Despite the heritage of the Cold War, I think the Army is adapting better these days as this Strategypage post describes it. Four fewer heavy brigades will be retained in the force being developed in favor of lighter forces while four brigade sets of armor will be forward deployed in places such as South Korea and Kuwait.
But this change is not coming easily. In part of his commentary on the so-called revolt of the generals, Jack Kelly notes this:
The real problem is Secretary Rumsfeld pays too much deference to generals who are demonstrably incompetent, Col. Macgregor said. The night Baghdad fell, Mr. Rumsfeld asked the Army ground forces commander how long it would take to get an armored brigade to Saddam's home town of Tikrit, Col. Macgregor recounted. The answer was 10 days. Mr. Rumsfeld then asked the Marines, who got there in 12 hours.
Back in April 2003, I has assumed that an Army force would drive north to Tikrit after bouncing Baghdad. The Marines, I thought, had pushed themselves to the limits in their unprecedented drive inland using their AAVs beyond their design capabilities. Even reaching Baghdad required the attachment of significant Army logistics assets to I MEF.
But instead of 3rd ID saddling up with their cavalry squadron in the lead, three Marine LAV battalions (I'm going by memory) struck north to forestall a last stand in Tikrit.
I have long wondered why and had assumed it was some sort of slight against the Army. But no, we did it to ourselves. After boldly dropping a weak parachute brigade (173rd) into northern Iraq with a dozen or more Iraqi divisions around them, we couldn't even send 3rd ID north with some type of cobbled-together brigade with the regime in collapse? Shoot, a 3rd ID cavalry squadron and a mechanized task force, plus an infantry battalion from 82nd or 101st AB couldn't have been pushed up the road in short order? What the Hell?
So instead, the Marines cobbled together a 3-battalion "brigade" to do the job. Can you imagine how Marines would feel if an Army 101st AB battalion was assigned to hit a beach using their helicopters because the Marines said they couldn't do it for a week and a half? To me, this is what sending Marines on an exploitation mission should feel to the Army--we who set the land-speed record in the Middle East.
And remember that a Marine took over EUCOM not long ago--a post traditionally held by the Army since the Army apparently couldn't get the expeditionary message fast enough. And for the first time a Marine general is Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
George S. Patton would slap somebody over this. And justifiably, too.
