Showing posts sorted by relevance for query zakaria. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query zakaria. Sort by date Show all posts

Thursday, April 12, 2012

Good God, He's Such a Fool

Could Fareed Zakaria be any dumber than to call Iran's agreement to negotiate a triumph of President Obama's policies? Does Zakaria want to be national security advisor so bad that he can spout such nonsense without even a twinge of guilt? Does Obama even get satisfaction from such op-ed stroking?

Zakaria may want a position in a second term of President Obama, but sadly I don't think Zakaria is spouting nonsense for personal gain. I think the man actually believes he is brilliant--a super genius, even.

The idea that Iran's agreement to negotiate is anything other than a means to buy time and hold off strikes or worse sanctions is about what I've come to expect from a man who clearly couldn't find his own buttocks with both hands and a GPS signal.

How can I know this? Because Zakaria gets dumber as he goes. Zakaria thinks that Iran can come to an agreement with us that leaves Iran with enough 20%-enriched uranium that could be enough (once enriched to even highter levels, a relatively easy step) for one bomb but halt their enrichment to lower levels only appropriate for civilian use.

The only problem is that Zakaria fails to understand that Iran wants nuclear bombs more than it wants a deal. Zakaria--bless his heart--actually believes the Iranians don't want a bomb. Or he believes they haven't decided to take the final step to building atomic bombs. Zakaria--bless his innocent heart again--actually believes Ayatollah Khameini when he said:

“The Iranian nation has never pursued and will never pursue nuclear weapons . . . because the Islamic Republic, logically, religiously and theoretically, considers the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin and believes the proliferation of such weapons is senseless, destructive and dangerous.”

Well then. That's it. If Khameini said that logic, religion, and theory precludes nukes, why negotiate with Iran at all?

Why not just end all the confrontations and negotiations, shake hands and simply wish the Iranians the best of luck in developing cheap, green nuclear energy? So sorry about the misunderstanding! But hey, you guys try dealing with Netanyahu, eh?

Oh, and Zakaria says to reach his negotiated outcome that Obama has to keep those dastardly Republicans from standing in the way of the big-brained deal that Zakaria outlined. Zakaria prefaced that with this nonsense:

The administration has handled its allies, Russia, China, the United Nations and even Tehran with skill.

Oh my God! Has Zakaria no shame? From now on, Wikipedia will need a picture of Zakaria for their entry for "suck up." Get a room, Fareed.

Sometimes I can still be stunned at how idiotic Zakaria is. Damn, still before noon and I find I need a drink to dull the pain of the idiocy that I inflicted on my frontal lobes.

Tuesday, October 23, 2007

The Mark of Sophistication

Zakaria doesn't think much of the Iranian threat or the Americans who feel threatened:


At a meeting with reporters last week, President Bush said that "if you're interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing [Iran] from having the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon." These were not the barbs of some neoconservative crank or sidelined politician looking for publicity. This was the president of the United States, invoking the specter of World War III if Iran gained even the knowledge needed to make a nuclear weapon.

The American discussion about Iran has lost all connection to reality. Norman Podhoretz, the neoconservative ideologist whom Bush has consulted on this topic, has written that Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is "like Hitler … a revolutionary whose objective is to overturn the going international system and to replace it in the fullness of time with a new order dominated by Iran and ruled by the religio-political culture of Islamofascism." For this staggering proposition Podhoretz provides not a scintilla of evidence.

Here is the reality. Iran has an economy the size of Finland's and an annual defense budget of around $4.8 billion. It has not invaded a country since the late 18th century. The United States has a GDP that is 68 times larger and defense expenditures that are 110 times greater. Israel and every Arab country (except Syria and Iraq) are quietly or actively allied against Iran. And yet we are to believe that Tehran is about to overturn the international system and replace it with an Islamo-fascist order? What planet are we on?


Is Zakaria serious?

The threat isn't from a nationalist Iran that looks to its self interests, but from cultish Shia Islamists who simply have the luck to rule Iran at this period of history to use the power of Iran for goals unrelated to Iran narrowly. When Iran's ruling mullahs tell the world that they'd take one for the team and happily sacrifice Iran itself in order to annihilate Israel, in what sense is it relevant to recount Iran's history?

The most direct answer to his question about whether Iran is serious about ruling the Moslem world and dominating the rest of us is to note that this is exactly what al Qaeda wants. Are they nuts? You bet. Did this stop them from hitting us on 9/11? Nope. And if 19 guys with boxcutters can do that much damage to us, what could an Iran of 70 million people, an economy the size of Finland's, and $5 billion in defense spending do? The question isn't whether Iran is about to overturn the international system, as Zakaria falsely states the problem, but whether they believe god wills them to rule and how many will die in their efforts to fulfill that destiny.

And if it isn't "invading" what do you call Iranian efforts to subvert the governments of Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain? What do you call their efforts to control Syria and Gaza, and their efforts in the past to bully Kuwait? The aggression is clear enough.

More broadly, the threat of World War III is indeed real if Iran gets the atomic bomb. Even if Iran has but one bomb and wipes out Tel Aviv with it, Israel will hit Iran in response with multiple atomic bombs. How will the Moslem world react? How will Pakistan react if their people feel pressured to respond with the "Islamic bomb" they've long claimed to possess. How will nuclear-armed India react to Pakistan? And how will nuclear-armed China react to India? And how do we react to China?

What if Iran does something really nuts like nuke Israel but saves a few in reserve and announces they will nuke India if Israel retaliates? With little point in retaliating against Iran, already glowing from Israeli nukes, would India hit Pakistan just in case? Perhaps out of fear that Pakistan will seize the chance to hit India? Or out of fear that the Iranian nuclear strike will cripple India so much that India sinks below an undamaged Pakistan in the following decades?

Once nuclear missiles start flying, where does it stop? Do we count on Israelis, Pakistanis, Indians, Chinese, or Americans to think that it would be overreaction to respond to a nuclear attack on their people and thus end a chain reaction?

And if Iran uses multiple atomic bombs, nearly wiping out Israel, will Israel restrict their nuclear response to Iran if the Israelis believe latent Arab hostility will exploit the chaos and destruction to renew the war on hold today only because Israeli strength deters them now? Will Israel strike their avowed enemy Syria, too, to be safe? Or add in Egypt and Saudi Arabia for good measure?

Even if Iran doesn't use their nuclear weapons, but just wants them to protect their terror campaigns or even just to deter us from invading, how long will it be before all those fearful Arab states Zakaria notes get nuclear weapons? Will they use them against Iran? Against one another? Will they lose one that gets picked up by terrorists? Will some hopped up jihadi infiltrate the nuclear arsenal and push the button in even one launch facility?

Is this close enough to risking World War III for Zakaria?

We are dealing with fanatics in Iran. Can they beat us? Unless we go all fetal and just give up, no they can't. We do have the power to crush them. But will we?

And what would the price be if Iran is nuclear armed? Even if we fight this enemy and ultimately crush them, Zakaria misses the point of the damage that they can cause until we win. Is Bin Laden's dream of a caliphate under his rule insane? Sure. Did he kill nearly 3,000 of us on 9/11? Yes. Zakaria seems to be claiming that any threat that can't destroy us utterly just doesn't count.

Zakaria's very question of why we deal with North Korea yet fear what Ahmadinejad would do with atomic weapons is a use of his knowledge to obscure rather than illuminate this critical point.

Why do we worry about an Iran that has not starved millions of its people while we talk to North Korea which has? Let me clue in Dr. Zakaria: Other than a few fans on American college campuses and International ANSWER, Kim Jong-Il has no potential Kimmunist recruits around the globe. Nor does the North Korean elite seem eager to commit suicide to advance Stalinism. Kim's North Korea is containable, in theory.

Ahmadinejad seeks the end of the world, it seems; and can hope to sway a billion Moslems even if 90% are Sunni and not Shia. Ahmadinejad can cause us tremendous problems--and kill perhaps tens of millions of us--by posing as Islam's champion against a West that he blames for Islam's problems.

In regard to this Islamofascism that Zakaria discounts, Christopher Hitchens has the right idea:


This makes it permissible, it seems to me, to mention the two phenomena in the same breath and to suggest that they constitute comparable threats to civilization and civilized values. There is one final point of comparison, one that is in some ways encouraging. Both these totalitarian systems of thought evidently suffer from a death wish. It is surely not an accident that both of them stress suicidal tactics and sacrificial ends, just as both of them would obviously rather see the destruction of their own societies than any compromise with infidels or any dilution of the joys of absolute doctrinal orthodoxy. Thus, while we have a duty to oppose and destroy these and any similar totalitarian movements, we can also be fairly sure that they will play an unconscious part in arranging for their own destruction, as well.


