While it is great that we have missile defenses in a world of North Korea and Iran, I always want these to be the last line of defense rather than the first line of defense. In time, they might be as reliable as a toaster. But now, who knows?
In the remote Alaska wilderness, some 3,800 miles from Pyongyang, North Korea, the United States' last line of defense against a nuclear warhead from North Korea or Iran stands ready to attack.
Fort Greely, Alaska, a World War II-era Army base that was reopened in 2004, is America's last chance to shoot down a missile from overseas that could be carrying a nuclear weapon. Its underground steel and concrete silos house 26 missile interceptors that have, in tests, a 50 percent success rate.
Fifty percent. They'll either hit or they won't. And firing two missiles just puts the odd of one of them working up to 75%. If three are fired, the chance of one of them working is 87.5%. I don't know about you, but I'm still uncomfortable pondering a 12.5% chance of a nuclear missile getting through our defenses. If this was a game, I'd be thrilled to have an anti-missile system with a 50% success rate. But in real life? I'd rather not even have to get to the point where we need to light up the Fort Greely missiles--let alone the Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, back-up missiles (4 of them).
If a missile is capable of actively resisting measures to shoot them down, we'll have to start over on the calculations. I assume North Korea is far from having counter-measures on missiles since they are still having difficulties getting the missiles to work right.
I'll even concede that the test rate of success may under-estimate the operational success rate if the tests were designed to really test the missiles under hard conditions. And that the operational success rate could be better than the test rate because of what was learned in the test rate. But I don't know. And I can understand why the military wouldn't want to say. We've said we are confident they will work. But we would say that, wouldn't we? An ineffective weapon that enemies believe is 100% effective will deter better than a weapon that everyone knows has a 50% chance of success. Obviously, if deterrence fails you want the latter weapon for actual use.
So before the Fort Greely missiles are launched, I want sea-based anti-missile defenses to go after the North Korean missiles on the way up.
And before the sea-based missiles are fired, I want our aircraft over the launch sites trying to destroy the North Korean missile launch facilities or even to shoot down the ballistic missiles really early in their launch.
Of course, I like the math better when it involves getting rid of the North Korean regime in the first place. As always, it's the regime, stupid. Who worries that France or India will nuke us? I know I don't sweat the math for them.
