Huzzah! The Taipei Times’ J. Michael Cole broke the story this weekend that Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan has levied funds to field a squadron of between seven and eleven stealthy Hsun Hai (Swift Sea) fast patrol boats by 2014. ...
This is a topic I and my wingman (or am I his wingman?) Toshi Yoshihara have tracked closely over the past two years. ... The only trouble is that an island populated by 23 million inhabitants boasts too few resources to keep up with China’s helter-skelter naval buildup of recent years. Its surface fleet is an assemblage of aging, and aged, destroyers and frigates. Nor is any foreign government prepared to incur Beijing’s wrath by equipping the ROCN surface fleet with weaponry lethal enough to withstand a PLAN onslaught. ... Taiwan can no longer command the sea.
What it can do is disperse large numbers of small combatants to hardened sites – caves, shelters, fishing ports – around the island’s rough coast. Such vessels could sortie to conduct independent operations against enemy shipping. Or, they could mass their firepower in concerted “wolf pack” attacks on major PLAN formations. While Taiwan is no longer mistress of the waters lapping against its shores, “sea denial” lies within its modest means.
However welcome the news that Taipei is pursuing advanced fast attack craft, let’s not crack open the champagne just yet. First, it remains to be seen whether the Hsun Hsai program heralds a decisive turn to sea denial. According to the Taiwan Navy website: “The main mission for the ROC. Navy is to ensure the safety of our maritime space and secure our international shipping line unobstructed…In the war time, we can easily deal with our enemy’s blockade and interception operations to maintain Taiwan’s international shipping line unimpeded, and ensure Taiwan’s safety.” Preserving free navigation and resupplying outlying islands aren’t sea-denial functions, while territorial defense of the island – the core of sea denial – is strikingly absent from the ROCN’s vision and mission statements.
Yes, I too have gone on about the need for Taiwan to put small vessels in the strait and keep their bigger stuff away from sure destruction.
I'd add that Taiwan desperately needs submarines to operate in the Taiwan Strait.
But I don't denigrate the idea that Taiwan needs to hold open their supply lines to the east. That's a vital mission to keep supplies flowing until our armed forces intervene. Taiwan's legacy surface fleet may not be able to operate in the Taiwan Strait, but it can operate east of Taiwan to keep China from blockading Taiwan. Remember, as I noted in the second post noted above, Taiwan can't choose between holding open sea lines of communication or breaking up an invasion fleet--Taiwan needs to do both:
The bigger Taiwanese ships with air defense and anti-submarine capabilities are safer east of Taiwan where they can keep Taiwan's sea lines of communication open. Together with mine countermeasures vessels and helicopters, that's where these ships belong. Also, operating at the northern and southern tips of Taiwan, the bigger ships could use anti-ship missiles to strike into the strait area before retiring behind the shield of the home island.
But to operate in the strait itself under the shadow of Chinese power, Taiwan needs many small boats that can survive as long as possible (with stealth features, small size, and operating amongst ground clutter close to shore) to hit the invasion fleet in cooperation with shore-based helicopters with anti-ship missiles, air power, shore-based missiles, and submarines (get submarines fast!).
And again, don't forget the Harpoon-equipped subs!