The fanaticism of our jihadi enemies lead them to kill us even as their eagerness to die in order to kill us makes it easier for us to kill them and beat them. This is true whether we are speaking of Sunni Arab or Shia Persian fanatics. But we have to choose to fight them to exploit this weakness.

Oh, and I remember that Bernard Lewis article that Zakaria ridicules as proof that Iran isn't a threat. Zakaria gets this wrong, too. Lewis didn't predict the end of the world on August 22, 2006, he explained the significance of the date and said it is something to watch. I wrote:


Bernard Lewis (via Real Clear Politics) is wondering about Iran, August 22nd, and nukes. He doesn't say it is likely that we would see a nuclear "answer" to our demands--just that it bears watching[.]


Follow the link in the quote from my post to read what Lewis said rather than trust Zakaria's description--or mine.

Zakaria is so sophisticated that he remembers not how Lewis actually wrote about that date, but how Lewis should have written about August 22, 2006 to bolster Zakaria's dismissal of the threat posed by Iran's mullahs.

Zakaria is too sophisticated to worry about the deaths of millions of Americans due to an Iranian atomic weapon as long as in the end we still win that struggle. Zakaria represents well that class of Americans who are so worldly that they affect a sophisticated disdain for the very idea that any threat must compel us to defend ourselves from them.

The question is, what planet is Zakaria on?

Sunday, June 15, 2014

Oops, He Did It Again

Ah, Fareed Zakaria weighs in on Iraq. God bless him. But the man couldn't find his own buttocks with both hands and a GPS signal. But let's look anyway, shall we?

You are never going to guess who Zakaria blames for the current Iraq crisis. Go on. Guess!

Okay, sure, he puts in Prime Minister Maliki. The man who is in charge when the crisis explodes is surely a likely suspect, no?

Zakaria blames Maliki for the failure to get a status of forces agreement to keep American troops in Iraq after 2011, when any sentient being with a half-functioning brain stem (and you'd think this would include Zakaria, but apparently not) knows that President Obama had no interest at all in finding a way to get to "yes."

We could have gotten an executive agreement but we insisted on parliament passing the agreement; and we pledged so few troops that Maliki could not afford to alienate Iran just to attempt to get a mere 5,000 American troops that the Obama administration offered to keep in Iraq. (I wanted 25,000 including 3 training brigades plus special forces and air power to help finish off al Qaeda and keep Iraqis from abandoning politics for violence to resolve differences.) The benefit-cost ratio was just too low for Maliki to risk defeat trying to keep us in Iraq.

Obama let the discussions languish and then when 2011 neared its end, said "We tried. So sorry." President Obama got exactly what he wanted. Don't try to pretend otherwise now.

But you'd be wrong if you thought Zakaria included President Obama as the other man in charge of a relevant country when the crisis explodes.

No, Zakaria blames George W. Bush. Yes, more than five years after the shadow of cowboyism lifted from the Oval Office and the world, Zakaria blames Bush.

Behold, puny mortals, the prodigious output of Zakaria's ginormous brain!

[The Bush administration] quickly decided to destroy Iraq’s Sunni ruling establishment and empower the hard-line Shiite religious parties that had opposed Saddam Hussein. This meant that a structure of Sunni power that had been in the area for centuries collapsed. These moves — to disband the army, dismantle the bureaucracy and purge Sunnis in general — might have been more consequential than the invasion itself.

One, we did not disband the Iraqi army. It collapsed and went home. There was nothing to disband.

Two, if Saddam's army hadn't collapsed we'd have had to disband it. In what world would the Kurds and Shias have sided with us if we had simply played musical chairs with minority-Sunni Arab (10-15%) domination of Iraq?

It was also absolutely necessary to purge the bureaucracy of higher ranking Sunnis and promote Shias (and Kurds) in the rebuilt security forces to keep the overthrow of Saddam from looking like new ruler same as the old ruler.

Having betrayed the Shias once in 1991 when they rose up against Saddam and we watched Saddam slaughter them into passivity, could we really have screwed the Shias a second time and not expected them to rise up against us?

Three, we actually fought the hard-line Shia religious parties. Remember Moqtada al Sadr, that breathing piece of garbage who we fought in two separate campaigns in 2004? And then again we fought the Shia hardliners in Sadr City during the surge offensive of 2007? Remember that? Zakaria, apparently, does not.

We had to put the Shias in the dominant position. Had to. Anything else would have led to a national uprising against us that had us fighting Sunni Arabs (Baathists and al Qaeda) and Iranian-backed Shias (while the Kurds hunkered down in the north).

If you must Blame Bush for allowing the disastrous Maliki into office, also remember that in spring 2008, Maliki showed he'd take on the Iranian-backed Shias (including Sadr) by mounting an offensive against them in Basra (the Charge of the Knights offensive). That Maliki stopped looking beyond sectarian divisions after we left in 2011 can't really be blamed on the Bush-era Maliki, now can it?

What might we have done had we stayed after 2011 to keep Maliki in line?

However, if you must include Maliki in the blame game while blaming Bush ultimately for Maliki, let's not forget the Obama administration's role in perpetuating Maliki's rule. In 2010, the Obama administration sided with Maliki cobbling together a parliamentary majority even though he did not win the most votes in that year's election. So the Obama administration ratified the so-called horrible Bush-era elevation of Maliki.

I almost always regret reading Zakaria. The man truly thinks he can get a government position in the foreign policy establishment in this administration. I shudder in horror that the wise and level-headed Susan Rice or that master of diplomatic nuance John Kerry might be replaced by Zakaria.

Without Zakaria, President Obama has managed to pull the spectre of defeat in Iraq from the jaws of Bush-engineered victory. We have enough problems in Iraq without letting Zakaria have any type of influence at all over what we do.

Saturday, November 24, 2012

He Really Does Try, God Bless Him

Fareed Zakaria takes a stab at blaming Israel for the lack of peace with the Palestinians. I have mentioned that Zakaria couldn't find his own buttocks with both hands and a GPS signal, right? I have? Good. But I never tire of pointing it out since Zakaria never tires of demonstrating it.

Zakaria cites the statistics that proves Israel is the dominant military power in the region. True enough, but there's more to it than that simple recitation of statistics.

He then says that because Israel is so dominant militarily, that peace will only come when Israel decides to take risks to make peace:

These are the realities of the Middle East today. Israel’s astonishing economic growth, its technological prowess, its military preparedness and its tight relationship with the United States have set it a league apart from its Arab adversaries. Peace between the Palestinians and Israelis will come only when Israel decides that it wants to make peace.

And here I thought evacuating the Gaza Strip was "taking a risk for peace," as Zakaria urges Israel to do.

The short Gaza fight came close to demonstrating why air power--the apex of technological arms--alone is insufficient: Israel was short of Iron Dome air defense missiles.

Yes, the technology of Iron Dome is amazing. Yet if Hamas had kept firing the rockets that Palestinians put together in their garages and the World War II-descended longer-ranged rockets that Iran supplied, that amazing technology just wouldn't have mattered.

The same applies to the Israeli military as a whole. The reality is that Israel relies on reservists for their military superiority. Israel is fine without the reservists as long as a war is restricted to an air campaign--or cyber-war, I suppose.

When Israel mobilizes their ground power, their astonishing economic growth comes to a grinding halt as people who do all the things that make their economy "astonishing" to Zakaria put on a uniform.

Israel is then on the clock. They must win a short and decisive ground campaign--and then demobilize. If they can't do that, their military can't remain in the field for long.

Zakaria thinks that because Israel can win any short conventional war, they can take a risk for peace. The problem is, their enemies won't fight a short conventional war with Israel. And Israel doesn't escalate every armed provocation to the level of a short, conventional campaign.

How does Zakaria's confidence in Israeli conventional power affect Hamas thinking? Despite Israel's overwhelming military power, Hamas struck Israel's cities, confident that Israel would not use their military to crush Gaza and arrest every Hamas leader they could grab to put them on trial and hang them by the neck after a fair trial.

If the Palestinians weren't so eager to continue to kill Jews, the reality of Israel's astonishing economic growth, technological prowess, military preparedness, and relationship with America might make Hamas think perhaps provoking Israel by trying to kill Jews isn't the best idea.

But rather than try to build a real state in the land they hold (which Israel took a risk to evacuate), Hamas and the other (God help us) more radical factions continue to rejoice in the ability to take shots at Jewish civilians. Oh, and if any Arab citizens of Israel are in the way where the rockets land? Oh well.

Or does Zakaria's deep plan assume Hamas be allowed to build a conventional military that Israel can destroy and therefore make Hamas less interested in killing Jews?

