that our units will be fully manned despite the lowering of end strength.

I can't complain about this move. With our troops withdrawing from wars, our Army is always reduced. So this is expected. And the Army should at least be in better condition that it was on September 11, 2001.

Keep in mind that the Army was too small for the wars we then waged. That will still be the case if we have to go to war again against a reasonably powerful land power. I know we deem that possibility has zero, others with reasonably powerful land power may disagree.

But given the reality of post-war budgeting, it could have been a lot worse. Let's hope this just isn't another step to an even smaller Army. Now that would be something I would complain about bitterly.

UPDATE: No, wait. My active/Guard allocation is ate-up. I forgot to account for the Stryker brigades which already have 3 maneuver battalions. We have 7 give or take 1--all but one in the active component. Assuming all active brigades with 2 battalions get a third battalion, that should account for 27 of the added battalions. That leaves 20 National Guard brigades to get a third battalion. Which means only 7 will retain just two battalions. Give or take 1.

And I forgot that the entire Guard was redirected to produce 4-5 brigades each year available for mobilization as an operational reserve to support the active force, so the tiering is kind of planned in a the structure of training, manning, and equipping for the Guard brigades. Unless our plan is to stop using the Guard as an operational reserve, in which case maybe there is some type of tiering in the pre-9/11 fashion.

Sorry. I started speculating on just a couple sentences, and I forgot some of the things I knew. But I've been eager to read any tea leaves for clues. I'll be happier when I read something more solid.