Tuesday, March 02, 2010

A Spasm is Not a Strategy

Iran could attempt to retaliate if they are attacked by either Israel or America (and France?) seeking to take out their nuclear facilities.

This author believes Iran could retaliate against any air offensive against their nuclear facilities with programs to ramp up insurgents and terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan:

Iran has a history of supplying surrogates to do its fighting. Along with Syria, Iran provided Hezbollah sophisticated weapons used against Israel in the 2006 Second Lebanon War. Perhaps of most concern to Israel was a variety of rockets with ranges of 20 to 100 kilometers. During that war, despite the best efforts of the Israeli Defense Force, the daily barrage of rockets did not end until the cease-fire took effect.

Hezbollah also employed high-end antitank guided missiles, which took a heavy toll on the Israeli Army, as well as air-to-ground missiles [NOTE: I assume the author means ground-to-ground rockets], anti-ship missiles and even unmanned aerial vehicles. None of these weapons has shown up in significant numbers in Iraq or Afghanistan—yet.

If Iran did introduce them, the level of violence and the risk to civilians and military installations would escalate significantly. Air-to-ground missiles and antitank guided missiles, integrated with improvised explosive devices, would dramatically increase risks for U.S. and coalition soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Particularly worrisome would be the introduction of portable air-defense missiles, commonly known as MANPADS, into Afghanistan. Mobility in Afghanistan depends upon airplanes and helicopters. Threats to flight would severely hamper current operations.

In this regard, we should remember that what unhinged the Soviet Union in Afghanistan was a similar increase in enemy capability when the United States gave the Mujahedeen Stinger missiles. The battlefield, including cities, could get much deadlier.

Iran can accomplish this without directly engaging coalition personnel with its own military forces. In essence, it can deliver a Lebanon-like war to Iraq and Afghanistan. It's a scenario the United States and Israel must seriously consider before pulling the trigger.

I think the author's worry about Iraqi insurgents and terrorists replicating what Hezbollah did in Lebanon in 2006 is seriously flawed.

Really, Hezbollah won not because of their weapons or tactics were great but because they were good enough to fight off an Israeli attack that was botched at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Troops weren't ready for combat and the leadership didn't order any type of ground offensive suitable for anything but token resistance. And reliance on aerial attacks (that killed civilian Lebanese) quickly exhausted the world's patience for Israel to harm Hezbollah. Israel screwed the pooch, as I wrote back then.

One, none of our enemies in Iraq or Afghanistan has the status of being a virtual state controlling a sanctuary as Hezbollah did in southern Lebanon. That is the reason Hezbollah could import and accumulate longer range rockets. In Iraq, it was too difficult for insurgents and terrorists to carry around anything other than the short-range 107mm rockets that they did use to bombard the Green Zone from Sadr City until we pushed out our security zone to cover launch areas. (See the chart here for rocket sizes)  Do you really think insurgents or terrorists can lug around 122mm or 240mm rockets except for maybe an occasional television operation? And why would terrorists even bother to use long-range rockets (or any rockets, really) when IEDs have worked just swell to slaughter civilians?

Nor would anti-tank missiles do the enemy much good. They learned the hard way not to take us on in conventional operations and instead they rely on IEDs. Hezbollah's success also relied on poor Israeli tactics and troops ill-trained to take on Hezbollah fighters who used light infantry tactics to hold fortified positions.

The notion of either Iraqi or Afghan (especially, being landlocked) terrorists successfully using anti-ship missiles or UAVs is laughable. Even Hezbollah only got off a lucky salvo when they used anti-ship missiles and their UAV use was a novelty item. Neither affected the outcome of the campaign.

I will grant that surface-to-air missiles could have an impact against helicopter operations. But with most of our air power flying higher because they use GPS bombs and missiles, man portable missiles are worthless against them.

We did shut down insurgent flak traps that used heavy machine guns in Iraq in the latter days of the insurgency. Also consider that we use parachutes (including GPS guided ones) a lot to send supplies to outposts and that our helicopters are more resistant to damage and have better counter-measures than the old Soviet choppers. And our Stingers are much better than anything Iran can hand out. Plus we have some Ospreys that have a speed advantage over helicopters. In short, while even portable SAMS would compel us to operate differently, it would not cripple our operations to the point of changing the outcome of the war.

Remember that we did beat Iran and Syria when they were trying very hard to support insurgents and terrorists in Iraq. Why didn't Iran supply those wonder weapons to either Afghan or Iraqi terrorists back then if they could be so decisive? And even if they could have been decisive in Iraq in 2006-2007, the security situation in Iraq is far different today. And if Taliban forces in Paksitan where they have territory to hold did not manage to get portable SAMS, could insurgents and terrorists in Iraq or Afghanistan use them effectively?

Iran also has to worry about crossing a line that could cause us to retaliate overtly. We did once or twice against Syria, recall, for their support for terrorists in Iraq. And we may have quietly done so in Iran, if rumors I read back in the day are correct.

So there are numerous reasons not to take this worry about Iranian retaliation in this manner seriously. Sure, violence could rise in Iraq or Afghanistan for a while if Iran tries to carry this idea out, but if we refuse to panic we can respond effectively.

A spasm is not a strategy. Although it does make for some good headlines breathlessly speaking about a "resurgent" enemy.

UPDATE: I'd forgotten that actual SAMs didn't work out so well for the Sunni Arab insurgency early in the war in Iraq:

These missiles were used in Iraq, without much success. Early in the war, up to a dozen Russian made missiles have been fired in Iraq a year. Few aircraft were hit, and most were able to land. It's uncertain exactly how many missiles were fired because several are known to have been duds (because of missile parts found), and other duds have probably not been found. So the missiles are still a threat, but not a large threat, at least judging by the damage these missiles have actually done in the last two decades. There were lots of viable SAM-7s in Iraq because Saddam had bought new ones, and tried to keep older models in good shape.

Could Iran really do a better job than Saddam's boys managed?