Good God, he's an effing idiot. I actually weep when I contemplate the possibility that the Obama administration looks to Zakaria for insights on foreign policy.

Monday, June 21, 2010

Well, He Does Know Fantasy ...

Fareed Zakaria never fails to astound me. He lives on a fantasy world and calls it "realism."

In regard to Iran, Zakaria argues that the idea of a revolution against the mullahs in Iran is a fantasy:

Ironically, those hoping to liberate Iranians are the same people urging punitive sanctions and even military force against Iran. Do they think that when the bombs hit, those who wear green will be spared?

He doesn't think much of sanctions or military force, either, I guess. I'm puzzled why it should be odd for those who support a revolution against the mullahs to also support sanctions or war. The objective is to keep the mullahs from getting nukes, right? Doing nothing fails to achieve that objective. War, sanctions, or revolt could achieve the objective. Why is it odd to think that way? After all, Secretary Gates clearly believes that the alternative to any of those measures is unacceptable:

"I don't think we're prepared to even talk about containing a nuclear Iran. I think... our view still is we do not accept the idea of Iran having nuclear weapons," he said in an interview with Fox News Sunday.

"And our policies and our efforts are all aimed at preventing that from happening," he said.

Asked whether a military strike against Iran was preferable to it acquiring nuclear weapons, Gates said all options remained on the table but added: "I think we have some time to continue working this problem."

To turn around Zakaria's objection that bombs or sanctions could hurt those Iranians who oppose the mullahs, I'd ask whether Zakaria would really find it a comfort that those wearing green in Iran might be really, really sad that their mullah rulers nuked Charleston.

As a bonus, does Zakaria really believe that the mullahs would be troubled that a nuclear attack on an American city would not spare "realists" like Zakaria who think Iran can be deterred--or even those who support Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions?

But if you doubt that Zakaria lives in a fantasy world, let me close with a quote from near the beginning of his opinion piece:

In a June 10 speech, later published as a cover essay in the New Republic, McCain urged that we "unleash America's full moral power" to topple the Tehran regime. The speech highlights one of the crucial failings of McCain's worldview, one in which rhetoric replaces analysis and fantasy substitutes for foreign policy. [emphasis added]

Zakaria is a fan of Obama's foreign policy, so I suppose it doesn't occur to Zakaria that his slam on McCain is actually a pretty good description of the Obama foreign policy.

Clearly, Zakaria has learned to stop worrying and love the Iranian bomb. The possibility of overthrowing the mullahs is fantasy, to him. Deterring Iran with nukes, however, is not a fantasy.

How is this man considered an insightful analyst of world affairs? He couldn't find his own buttocks with both hands and a GPS device.

Wednesday, June 12, 2013

God Help Us if Zakaria Has Influence in the White House

If Fareed Zakaria thinks we should not intervene in Syria, I'm tempted to think we should send in 3rd Army right now.

The idea that someone might swoon over Zakaria's analysis of Syria is just depressing. The man couldn't find his own buttocks with both hands and a GPS signal, I say. Yet he says we should not intervene in Syria as Zakaria strokes the wisdom of President Obama for staying out (does Zakaria still hope for a position in the second term of the administration?).

We don't have to "own" Syria if we intervene. I don't think we need to impose a no-fly zone or otherwise strike Syrian targets, let alone send in ground troops. Our intervention can consist of sending arms to rebels, humanitarian aid to Syrians outside of Assad's control, and pressure to get Assad to go into exile so that even an Alawite mini-state might evolve away from alliance with Iran.

The idea that attempting to influence events to our favor and against Iran means we own the outcome is just ridiculous.

Because you know what Zakaria's analysis going back to the post-Ottoman Empire settling of borders and minority regimes in the region fails to mention? Iran.

Zakaria completely ignores Iran's interests and actions right now in Syria, perhaps eating up time on the video with his absolutely fascinating discussion of minority regimes. We have an interest in giving our enemy Iran a bloody nose and reducing their influence in the region by destroying the Assad regime, which achieves a bank shot of also weakening Hezbollah and Hamas.

Freaking idiot. I guess I picked a bad day to stop sniffing glue.

UPDATE: I didn't think Syria was a simple case of the Alawites being put in charge after World War I. My memory was that it was far more recent. Alawite domination was a more nuanced process than Zakaria makes it out.

And now that I think about it, Lebanon wasn't a case of Christians being put in control of the entire country, but a confessional system that reserved power to religious groups. The problem was that Christian demographics shrank while their share of power didn't, thus making maintenance the system less acceptable.

Why Zakaria has any fans is beyond me.

UPDATE: Humanitarian help for the rebels will be easier:

The United States on Wednesday eased restrictions on exports to opposition-held areas in Syria to help rebuild shattered infrastructure in a move U.S. officials said will help facilitate oil sales from rebel-controlled areas.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry signed a limited waiver of the Syria Accountability Act, allowing companies to apply for export license for such things as software, technology, water purification, food and agricultural equipment, and construction materials to opposition-held areas.

Now we just need to arm rebels and provide Secretary Kerry with a brain. And a spine.

Friday, June 14, 2013

Get a Freaking Room, Fareed

Oh. My. God. Fareed Zakaria really wants to be appointed to something in President Obama's second term where his ginormous brain can go to work. His latest column's title--I kid you not--is "Hail, President. Well Met". Really.

Zakaria argued that unlike past summits, the recent one between President Obama and President Xi Jinping of China was of substance and not talking points.

Zakaria, who could not find his own buttocks with both hands and a GPS signal, dismisses recent scandals and crises to praise the significance of the California summit:

National Security Adviser Thomas Donilon. He explained to me that the two teams agreed to a format that was a real break with the past: "Usually at meetings like these, each leader brings a set of talking points. This creates a format that highlights problems. This was different: We didn't come in with a set of complaints. The leaders came with ideas about opportunities. It created a completely different discussion and dynamic."

And what did they achieve?

Xi discussed his future internal goals and his slogan "China Dream"--no mention of China leaning forward on disputed borders all around China--and creating new disputes every year.

Obama discussed his first term and hopes for second term goals. One can assume a lengthy discourse on the meanings of "Forward" and "Hope and Change."

Oh, and they discussed the challenges and opportunities of world crises! Metternich, doff your hat, you diplomatic piker.

And they exchanged their biographical backgrounds. The Chinese also busted out the Moutai for toasts. Score!!! As a first date, that's a success, I guess. But a diplomatic achievement?

Notwithstanding his attempt to fluff this president's record, Zakaria even admits nothing much was achieved:

While the purpose of the meeting was to build trust rather than produce a set of results, progress was made on specific issues.

Given the build up of expectations that Zakaria held out, mere trust building seems so pedestrian. But while there were no results in this summit that was a break from the past, there was progress! I can hardly wait! What was the progress, pray tell?

Let's see. China again said their priority is a non-nuclear North Korea. But this time they mean it. Although they are too late to keep North Korea from going nuclear--that ship sailed--in a diplomatic world of child-sex-soliciting ambassadors, I guess the State Department calls this a success (but go easy on the Moutai).

And the other progress?

In the discussions on economics, contentious issues like cyberattacks came up, and each side stood its ground[.]

So China said they wouldn't stop and we said we wanted them to stop--and that counts as manly standing our ground? Good God, this is getting sad. Cyber-war was grouped with economic issues rather than national security so Zakaria could add that we proposed some mutually beneficial energy deals. So it all balanced out.

I did mention that we obviously failed to get China to back off from cyber-warfare on us. So diplomatic progress in no way describes this issue.

Surely there is more to this hail-worthy summit?

Ah, foreign policy. This is where Zakaria pretends to have expertise. China, he says, was "impassioned" about their position on pushing Japan around.

Which means China won't stop trying to intimidate Japan and gain the Senkaku Islands.

Wow. I stand in the shadow of diplomatic giants. Learn me some more, Fareed!

And China stopped complaining about our pivot, he says. Maybe that's because the Chinese finally realized that the spin of the pivot doesn't match facts on the ground (or in the seas). I'd count that a failure. But that's me.

In the end, this meeting is counted as a foreign policy triumph because we established good will with China:

This is mostly rhetoric and atmospherics. "The true test of this summit will be in two or three or five years," Donilon acknowledged, "when this background goodwill has to get translated into specific actions on both sides."

What the Hell. Bonus points since President Obama didn't throw up on Xi, I guess. I'm feeling generous.

Yeah, alleged good will and a buck will get us a cup of coffee in Peking the next crisis. Conveniently, judging this Outreach to the Han World will be put off until after President Obama has left office. So for now sycophants can hail the achievement.

If Zakaria wants a job in the Obama administration, I suggest court jester.

God, two Zakaria brain spasms in one week to address. I'm being punished for something.

