The Naval Institute Proceedings has an article discussing the rise of a century-old British author who wrote about naval power in relation to supporting land power. In one part, the article notes that the Chinese have absorbed some of Sir Julian Corbett's thinking in relation to sea control:
[The] official PLAN encyclopedia definition of “command of the sea” proclaims that local command is attainable in generally contested waters. Under such conditions, declare the authors, “each side must assume significant risk to operate [at sea], requiring effective sea control within a limited sea area and limited timeframe to conduct certain naval operations.”12 This is precisely what Corbett meant by “command in dispute,” which the Englishman describes as the “most important [stage of naval warfare] for practical strategy, since it is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and frequently all through it.” ...
These sober—and very Corbettian—Chinese pronouncements are a far cry from neo-Mahanian assertions that China can and should seek absolute command. In practical terms, this more realistic appraisal conforms to China’s offshore-defense strategy, which seeks to assert sea control for a finite time up to several hundred miles off the mainland’s coast. Corbett doubtless would have approved.
Indeed. It is no shock that the Chinese would seek to operate as best they can under our (US and our allies) overall naval superiority. That is just practical. What is interesting is that the Chinese are looking for theoretical justification for it, indicating that they really see a need to carry out such a mission of limited sea control for a specific mission on land.
Remember, China doesn't have to wrest control of the sea from us to defeat us in a war--getting sufficient command of the seas around Taiwan for a finite period of time will be enough for them in the short run.
