Last month, Iran moved its enriched uranium from underground facilities, to an aboveground building. This made the enriched uranium, which could eventually (once enriched sufficiently) be used in a nuclear weapon, an easy target for an air strike. It's as if the Iranian leadership was inviting Israel (which Iran often and loudly vows to destroy) to come in and attack. Very curious behavior, but understandable. That's because the government of Iran sees an attack on that enriched uranium as one of the few things that can save the government from being overthrown.
I've heard it said a lot that Iran would welcome an attack as strengthening their regime. I doubt that. But then, Saddam apparently thought that he'd endure anything we could dish out in 2003 and Osama welcomed our attack on the Taliban and al Qaeda in 2001. So even if Iran welcomes an attack, that doesn't mean they're right.
An interesting conclusion of this interpreation is that regime preservation trumps nuclear weapons. Would Iran really trade their raw material for nukes in order to get the public to rally behind the regime? How long would the rallying effect last? how long would it take to replace the enriched Uranium?
Further, if Iran is willing to make that trade, why have negotiations failed over the past several years? Implicitly the West has offered security for abandoning nukes, yet Iran has stubbornly pressed forward on nukes. And we have the North Korean parallel example of a nuclear state refusing to exchange nukes for an American guarantee of peace. Why would iran be different?
So if Iran didn't screw up with their positioning of their Uranium, why did they do it?
What if it was a Red Herring designed to get America or Israel to attack and lead us to believe we'd crippled Iran's nuclear drive? What if Iran's Uranium enrichment program (and their Plutonium program) are meant for the long term and not for getting their first atomic bomb, because they know that sufficient progress in either is a red line that could trigger an attack?
The problem from Iran's point of view is that they can't know if crossing one of these lines could trigger an American or Israeli preemptive strike out of fear that further delay in attacking would be too late to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. And if I was an Iranian nutball, I wouldn't assume the Americans and Israelis couldn't knock out my infrastructure.
Were I an Iranian nutball, under those circumstances, I'd want at least a few atomic warhead on hand before I announce capabilities to produce atomic weapons-grade material. Which would mean I'd have had to have bought some from either North Korea or Pakistan--or possibly even from some broke custodian of Russia's arsenal.
If Iran can announce both the ability to make nuclear bomb material and the possession of actual nuclear weapons--perhaps by detonating one in a test on their own territory--Tehran would quite possibly deter an attack on Iran's nuclear infrastructure.
We're not dealing with idiots. If the Iranian mullahs believe there are red lines that trigger Israeli or American action, why wouldn't they take counter-actions rather than just blindly cross those lines and provide a pretext for military action against them?
We could be dealing with at least an idiot who had the authority to move the enriched Uranium, but not the common sense to realize what could happen.
But with if we're not dealing with idiots? What if the Iranians have a few purchased nuclear warheads and just need time to get them on missiles? What if the mullahs fear we're on the verge of attacking them successfully, and Iran isn't quite ready to make any announcements that could stay our hand? What if they think that sacrificing their enriched Uranium to an attack by Israel or America--and any outrage the Iranians can gin up--will buy them that time?
I'm reasonably sure we're dealing with nuts (from our point of view) in Tehran. But they aren't stupid.