UPDATE: Hey, here's some increasingly impassioned talk about Okinawa!

The Chinese government itself has not asserted a claim to Okinawa or the other isles in the Ryukyu chain. But the seminar last month, which included state researchers and retired officers from the senior ranks of the People’s Liberation Army, was the latest act in what seems to be a semiofficial campaign in China to question Japanese rule of the islands.

I'm sure our newly forged good will with China will end this budding misunderstanding.

Saturday, August 06, 2011

Repair the Foundation

Our financial and economic problems are bringing to the fore a problem that any long range strategy must address. We need to maintain a military to deal with near-term military problems (a war in Afghanistan, two half-wars in Iraq and Libya, a shadow war globally against jihadis). Toss in containment and gray area skirmishes with pirates, North Korea, and Iran, and we have a full plate right now.

We also need to invest in the military for the next decade's military problems because what we do now will define our capabilities in a decade or two. This means technology, buying weapons, and training high quality people.

Yet our military hardware and technology rely on a sound economic base. We are easily still the largest economic power on the planet. But the cracks in the foundation are apparent:

Standard & Poor's, one of the world's three major credit rating agencies, cited "difficulties in bridging the gulf between political parties" as a major reason for the downgrade from U.S.'s top shelf AAA status to AA+, the next level down. The rating agency has essentially lost faith in Washington's ability to work together to address its debt.

This is a good reminder that raising our debt limit is not the same thing as dealing with our skyrocketing budget deficits. The media conflated the two, acting like failing to raise the limit was failing to satisfy the markets watching our economy. The markets aren't, apparently, impressed with our debt problem being solved with authority to borrow more. Fancy that.

Did President Obama cause this situation? No. Many on the right were not happy with the financial stewardship of the Bush presidency. But my God, President Obama makes Bush look like a skinflint.

In response to our financial problems, Fareed Zakaria counsels defense cuts. And rather than seeing that as a tradeoff that has to be made, he welcomes our new debt overlords:

It would be a much-needed adjustment to an out-of-control military-industrial complex.

A what? Ah yes, the dreaded "military-industrial complex." Boo!!

First of all, before addressing Zakaria's complaint, I must say that I have absolutely no respect for Zakaria as a foreign policy and defense analyst. But it gets worse. Zakaria cites another analyst to bolster his thinking:

Lawrence Korb, who worked at the Pentagon for Ronald Reagan, believes that a $1 trillion cut over 10 to 12 years is feasible without compromising national security.

Good God, it's the Korb leading the Zakaria. Korb, who I believe had his last name officially changed to "Who worked at the Pentagon for Ronald Reagan," is an even worse analyst than Zakaria.

So Zakaria thinks we spend too much on defense, stating:

Over the past decade, when we had no serious national adversaries, U.S. defense spending has gone from about a third of total worldwide defense spending to 50 percent. In other words, we spend more on defense than the planet’s remaining countries put together.

So what? The questions are what do we need and what can we afford? As I wrote in the post criticizing Korb I wrote:

Our economy is way bigger, and the burden of our defense budget compared to that is pretty darned low--even for peacetime levels during the Cold War.

As for the US defense budget being half of the world's--so what? The question is what do we need and what can we afford? We already see that Korb misrepresented what we can afford--as a burden compared to our GDP, defense spending is pretty low. Talking about defense as a fraction of our "discretionary" spending is also misleading because a vast span of domestic spending items are mandatory, while in the strange budgeting world of Washington, D.C., defense spending is a "discretionary" item--as if it is a luxury.

Back to the point, so what if we spend half of the globe's defense budget? One, this allows us to field forces to fight enemies far away from us rather than close to us. There is a reason that the only threats to our soil are terrorists and nuclear weapons. We enjoy the protection of our military keeping potential foes far from us. How much is that worth?

Second, the money buys us equipment and training that allows us to fight more effectively than our enemies. Spending money saves blood--that of our own troops and even the enemy's, too, for that matter. Yes we could win wars without all that stuff and skill. But we'd suffer far more casualties. And leave vast collateral damage in our wake.

We get a lot for our defense dollars at a relatively small (and since Eisenhower, decreasing) burden on our economy. But Zakaria thinks that we spend too much and also that we spend too much relative to non-defense foreign policy:

Defense budget cuts would also force a healthy rebalancing of American foreign policy. Since the Cold War, Congress has tended to fatten the Pentagon while starving foreign policy agencies.

Dude, if your concern is "balance" we could spend the money to get our State Department people some new cell phones. Hell, give 'em a State Department band or 20 if it makes you feel good. But this is typical of left-wing thinking. Worried about the gap between rich and poor? Hobbling the rich is easier and if the gap is narrower, it's the same as raising the poor. And if poor and rich are better off but the rich are more better off? The horror!

If Zakaria is worried about our non-defense foreign policy lacking funding, address that spending. If we slash defense spending to get that magical "balance," will our State Department officials suddenly get upgrades from coach flights as Zakaria complains?

Again, the questions for defense spending are what do we need and what can we afford? In both the near term and the long run?

Remember that Eisenhower wasn't complaining about an imbalance between defense spending and foreign policy spending. His complaints about the military-industrial complex were about warning that they should not have excessive influence in our civilian decision making. This is what Eisenhower said on that score:

Now this conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence -- economic, political, even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every Statehouse, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet, we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources, and livelihood are all involved. So is the very structure of our society. [Emphasis added]

So Eisenhower thought the actual military-industrial complex was necessary. He goes on about the actual military and industry. Let's go back to the speech Zakaria links but did not apparently read:

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction. Our military organization today bears little relation to that known of any of my predecessors in peacetime, or, indeed, by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense. We have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions.

Huh. We need our military. We need industry. And we need them working now in case we need them in the future.

But we can't sustain military spending in the long run if our economy can't support the research and production base of that military. If--and this is a big "if"--we slash domestic spending (discretionary and non-discretionary) I'd be willing to cut defense spending in the short run to leverage those cuts.

But if our apparent resolve to balance our budget fails to change business as usual and the usual suspect of defense spending bears the burden of cuts that won't affect the bottom line anyway (because legislators turn around and spend saved defense dollars on domestic projects), then I oppose any defense cuts at all since we'd harm the foundation and gut the existing defense "building" that rests on the foundation.

I wonder if Eisenhower had anything to say about balancing today's wants with tomorrow's needs? Ka-ching!

Another factor in maintaining balance involves the element of time. As we peer into society's future, we -- you and I, and our government -- must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering for our own ease and convenience the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow.

Inconveniently, we've become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow (well, AA+ rating, anyway).

Oh, and as long as we are having fun with Eisenhower's farewell address, might this section be relevant to the global warming science industry today that wants to regulate every aspect of our life for our own good?

Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.

It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system -- ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.

Beware the "scientific-technological elite." Words to remember.

Balance, people. And when domestic spending has outstripped defense spending since Eisenhower was president, don't be so quick to assume where that balance lies.

God, I hate myself when I waste my time reading Zakaria's so-called defense analysis. Let me go take a shower, now.

UPDATE: Samuelson has more on the declining defense budget:

Even before the deal, the Obama administration projected that — assuming continued withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan — defense spending would shrink to 15 percent of the budget by 2016. This would be the lowest share since before World War II. The deal’s cuts, potentially as much as $950 billion over a decade, would reduce that further. In the 1950s and ’60s, defense often was half of the budget.

Balance, indeed. I don't think that word means what Zakaria thinks it means.

Wednesday, November 16, 2011

The Big Thing Zakaria Did Not Know

Recalculating.

In May 2009, Fareed Zakaria--who couldn't find his own buttocks with both hands and a GPS signal--told us that everything we thought we knew about Iran's supposed nuclear ambitions was wrong. It was a joke then and it is obviously a joke now.

This writer takes the Giant Brain to task for that statement:

In 2009, Fareed Zakaria wrote an article asserting that “everything you know about Iran is wrong.” Following the release of a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Tuesday, November 8, it seems, rather, that Mr. Zakaria was wrong about everything. Zakaria suggested that Iran did not really want an atomic bomb; instead, it “could well be happy with a peaceful civilian program.” However, according to the IAEA report, Iran is not content with a civilian nuclear program, and is quickly developing nuclear-weapons capabilities. Iran is currently engaged in several projects that have no applicability for a civilian program, e.g., research on nuclear-payload delivery systems.

In his essay, Zakaria accepted Iranian leaders’ solemn pronouncements that they had no desire to acquire nuclear weapons. Both President Ahmadinejad and supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared that atomic bombs were “un-Islamic,” and Zakaria swallowed their statements.

I won't say that everything that Zakaria knows about Iran is wrong. But he was wrong on the one big thing we must get right.

