In the absence of a clearly articulated strategic concept, a world order that erodes borders and merges international and civil wars can never catch its breath. A sense of nuance is needed to give perspective to the proclamation of absolutes. This is a nonpartisan issue, and it should be treated in that manner in the national debate we are entering.
I think we need a clearly articulated strategic concept that if you screw with us, we'll make you pay. It may not be today. And it may not be tomorrow. But slip up just once and we'll be all over you like ugly on an ape.
Further, why should we give Assad the benefit of the Treaty of Westphalia when he did not grant us the same respect in Iraq? Syria tried very hard to destroy the Iraqi government by supporting terrorists trying to wreck the fledgling government and spark a civil war that they hoped they could exploit to their own advantage. In what way did Assad display any appreciation for avoiding actions "overturning prevalent notions of international order," as Kissinger put it? Really, the Westphalian ship has sailed and non-state military actors are on the rise, as I wrote about in this compilation of essays on sale for only 99 cents.
This argument by Kissinger for caution doesn't even begin to persuade me:
Who replaces the ousted leadership, and what do we know about it? Will the outcome improve the human condition and the security situation? Or do we risk repeating the experience with the Taliban, armed by America to fight the Soviet invader but then turned into a security challenge to us?
Seriously? Bleeding the Soviet Union in Afghanistan helped to achieve their downfall. Is anyone seriously going to argue that we'd be better off if we hadn't done what we could to defeat the USSR and instead of the Taliban problem--which, given the problem of Islamo-fascism's appeal might have popped up elsewhere--we still faced the Soviet Union that might have recovered from their economic and moral doldrums? And maybe the problem isn't that we intervened to help anti-Soviet elements but that once we achieved that goal we walked away from Afghanistan without trying to shape an environment where the Taliban--created by Pakistan who must have a dreadful respect for the Westphalian system, by the way--seized power. Hmm?
I don't say we need to intervene directly in Syria. Practically speaking, we're too tired of ground war to even think about that now even if it was the perfect solution to the problem.
If Turkey wants to intervene, pat them on the back, cheer them on, and lead from behind or the side or wherever we can have a good view. But other than that, since the majority of Syrians want to fight their dictator, why not arm them? Did Assad refrain from hurting us during the Iraq War by sending jihadis who joined Saddam's Fedayeen during the invasion to fight us and later funneled al Qaeda suicide bombers into Iraq to kill, maim, and terrorize?
We have a chance to hurt an enemy for past deeds against us and which is a useful tool for Iran to hurt us in the future. Explain to me again why we shouldn't take this opportunity to hammer Assad?
