Attacks are up but we aren't giving out numbers:
No one doubts that the Taliban have stepped up their attacks, but what is less clear is whether they are trying — or able — to mount an all-out attempt to test the Afghan security forces as they begin to take over completely from withdrawing foreign forces. By early summer, Afghan forces plan to be in charge throughout the country, with American and other allies in a supporting role.
The American military, which last year publicized data on enemy attacks with meticulous bar graphs, now has nothing to say. “We’re just not giving out statistics anymore,” said a spokesman, Col. Thomas W. Collins, suggesting that the Afghan Ministry of Defense might do so.
This is to be expected. Especially since we never tried to knock down the Taliban in Regional Command East as we originally planned with our surge's staged offensives (first Regional Command South--which we executed; then RCE--which we never carried out). When we pulled out of Iraq, we'd done enough damage to the enemy to make any parting shots feeble.
But we are leaving an ongoing fight this time, which makes it far easier to repeat what the Iraqi terrorists claimed but be believable this time:
The Taliban have complained that American troops “have lost all will to fight mujahedeen head-on in the battlefields,” according to a statement released Tuesday on an insurgent Web site that is monitored by the SITE Intelligence Group.
"Complained?" I think something was lost in translation there. I've noted a number of times that one problem of turning over responsibility to locals--which is counter-insurgency 101--is that the hand off can be portrayed as our retreat rather than a sign of victory through local capabilities. As I said, we didn't knock down the Taliban enough to prevent the Taliban from making a credible case that they are chasing us out. I don't think we are being chased out. But this is a perception problem we have to combat lest it become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
This last problem seems less of a mystery:
While the Ministry of Defense refused to give latest figures for Afghan casualties, one ministry official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of orders against releasing the information, said ministry data showed that 1,183 soldiers were killed in the year ending March 20, compared with 841 in the year ending March 20, 2012, an increase of 40 percent.
In addition, the official said, the data showed that Afghan forces had killed 4,664 enemy fighters that year, and captured 6,401. Since most Western estimates are that the Taliban’s active strength is on the order of 20,000 to 25,000 fighters, that would represent more than half of the insurgents’ total numbers, which seems unlikely given the increased tempo of insurgent attacks.
This doesn't seem a mystery. I'm not sure how many police were casualties, too. And I'm not sure about desertions from the government (or from the Taliban, for that matter). But it is clear that the Afghan forces give better than they endure in the fight. And the numbers don't seem odd. If the Taliban have 20,000 to 25,000 fighters, that should represent the tip of the spear of 200,000 to 250,000 Taliban. Just like our infantry, armor, artillery, and scouts are only a small portion of our army, the Taliban fighters likely represent 10% of the total Taliban force.
So the Taliban have endured casualties of perhaps 5% of their force. Some of those Taliban may have been part-timers or "logistics" supporters. And the Taliban can recruit replacements for full-time fighter losses from the 90% who aren't fighters. Our casualties per year in Iraq were perhaps 0.6% killed in action, so 5% losses are pretty big, really.
Don't get all over-focused on the body count and conclude that something is odd when we've "killed all the Taliban" yet they still fight. The Taliban can't keep up the pace forever and we need to help our friends weather the surge and then counter-attack when the enemy is too weak to continue their offensive.
We can win this war. But the enemy wants to win, too. Don't talk our side into defeat with excessive hand wringing.