What a fool and what a tool.

Monday, January 14, 2013

The Bewilderments of the Zakaria

Fareed Zakaria, who wouldn't recognize a clue if it stabbed him with a fork, says our coercive diplomacy isn't working on Iran. His solution is simply to bribe Iran into halting their nuclear program, which Zakaria has long said there is no proof to indicate Iran wants. This is, of course, quite silly. It takes the "coercion" out of coercive diplomacy and requires both Iran and us to pretend we've won.

Lord, I hate reading anything by Zakaria. I feel brain cells choke and die every time I do so. I worry I'm in the later stages of Flowers for Algernon because of him.

Zakaria directs his deep nuance at the problem of coercing Iran into giving up their nuclear program:

In a superb essay in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, Columbia University scholar Robert Jervis points out that the U.S.'s coercive diplomacy has almost never worked. In Panama (1989), Iraq (1990), Serbia (1998), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (again, in 2003), Washington used sanctions, pressure and the threat of force to try to get leaders to change course. None did, and Washington had to make good on its threat and go to war. With North Korea, the threats also failed, but in this case, Washington has chosen to abjure military action and contain the regime. If the Administration wants to succeed this time, Jervis argues, "it will need to up its game and take an unusually smart and bold approach to negotiations."

The "smart and bold" part would be offering enough carrots to get Iran to verifiably end their nuclear weapons program.

Silly me, I thought the solution was difficult.

One, coercive diplomacy is always very difficult. In the history of using the threat of armed force or other pain to make a state change its policies from the status quo, few examples of success exist. Threats of force to deter actions are far more successful. Part of that relative success rate is that if a state refrains from doing something (they are deterred)--maintaining the status quo--the target state can simply deny that they planned to take that action anyway and that the side threatening force was just getting all worked up over nothing. Defeat is always more obvious if you give in to threats to change the status quo. It is harder to argue you intended to stop doing what the force-wielding side told you to stop doing.

Which makes sense because coercion and deterrence are opposite sides of the same coin in a struggle. If we try to coerce Iran by inflicting pain on them, Iran is simultaneously trying to deter more pain than they can endure by threatening pain we cannot endure if we resort to force.

The supreme silliness of Zakaria's position is that because we are involved in a course of action that is inherently very difficult, we can essentially redefine "coercion" and declare victory. Zakaria would have us offer benefits to Iran that gets them to agree to verifiable steps to end their nuclear program.

Let me digress to point out that Iran denies it has nuclear weapons programs and that Saddam Hussein showed how to turn a verification program intended to make Iraq prove it disarmed from WMD into a program that requires the inspectors to prove that Iraq hadn't disarmed. So there is a problem with any program that relies on the current regime agreeing to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons.

Back to the bribery angle. Iran has been pursuing a nuclear program at great cost, under increasingly burdensome sanctions, and in the face of a level of threat that is difficult for me to judge. Does Iran really believe Israel has the capability to attack and does Iran believe America has the resolve to attack?

Indeed, does Iran believe that even a successful attack on Iran's known facilities will cripple their program rather than merely set it back a bit?

My point is that any agreement that can convince Iran's current leaders to give up their nuke program will involve a bribe so large that it is no longer "coercive." Clearly, saying that a "carrot" is needed to make "coercive" diplomacy work is just a way to appease Iran without appearing to appease them. Hey, we're just talking about a smart and nuanced way to make "coercive" diplomacy work, right?

Poppycock.

And even if we can get Iran to pretend to agree to an end to their nuclear program if we give them enough bribes, my digression on enforcing the deal becomes the primary problem.

Talks with Iran have several goals and none of them are ending Iran's nuclear program through talks.

One, talks can buy time for Iran to go nuclear by cushioning coercion by delaying sanctions and force.

Two, talks can buy time for Iran to go nuclear by allowing people nominally opposed to Iranian nukes (or those unwilling to say that they don't mind if Iran gets nukes) to claim they are working to end Iran's nuclear programs until it is too late to stop Iran, relieving them of the burden of refusing to stop Iran from going nuclear.

Three, talks can convince skeptics of using force to stop Iran that we truly are trying to avoid the last resort of force and make armed strikes acceptable to a sufficiently large coalition. (Note that all but one of the examples of coercive diplomacy failure cited above--North Korea--could be considered successes under this class of objective, if not means, of course.)

Four, talks can marginally slow nuclear progress in Iran long enough for opponents of the regime to bring down that regime.

Five, talks might lower tensions to prevent a needless war over a nuclear program that doesn't exist.

I suspect reason one is why Iran talks and reason two is why we talk.

And Zakaria chooses reason number 5. I suppose I shouldn't mock Zakaria and simply hope that his present state of analysis is one of coming into the light rather than coming out of the late--or just existing in perpetual darkness.

Monday, May 25, 2009

The Giant Brain Speaks!

Zakaria says we don't know that Iran really wants nuclear weapons:

Everything you know about Iran is wrong, or at least more complicated than you think. Take the bomb. The regime wants to be a nuclear power but could well be happy with a peaceful civilian program (which could make the challenge it poses more complex). What's the evidence? Well, over the last five years, senior Iranian officials at every level have repeatedly asserted that they do not intend to build nuclear weapons. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has quoted the regime's founding father, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who asserted that such weapons were "un-Islamic." The country's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued a fatwa in 2004 describing the use of nuclear weapons as immoral. In a subsequent sermon, he declared that "developing, producing or stockpiling nuclear weapons is forbidden under Islam." Last year Khamenei reiterated all these points after meeting with the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei. Now, of course, they could all be lying. But it seems odd for a regime that derives its legitimacy from its fidelity to Islam to declare constantly that these weapons are un-Islamic if it intends to develop them. It would be far shrewder to stop reminding people of Khomeini's statements and stop issuing new fatwas against nukes.


You know, for a member of the sophisticated class that keeps telling us that jihadis don't really understand Islam, so they can't be using "true" Islam as an excuse to kill us, Zakaria should exercise a little more humility in judging how Islamists can use Islam to justify nuking somebody in the name of Islam. Unless Zakaria is trying to argue that Islam is all on board supporting terrorism as Iran does in the region, from Afghanistan to Egypt, and most points in between, it would be prudent to accept that there is an Islam believed by the nuts with nuclear ambitions that sees no contradiction between Islam and killing lots of Infidels. [I fouled up this sentence originally, and corrected it.]

And unless Zakaria thinks that the experience of the Iran-Iraq War, which led Iran to start a nuclear program, has been forgotten.

And how do you explain the secret nature of much of Iran's work if they aren't seeking nuclear weapons when they could pursue peaceful nuclear energy openly under the IAEA?

I don't know about the "you" in "everything you know about Iran is wrong," but I'm positive it applies to Zakaria. Truly, I don't know what planet Zakaria lives on when it comes to anything related to radical Islam--whether Sunni or Shia. Heck, I don't know what planet he lives on when it comes to any issue touching on our defense.

Iran may not want the bomb? I'll go with Admiral Mullen on this issue:

President Barack Obama's top military adviser says Iran's objective is to obtain nuclear weapons — and that threatens the region.


Of course, I'll freely admit that Mullen lacks the nuance that Zakaria demonstrates so consistently. Gosh, and Newsweek is losing readers? Go figure.

UPDATE: Heh.

Thursday, September 13, 2012

Byline Folly

God help us all, Fareed Zakaria is back to writing his own stuff. How do I know? It makes no sense. I've said it before and I'll say it again now, Zakaria couldn't find his own buttocks with both hands and a GPS signal.

Clearly stroking the presidential ego to position himself for a position in the Obama White House in a second term, Zakaria says of the president's Iran policy:

The Obama administration has brought together a global coalition, put into place the toughest sanctions ever, worked with Israel on a series of covert programs and given Israel military hardware it has long wanted. In addition, the Obama administration has strongly implied that it would be willing to use force as a final resort. But to go further and define a red line in advance would commit the United States to waging a war; no country would make such a commitment.

Every sentence is ridiculous, indicating only that Zakaria is trying to be the administration Official Flatterer.

A global coalition to stop Iran? What rot. There is a coalition willing to inconvenience Iran to avoid having to decide to actually stop Iran's drive for nuclear weapons. I'd like to note that Iran seemed to gather a larger global coalition to support them. And Russia and China continue to run interference for Iran, stopping UN action and diluting sanctions whenever they can.

Economic sanctions are the toughest ever? The issue isn't whether the sanctions are stronger than ever. They have been a joke in the past so that's no great achievement. The question is whether they can be effective. Raise your hand if you think Iran's leaders won't commit their people to eat grass to get atomic bombs.

