China isn't building up their navy at an alarming rate and they aren't being aggressive militarily against their neighbors according to this analyst.
First, says the author, China is building up their naval power but it is natural as they turn from being a land power to a sea-dependent power, after largely settling their land borders. After all, the author says, America didn't turn to the sea until after the Mexican War and the purchase of Alaska largely settled our continental boundaries.
Two, the author denies that China is engaged in a major naval arms build up, although he does admit, "Yes, there is some evidence of Chinese military procurements."
Three, he says the major development at sea is the unification of four of their five civilian armed fleets. Which, since they are civilian agencies, don't count as naval power. This is "designed to be assertive without being confrontational," he says.
Then the article gets loopy. You think we are in a general defense of China that seems to conform to the Chinese view of the conflicts:
In the Chinese narrative, Beijing has not changed its foreign policy goals, expanded its territorial claims, or adopted a more assertive attitude toward maritime territorial disputes. Rather, other countries, emboldened by passive or active U.S. support, have stepped up their efforts to challenge China’s long-established territorial claims, forcing China either to allow them to trample on Chinese sovereignty or to take appropriate measures in response.
But the author then goes on to extensively nullify his third apparent point by illustrating how China's "civilian" navies have been used aggressively to push neighbors around and harass United States assets; and by noting that a unified coast guard makes it clear that China's actions are coming from decisions at the top rather than from local decisions by competing naval agencies.
Yet, this is supposed to mean that China isn't a military problem. Paint some of your warships white, send them out to ram and torment foreigners, and it is just a little "assertiveness."
Amazing.
Since the author himself essentially rebuts his third defense of China's actions by highlighting Chinese aggressiveness with those "civilian" assets, I'll just go back to the first two.
First, I think India would be surprised to learn that China's land borders are settled, given the many Chinese intrusions into Indian-controlled territory. Tibetans might quibble, as well. Russia may have settled their disputes on paper, but since China still believes Russia ripped them off in the 18th century, Russia worries that Russian weakness in the Far East could lead China to revise those "settled" claims on Russian territory. Those maps China prints (the Wall Map Series of National Territory) do seem to change, don't they?
And saying that we didn't turn to the sea until late in the 19th century ignores our early history of naval deployments. The Quasi-War with France in the Caribbean Sea, two wars against the Barbary pirates of North Africa, opening Japan with a naval expedition, anti-piracy actions in the West Indies, anti-slave trade patrols off of West Africa, post-Barbary War Mediterranean patrols to keep the peace. With our small navy, we routinely sailed in the Indian and Pacific oceans to protect our commerce. We even contemplated establishing a permanent squadron off the coast of China in 1840, and in the next decade patrolled off the coast of China where we engaged Chinese forces on occasion.
To say that we didn't turn to our navy until the late 19th century is to ignore our early naval deployments and implies we had a relatively large army to settle our land frontiers. Our ground forces were small throughout our period of so-called land focus, growing only during wars, and rapidly returning to near nothing after the wars. Remember, we had a Department of War to run the Army--assuming it only really existed during war, and a Department of the Navy--assuming it was around all the time. This shows we did not emphasize the Navy? And means we shouldn't be concerned about China's naval rise and alarmed by China's more aggressive stance toward territorial disputes at sea? This foray into American history is both wrong about us and irrelevant to coping with China today.
Two, in what world is China's naval power not racing ahead? If you simply say there is no arms race, that is one thing. That would require China's neighbors and America to be building in response. We are shrinking our Navy. So there is no "race" inasmuch as that implies at least two sides running.
But China's naval power (and their air and land power, too) is incredibly more powerful than it was two decades ago because of some incredible focus on naval and air procurement. In 1996, the Chinese couldn't even detect our carriers sailing near China during a crisis with Taiwan. Today we worry that Chinese ballistic missiles could target our carriers far out to sea. This is not to say that China's navy is superior to ours. It is to say that China can challenge us near China when before they could not. Our new AirSea Battle doctrine is a recognition of China's new ability to contest the western Pacific.
China's use of civilian agencies to confront other nations around China--and even their use of civilian fishing vessels to throw elbows at sea--is nothing more than a sea version of keeping the army off the streets and sending in para-military police and hired street gangs to rough up protesters.
China's naval power is growing and their aggressiveness is growing. And no amount of pretending not to see what is right in front of us erases those facts.
NOTE: Post corrected for frustration-induced typos about 18th century when I meant 19th.
