It's hardly worth going back over all of the twists and turns of US-North Korean nuclear diplomacy in order to look at the Bush administration's current embarrassing position. The pattern has been set, with relatively minor interruptions of sanity, since 1994: the US makes tough-sounding threats, North Korea cheats/provokes/lies, the US expresses disappointment and then offers second-chances accompanied by generous concessions.
The difference is that since 2002, we haven't pretended not to notice North Korea's push toward nuclear weapons. We still talk, but less aid flows to Pyongyang and the North Korean military continues to erode and the North Korean government continues on the path of either regime or actual state collapse. I'm just fine with talking as long as the North Korean regime continues to wither while we smile at them and debate the next meeting agenda for weeks on end.
And I'm not aware of generous concessions. What exactly are we losing by talking without opening the money spigot? North Korea's bargaining position is based on their ability to conquer or destroy Seoul. Today, North Korea can't seize Seoul when once they probably could have. In time, South Korea will gain the ability to invade North Korea and carve our a no-launch zone that pushes North Korean artillery out of range of Seoul. And if we had ended talks in 2002, what would have persuaded North Korea to refrain from attacking out of desperation while their military power was greater? Talks keep the North Koreans from rolling the dice with an attack by holding open the possibility of our whipping out the check book and writing the big bribe. A little bit of aid that simply dangles the hope of the big payoff while not slowing North Korea's collapse is no concession.
And just what should we do instead? Nuke North Korea? Attack with conventional weapons? Cut off all aid and blockade North Korea?
Yeah, we could get away with a preemtive nuclear strike. And a conventional campaign would have to be done from sea only and Guam-based strategic bombers. South Korea and Japan would hardly help right now. As for a blockade and end of all American aid, South Korea would still send aid if it wished and China can make up for any shortfalls from our action.
North Korea failed to fully detonate a nuclear device in 2006. It fizzled. And the North Koreans would have to weaponize a nuclear device before it is a weapon. The North Koreans fizzled a stationary device tended by lots of scientists and technicians. That is a far cry from making something that can detonate small enough to fit in a warhead and go off after a ballistic missile flight. Nor do the North Koreans have a missile to reach us. So North Korea is not a direct nuclear threat to us. We have time.
And remember that South Korea won't take action. What could we do without their full support and bases?
As long as South Korea doesn't want to risk Seoul, let them risk it if there is no North Korean threat to destroy an American city. That way, South Korea takes the first hit should North Korea roll the dice. Hey, that's Seoul's choice. But we'll have all the South Korean cooperation we need at that point. Remember, we've pulled our forces from their tripwire position on the DMZ. Our troops will no longer die in large numbers should North Korea attack south. Our troops are no longer hostages to North Korean actions.
If North Korea gains the ability to nuke one of our cities, we have to revisit the whole question of what we would do. Protecting our cities would take priority over South Korean worries about Seoul. That's just the way it is. Unless North Korea becomes a threat to our cities, we talk and we talk. And North Korea dies a little more each day. Hopefully they die before they get long-range nuclear-tipped missiles. At least they will be weaker conventionally by that point giving us more options to dealing with the threat.
Of course, if a new administration in January decides to whip out the check book as the Dear Leader is counting on, the whole strategy goes down the drain. Then we could be back to the 1994-2002 strategy of writing checks and ignoring North Korean progress toward nuclear weapons.
But until and unless we follow Pyongyang's script for the talks, give North Korea time to die by talking them to death.