Working with Israel? How? By refusing to meet with Netanyahu? By making it clear we're working with Israel to restrain Israel? Joint missile defense exercises indicate an effort to live with Iran's nuclear missiles and not an indication we are working with Israel to stop Iran.

Zakaria mentions covert operations. At best, they've slowed Iran a bit.

We've given Israel military hardware? So what? We don' want Israel to use them and aren't working with Israel to find a way to use them effectively. Again, this effort is just meant to keep Israel calm enough for now by making them think they'll have the option to strike for a longer period of time with those weapons.

As for not ruling out force, by making clear that virtually anything--including a bout of interpretive dance--comes before that "last resort" of force, we've given Iran no reason to believe we'll ever reach that stage.

And God almighty, defining a red line doesn't guarantee a war. If we are serious about stopping Iran from going nuclear rather than just pretending we are serious until it is too late to do anything about Iran, we eventually must issue Iran an ultimatum to halt progress toward nuclear weapons and submit to intrusive inspections to make sure they do not pursue nuclear weapons.

If we are serious about stopping Iran rather than avoiding responsibility for stopping them, a red line is exactly the sort of commitment we'd make.

As for Zakaria's assumption that Iran will drag the region into chaos if we strike, that is just an excuse for inaction based on Westerners playing games rather than an assessment of what might happen based on past events.

Might things go really bad if we or Israel strikes? Yes. But they likely won't be worst case.

And the worst case if Iran goes nuclear actually encompasses many worst cases such as nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, and nuclear proliferation that results in regional nuclear war. Even the best cases where Iran merely uses nukes to shield their conventional and terrorist aggression is pretty bad.

But hey, at least I have no doubt that Zakaria crafted every word of this article.

UPDATE: Krauthammer covers similar terrain.

Pretending that mullah-run Iran with nuclear weapons isn't that bad is sheer insanity. "Folly" doesn't begin to cover the problems with that attitude.

Monday, September 28, 2009

Message from God

Fareed Zakaria is God's way of reminding me that Thomas Friedman doesn't hold the title of world's most over-rated strategic deep thinker all on his own.

Zakaria, God bless him, is impressed with our president's diplomacy:

Obama is gambling that America is mature enough to understand that machismo is not foreign policy and that grandstanding on the global stage won't succeed. In a new world, with other countries more powerful and confident, America's success -- its security, its prosperity -- depends on working with others. It's a big, bold gambit. I hope it works.


Zakaria picked a bad day to stop sniffing glue.

The problem in reality, as opposed to Zakaria's Bizarro World, is that our security and prosperity depend on working with our friends--not throwing them under the bus to work with our enemies who do not share our goals.

Zakaria thinks running away is nuance and surrender is sophistication. I guess I'd worry about my judgment if I ever thought Zakaria made sense.

For those people called "enemies" in the real world, working with our allies to contain or defeat those enemies is what our security and prosperity depend upon. That's the big and bold reality of it all.

I must be an optimist, for I am forever stunned at the idiocy of Zakaria. As long as he's writing, Friedman can never claim to stand alone at the pinnacle of foolish, faddish thinking.

Sunday, June 22, 2014

Thus Spaketh the Giant Brain

Fareed Zakaria thinks we should split Iraq into three pieces. Of course he does.

The idea that we could achieve victory by splitting Iraq into a Kurdish state, a Sunni Arab state, and a Shia state was awful when proposed by then-Senator Biden (and others), and it is awful now that Fareed Zakaria is proposing it:

The United States should recognize that Iraq is turning into a country of enclaves and work to ensure that these regions stay as stable, terrorism-free and open as possible. The Kurdish enclave, bolstered by having captured the vital city of Kirkuk, is already a success story. The Shiite region of the south can be stable. It will be possible to work with countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan to influence the Sunni groups in the middle of the country, purging terrorists and empowering moderate Sunnis.

The idea that we can avoid the cost of defeating our enemies in Iraq by splitting Iraq into a Kurdish, Sunni Arab, and Shia states is ridiculous.

Let's just assume that somehow the borders within Iraq can be drawn and populations moved--including who gets Baghdad--without a major struggle as Zakaria's proposal would require.

And let's assume that the assets and liabilities of Iraq can be apportioned among the three new states.

Once you get past those minor piddling details that I'm sure the ginormous brain of Zakaria could dispose of with a one-page memorandum to the parties on the wonders of a "soft" partition that avoids those hard details, then we face the reality of three sectarian-based states.

Splitting off an independent Kurdistan could wreck that de facto independent success story taking place within the formal legal status of being part of Iraq. Why risk that success by making a formally independent Kurdistan a magnet for hostility by Turkey and Iran who face sizable unhappy Kurdish minorities? What if Kurdistan wants to unite with the Kurds of Syria, too?

If the Kurds can't get the Turks and Iranians to sign off on this, the Turks could pressure the Sunni Arab state to block the Kurdish state's access to the world. And Iran could pressure the Shia state to do the same. How does the landlocked Kurdish state thrive in those circumstances?

Splitting off an independent Sunni Arab state essentially just gives the region to jihadis who already dominate the region. Without Iraqi troops trying to stop the jihadis, just who would? The local Sunnis haven't controlled the jihadis. Just who will help defeat the jihadis if anti-jihadi Sunni Arabs can't call on Iraqi government troops that include Shias and Kurds?

But Zakaria seriously thinks that Saudi Arabia and Jordan will influence those jihadi groups to behave or will strengthen non-jihadis to create a non-jihadi Sunni state in the west? In what alternate universe would Sunni Arabs be a source of stability rather than offering support for jihadis?

Even if wealthy Gulf Arab states didn't support a jihadi Iraqi state in the west as a counter-weight to Iran and the Shia state in the south, wealthy Arab Sunnis who support jihadis around the Middle East would simply add the Iraqi Sunnis to their list of grant recipients--and put them to the top of the list since they'd control a state of their own.

And what of Shia Iraq left in the south? Without Kurds and Sunni Arabs as counter-weights to the pro-Iran elements within the Shia community that helps limit Iranian influence in current Iraq, the pro-Iran elements obviously become a larger part of that new Shia state. Even if the pro-Iran elements are still a minority, they will be a larger minority. In what world does that contribute to a stable state? How is that possibly in our interests?

One day, when Iraq is peaceful--say as peaceful as it was at the end of 2011 when the Obama administration was boasting of our success, Iraqis could agree among themselves to go their separate ways. Under those conditions, a partition could go as peacefully as Czechoslovakia rather than looking more like Yugoslavia.

Why does anybody listen to Zakaria on anything but the correct spelling of his name?

Yes, I know. I say this a lot. But Fareed Zakaria couldn't find his own buttocks with both hands and a GPS signal.

I say it because it is true. Don't listen to this man. God bless him, but he hasn't a clue.

And if God is just and loving, he will keep this man from getting a position in the Obama foreign policy establishment.

Tuesday, June 01, 2010

Remain Calm! All is Well!

Fareed Zakaria thinks that President Obama is doing just fine in foreign affairs.

Why? Because Bush was unilateral and Obama is repairing our strained relations with the world:

His conservative opponents believe that Obama needs to get tougher, to push around these other countries and show them that America means business. There's just one problem: that policy has been tried extensively and failed miserably. The administration of George W. Bush consciously defined its foreign policy as tough and aggressive. "It is better to be feared than loved," Dick Cheney used to say, quoting Machiavelli. Donald Rumsfeld chose a less upmarket source, often citing Al Capone's line: "You will get further with a kind word and a gun than with a kind word."

Have we forgotten the results of this experiment in foreign policy as machismo? America's oldest allies in Europe turned against the United States. Governments publicly criticized Washington on policy after policy and refused to support its efforts. By 2007, large majorities of people in country after country, even historically pro-American places like Britain, had turned against America.

Well golly, Fareed. Really? I remain perplexed that Newsweek is going broke with insightful analysis like this.

Let's take the first sentence, "His conservative opponents believe that Obama needs to get tougher, to push around these other countries and show them that America means business."

Well, I'd settle for just not being pushed around. We can work on pushing other hostile countries around later. Baby steps, people. Baby steps. Is Zakaria really arguing that a reputation with friends, allies, and enemies for meaning business is bad?

The remainder of that paragraph is just ridiculous. First, sometimes it is better to be feared than loved. Our enemies won't love us no matter how lovable we try to be. Enemies, rivals, and even friends, so far, have just figured that our lovability is a license to push us around and do what they want. As for Rumsfeld's quote, all that is saying is that kind words work better when backed up with hard power than kind words alone. Is Zakaria really disputing that bit of Foreign Policy 101?

