Sunday, December 19, 2010

Are We Doomed?

Given the opportunities we have as the result of our military victory in Iraq, I think the New York Times is a little overwrought:

The protracted political turmoil that saw the resurgence of a fiercely anti-American political bloc here is casting new doubt on establishing any enduring American military role in Iraq after the last of nearly 50,000 troops are scheduled to withdraw in the next 12 months, military and administration officials say. ...

Even as contingency planning for any lasting American mission has quietly continued in Baghdad and at the Pentagon, however, the shifting political landscape in both countries has made it increasingly possible that the 2011 withdrawal could truly be total, the officials said. Both Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki of Iraq and Mr. Obama, struggling to retain the support of their political bases, have repeated their public vows to adhere to the deadline.

Yes, both sides continue to insist that we will be out at the end of 2011. But in my mind, since we have an agreement right now that says that, what are both sides supposed to say? But given the weaknesses in Iraq's depth of military capabilities (having been rebuilt as a counter-insurgency force after 2003), it makes sense that we will have a new agreement that preserves American logistics, intelligence, special forces, training, aerial, and conventional capabilities to help the Iraqis fill in the military capability gaps, deter foreign threats, and try to snuff out the reduced terrorism threat.
 
Our presence will also help keep political differences in the political arena and give parties the confidence that they can remain in the political arena when fighting over political issues.

Yes, the presence of Sadr's pro-Iranian thugs in the government will complicate things. This is a problem. But this is not insurmountable, I think. The clear majority of Shias fear Iran and understand they need our military's presence. The Kurds want us to stay, given their history with the Arab majority. The Sunni Arabs desperately want us to stay to keep the Shia's from seeking revenge over their complicity in Saddam's reign of terror.

By all means, make plans that assume we will be out at the end of 2011. This will keep those inclined to oppose our continued presence from getting ammunition right now to scuttle negotiations that will take place after the Iraqi government is in place. Will the Sadrists really try to bring down the government by pulling out of the governing coalition? And risk their positions in the government when a new coalition might be formed without them?

But let's not get too far from reality. The Iraqis will ask us to negotiate a new agreement. Out troop numbers will be lower. But by putting some capabilities outside of Iraq, making more use of civilian contractors, and shaving our 6 combat brigades down to 4, we could halve our presence to 25,000, I should think. If we have to, we could have longer overlap time as units rotate to effectively put our on-the-ground strength up by several thousand above any limit set in an agreement.

But above all, remember that we must remain involved in Iraq to cement the victory we bought on the battlefield. An imperfect democracy is better than what we destroyed. And given time, an imperfect democracy can be improved. In the Middle East, a thriving Arab Moslem democracy could be revolutionary.