The demonstration that troops apparently hopelessly outclassed can make a good showing -- even if they have to do nothing more complicated than die in place in their bunkers -- is useful. Iran's ill-coordinated light infantry forces were stubborn obstacles to Iraq's ambitions when deplyed in the cities of Khuzestan. Fighting a determined foe block by block and house by house as the Iraqis died in Khorramshahr would force our Army to play by our enemy's rules. Although it is possible that information dominance could extend our superioirty in open warfare to urban areas, that breakthrough has not happened. We must not forget that urban conditions may limit our technological and training advantages, lest we epxerience our own Khorramshahr debacle on day.
Strategypage notes that the enemy thought they could achieve exactly this inside Fallujah in the fall of 2004:
Most of the fighting was done by small groups – fire teams and squads – with little or no direct supervision by higher command. Their orders were essentially to impede the U.S./Iraq forces by any means necessary. Their tactics relied heavily on traps, ambushes, infiltration, and long range fire. This is how the Japanese fought the final battles of World War II. It was based on the assumption that, if you could not beat the Americans, then you could at least try to hurt them.
But Fallujah in fall 2004 showed that fanatical enemies who are expected only to die in place can be killed without letting the enemy kill lots of our troops in the process. Five thousand of our troops ripped apart 4,000 defenders:
The end result of all this was a two week campaign that resulted in some 500 American and Iraqi casualties, but the obliteration of the defending force (1,200, 1,500 captured, the rest either got out, or were buried in bombed buildings). While the enemy were not, compared to the U.S. troops, well trained, they were motivated, and often refused to surrender. But the speed and violence of the American assault prevented any coordinated defense. The U.S. troops quickly cut the city into sectors, that were then methodically cleared out.
So the enemy's plan did not work out and my worries were shown to be misguided or obsolete. Most charitably, we were successful in creating the information dominance in the ten years since I wrote that cities were a dangerous place for our troops.
Of course, this doesn't tell us how we could uproot skilled defenders who fight an organized regimental battle to defend a city against our attacks. But sheer hatred and willingness to die aren't the equalizer our enemies assumed they had. Or what I assumed ten years ago.
UPDATE: In my own defense, even though we smashed up the Fallujah defenders rapidly, keep in mind that it took us about the same time and casualties to take one city from 4,000 defenders as it did to take the entire country from several hundred thousand Iraqi military personnel.