So how did Bush "fail miserably" with this so-called policy of pushing others (enemies) around? We pushed the Taliban down. Pushed Pakistan to flip and side with us. And pushed Saddam into his grave. Not too bad. Sure, we failed to get Turkey to help in the Iraq War, but we got enough support from other allies to set the land speed record in the Middle East anyway. Is that really an extensive record of pushing around other countries? And was it a failure? If that be pushing, let's start pushing again.

And recall the two big non-pushes of the Bush administration that got us nowhere--Chavez of Venezuela and North Korea. Oh, and one more example: Iran. How has the Obama non-push, open-handed outreach been going?

And Zakaria says we've alienated countries, including our allies?

Sure, we failed to get France, Belgium, and Germany to help us in Iraq. But Germany was never going to support us, anywhere, given their history, And France's help was not going to be any more militarily significant than it was in 1991, when France did help us. Further, the lack of help from France and Germany did not result in a broad collapse of their help in other security areas. Indeed, elections that replaced the leaders of France and Germany led to better relations with us without American ending the Iraq War.

And Britain, supposedly really alienated under Bush, followed us into Afghanistan in force after they withdrew from Iraq. Note further that the talk of the end of our special relationship happened under the policies of Barack Obama. Also, it is only now--under Obama--that India worries about our new budding alliance.

Zakaria's essay-ending conclusion of the bleeding obvious that the developing world is gaining in its percentage of global GDP is no reason to justify Obama's rolling over for our enemies and opponents. Our percentage of GDP is holding steady, and the fact that Europe is losing ground to the rest of the world is no reason for America to roll over and play dead, too.

Yeah, everything is fine now under the new era of hope and change. I can just hear Zakaria insisting that we should remain calm and that all is well.



I'm very reassured.

UPDATE: Austin Bay writes of the death of hope as a foreign policy strategy for the Obama administration. Rather than changing how the world works (and has worked for a few thousand years, now) with his purportedly inspirational words, the president finds that he must cope with the world as it is--hostility and cynical intrigue, included.

UPDATE: Thanks to Instapundit for the link. Usually, for the rare times I've gotten an Instalanche, I have to flog a post to him to get a link ...

Saturday, January 25, 2014

Please, Pass Me the Clue Bat

Fareed Zakaria is confused. Wait. Allow me to me more specific. He's confused about the interim agreement between the American-"led" West and Iran.

Apparently, differing views about what is in an interim agreement supposedly typed up on paper that they both signed cause Mr. Zakaria to question the value of the agreement in reaching a final settlement:

[Iranian President] HASSAN ROUHANI: So in the context of nuclear technology, particularly of research and development and peaceful nuclear technology, we will not accept any limitations. And in accordance with the parliament’s law, in the future, we’re going to need 20,000 mega watts of nuclear produced electricity and we’re determined to get it at the hands of our Iranian scientists.

FAREED ZAKARIA: So there would be no destruction of centrifuges?

ROUHANI: Not under any circumstances. Not under any circumstances.

CHRIS CUOMO: I mean, what is the deal? That’s supposed to be the whole underpinning of moving forward from the United States perspective. How do you interpret what you just heard from the president?

ZAKARIA: well, I was as struck by it as you were. This strikes me as a train wreck. This strikes me as potentially a huge obstacle because the conception of what the deal is going to look like and the American conception now look like they are miles apart. The Iranian conception seems to be they produce as much nuclear energy as they want, but it is a civilian program. The American position is that they have to very substantially scale back the enrichment of uranium and the production of centrifuges. For the fist time you have the president of Iran unequivocally saying there will be no destruction of centrifuges. So this seems like — you know, this is still — I’m not even quite sure what they’re going to talk about if these are the opening [positions?] and it’s very hard to walk back from as absolute [a provision?} as the president of Iran laid out.

Ya think?

Look, let me apply the clue bat to Zakaria. The man couldn't find his own buttocks with both hands and a GPS signal, so, you know, God bless him, and all.

But there is no problem here to getting a deal if you keep in mind what this is about.

Iran wants nuclear weapons.

We want a deal. All signed in multiple official languages and with bright ribbons affixed with wax seals! And oh! Be still Kerry's heart. Maybe a Nobel Peace Prize by the end of 2015!!

Within that penumbra where American and Iranian positions overlap lies a deal: Iran will solemnly promise not to build a nuclear weapon. And we will solemnly pretend to believe the Iranians.

Voila!

I can understand how the Nuanced-Americans in our foreign policy elite--in and out of government--can be confused about this. For they were and remain confused about the Syria deal about getting rid of Assad's chemical weapons.

The elites continue to strut about boasting about how threatened (incredibly small!) American air strikes got Assad to get rid of his chemical weapons.

But the fact is, this agreement is not about getting rid of chemical weapons. It is about buying time for Assad to defeat the rebels. While the temporary disarmament is going on, we won't do much to help the rebels and we certainly won't launch air strikes, as in Libya.

For Assad, he knew that time is more valuable than chemical weapons. Even the passive Obama administration would have to take official notice and do something if Assad used chemical weapons enough to affect the war. Even the Russians and Chinese would not have used their Security Council veto to protect Assad after that. So chemical weapons were of no value to him in this war.

After the war, of course, if he wins, Assad can rebuild his chemical weapons stocks (with newer delivery systems and more deadly agents!).

Or, if you prefer an actual nuclear deal to compare this to, consider North Korea. In 1994, we negotiated a fine deal--the Agreed Framework--that we thought would halt North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Sadly, North Korea didn't agree with our assessment. During the Bush administration, we rudely pointed out that North Korea was pursuing nuclear weapons.

And today, North Korea has blown off a few nuclear devices and is working on making their devices small enough to put on a missile warhead.

Diplomacy with nutballs sure is grand!

So yeah, Fareed, this is a train wreck. But it is not a train wreck because differing views on it are an obstacle to a deal. It is a train wreck because despite the differences, our differing objectives contain the basis for a signed deal that gives each of us what we want.

Not that a clue bat would have any effect on Zakaria. He will require a clue nuke.

Have a super sparkly day.

Friday, December 14, 2007

Of Mice and Men

When I read that Japanese scientists had bred fearless mice who would snuggle cats, I was not impressed. After all, we have bred pundits who have no fear of jihadis killing us. I noted Paul Krugman's misuse of FDR's quote already.

And now we have Bravely Brave Sir Zakaria, who bravely runs away:

Then came 9/11. Ever since the attacks, the United States has felt threatened and under siege and determined to carve out maximum room to maneuver. But where Americans have seen defensive behavior, the rest of the world has looked on and seen the most powerful nation in human history acting like a caged animal, lashing out at any and every constraint on its actions.

At the heart of this behavior is fear. Americans have become scared of the new world that is emerging around them. As long as this atmosphere of fear envelops U.S. politics, it will surely produce very similar results abroad. Washington's real task, therefore, is to combat such unthinking emotion.


We've lashed out unconstrained? That is a fascinating view point. It is laughable. Zakaria is horrified that we might fight Iran, writing "if it happened, it would be the third U.S. war against a Muslim country in seven years." So it's governing while Islamic or something? Religious profiling?

Sadly, a white protestant country hasn't threatened us lately. That three Moslem countries might be subjects of three wars in short order might just be because Moslem thug rulers have threatened us, no? And since the two we've gone to war with so far seem very happy that their former thug rulers are gone, might not Zakaria say we might liberate three Moslem countries in seven years? Really, don't non-Moslem countries deserve that sort of attention. Burma? Zimbabwe? Bueller? Anyone?

Somebody break it to George Clooney that we can't "do something" about Sudan since that would be a third war "against" Moslem countries in seven years. Sorry Darfur! Unless Ann Coulter succeeds in a mass Christianity conversion campaign in Khartoum, you guys are out of luck.

Zakaria is just bizarre. I've asked it before, but what planet is this man on?

And his idea that our fear of jihadis getting weapons of mass destruction or even just plane tickets and boxcutters means we are afraid of "the world" is ludicrous. It is dishonest. Yet it truly represents the breed of faux fearlessness that mistakes refusal to see enemies for bravery. Who has the unthinking emotion here? Ron Silver might have an answer for you.

So while a breed of fearless mice is a yawner given our breed of fearless sheep, I am impressed that South Koreans have developed glowing cats. Which is ahead of the curve for our jihadi enemies who still can only hope to nuke us until we glow.

Zakaria may think he's conquered unthinking emotion, but all he's done is suppress his survival instinct. In reality, he'll just be glow-in-the-dark cat food for a hungry predator. Remember, there is a good reason mice are supposed to fear cats.

Saturday, May 09, 2015

Fifty Shades of Zakaria

I'm a masochist. I must be. I see a link to Fareed Zakaria's musings and I can't help but put in the ball gag, don the leather (I really apologize for that visual), and read his thoughts.

Zakaria has thoughts on Israel's best interests at this moment in time.

Basically, he thinks that since Israel's enemies are either in disarray, at peace with Israel, or worrying about Iran, that Israel can exploit this better strategic environment to--wait for it!--capitulate to Palestinian extremists:

So while it faces real dangers, Israel has policies to fight them with force and effectiveness. The danger for which it has no defense is that it continues to have control over Gaza and the West Bank, lands with 4.5 million people who have neither a country nor a vote. The feeling on the Israeli right, which now rules the country, seems to be that if the Palestinian problem is ignored, it will somehow solve itself. But it won’t, and the tragedy is that this is the moment, with so many stars aligned in Israel’s favor, when enlightened leadership could secure Israel permanently as a Jewish democratic state and make peace with its neighbors. It is a golden opportunity, and it is staring Netanyahu in the face.

I'd like to note that Israel does not in fact have control over Gaza. There are no Israelis there to govern or control the Gazans. And Israel shares control of Gaza's border with Egypt.

Also, Gazans had a vote after Israel left--once. Hamas didn't see fit to have another vote.

I don't believe that the Israelis are ignoring the Palestinians as much as they are refusing maximalist Palestinian demands that view any deal with Israel as a mere stepping stone to destroying Israel.

Why on Earth would Israel give ground to fanatical jihadis like Hamas when Israel has a stronger negotiating position?

As we've been told on other issues, no deal is better than a bad deal. But as Zakaria shows on this issue, the Left doesn't actually believe that.

Any deal is just fine with them. The deal is the objective, for some strange reason. And if it hurts our side? Well, we probably deserve it. That's the enlightened way to view submissive behavior.

Zakaria couldn't find his own buttocks with both hands and a GPS signal. But I've noted that before, I'm sure you recall.

If the Palestinians want a deal, let them stare their reality in the face and adapt to their far inferior strategic environment by offering something acceptable to Israel that isn't just a ten-year pause prior to wiping out Israel.

Sunday, January 25, 2015

Three Out of Five isn't Bad

Normally, I don't have much confidence that Fareed Zakaria can find his own buttocks with both hands and a GPS signal. But he did at least grab a hand full with this article that at least starts with the premise that we have to fight Islamist jihadis.

Zakaria has a four-part solution:

Washington and its allies can support Muslim moderates, help their societies modernize and integrate those that do. But that’s for the long haul. Meanwhile, Washington and its allies must adopt a strategy that has four elements: intelligence, counterterrorism, integration and resilience (ICIR).

He at least recognizes that friendly autocrats fueled Islamist opposition. That's why in the long run I think the Arab Spring could bring success since it was founded on the idea that democracy should be the alternative to autocrats or mullahs.

His intelligence focus is good. As he says, we need it from on-the-ground sources to both defend ourselves and to focus our attacks.

Counterterrorism is the work of drones and special forces direct action in his thinking.

Integration is the long term hope that sees Moslems integrating better in Europe. We've done a much better job here, but we are a nation of ideas and not of blood and soil, so I don't know if that is a sound hope on its own.

More to the point, integration has to mean the victory of moderate Moslems in the Islamic Civil War that we are basically collateral damage as jihadis seek to define Islam their way and snuff out moderates who'd rather not have their religion be a death cult.

So far, so good.

His fourth point is just twisted. By resilience he means we should not get panicked and overly worked up over the terrorism as the other three factors are allowed to work.

This seems to be a general theme of the liberal spectrum. They believe conservatives are panicked over what a nuanced view of the world would see as mere noise.

But I've never been panicked about the jihadi threat and I don't see conservatives as being panicked. What those of us who wish to fight the jihadis do is take the threat seriously rather than blathering on about "why do they hate us?" and coming up with tons of reasons why it is really our fault, when you think about it.

There is a difference between panic and resolve to win. Why that seems so difficult to grasp is beyond me.

We have been resilient. We do go on with our lives. We do that so successfully that other people see fit to note that since 9/11 only our military has been at war while our people have been "at the mall."

Or have you been too busy to shop because you are pulling guard duty tonight at the road block at the front of your cul-de-sac with other members of your local defense militia on the look out for dark-skinned foreigners who've escaped the internment camps?

Oh, there aren't any of those things here and you have been shopping and spending all along? There hasn't been any sign of an anti-Moslem backlash here? Well good. Now stop whining about panic and lack of resilience.

Still, we do need resilience. Why Zakaria doesn't see that we've displayed it is beyond me.

There is another problem with the resilience theme. To assume that the function of terrorism is simply to terrorize us in incomplete. It isn't always about us.

Brutal terrorism against the West is also a recruiting tool. Videos of beheadings and bomb blasts and planes flying into buildings are part of the recruiting process for jihadis. That stuff inspires the proto-jihadis sitting around with pent up rage against the world around them that has left them molding away in a society that always seems to fall farther behind the rest of the world.

So even if we had the perfect resilience as Zakaria defines it and shrug off every terrorism death here as something that pales before auto accidents and perhaps even lightning strikes and shark attacks, the jihadis would seek to kill us.

What Zakaria fails to see what we need is military intervention. He explicitly states (and cites an earlier article he wrote) that more military intervention is not the answer to ending Islamic radicalism.

Given that the answer is ultimately an Islamic Reformation that wins the Islamic Civil War for the good guys, I can't argue against that point.

But the problem is getting to that ultimate point in the long run. Until then, military intervention absolutely is part of the solution--or at least part of the effort to contain the problem and keep it away from our shores until the solution is achieved.

If we are facing a threat with a government that has the power on the ground to provide ground power and intelligence, we can restrict our military intervention to air power and other support--perhaps relying on allies and military contractors for much of that.

If the host government is less capable, we may need to provide special forces and other assets to help provide intelligence, as well as to work with regular Army and Marine troops to train the local forces to be good enough.

If the host government is even weaker, we may need to supplement or even supersede their forces until we can build up host government ground forces to take over the role all or in part.

If the local government is not a host and in fact supports the jihadi enemy, we may need to use military intervention to overthrow the regime or just punish the regime with the goal of compelling them to end or reduce that support to "acceptable" levels.

Military power certainly can't solve this problem. But is absolutely necessary to bolster the local forces who fight on the battlefield and fight for the soul of Islam, as well as necessary to contain the problem away from our shores as much as possible.

Remember, the use of military intervention in Iraq where we killed lots of jihadis was ultimately the factor that led more Moslems to condemn jihadi terrorism.

Terrorism was never a fatal flaw in jihadi reputation in the Islamic world as long as Western Infidels died. But when fellow Moslems started being blown up so visibly in Iraq, Jordan, and even Saudi Arabia? Well, that's not funny, any more.

So call it ICMIR and just be grateful that Zakaria got this close to the target. It's called the Long War for a reason, you know.

Thursday, October 29, 2009

Blithering Half-Baked Idiots

What is it with our big-brained, nuanced class that they insist on entrenching fantasy history?

Fareed Zakaria, of course, is one of them. I couldn't even get beyond this line in his latest drivel:

Dick Cheney has accused Barack Obama of "dithering" over Afghanistan. I suppose if the president were to quickly invade a country on the basis of half-baked intelligence, that would demonstrate his courage and decisiveness to Mr. Cheney.


I'll not address the dithering issue. What gets me is the charge that President Bush invaded Iraq on the basis of half-baked intelligence. We debated invading Iraq from about the time of the fall of Kabul to fall 2002 when Congress voted to go to war. Then we waited until March to actually attack. That's quickly invading a country?

As for the half-baked intelligence issue, I suggest Mr. Zakaria take that up with the intelligence agencies of all the Western powers who believed Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. I certainly believed Iraq had chemical weapons and if given time would develop nuclear weapons. I had no idea of the status of biological weapons. We were apparently wrong about the WMD issue, but to suggest this was anything but the best judgment of all the leading intelligence agencies is ludicrous. But this is Fareed Zakaria, so I expect no less.

Lawrence Korb is another leading star in the fantasy-based intelligentsia. Check this out:

If the planning on how to go into Iraq was as good as the planning on how to get out, we would not have created such a big mess in 2003 after we invaded under false pretenses with no plan on what to do the second day we were there.


Ah, the no-planning charge. Plus we invade on a false pretense as Zakaria implies. And we created the mess. First, the Baathists created the mess. They started shooting up the place and called on their jihadi imports to help out. Second, there was no false pretense. The declaration of war on Iraq was based on a whole list of problems with his regime, and WMD was only one (albeit the one we emphasized believing it to be the strongest and most ironclad charge). We were apparently wrong about that charge, but the rest hold true. There was no false pretense.

And we certainly had a plan for the post-war. Heck, we even had a plan to build democracy in Iraq--it was never an after-the-fact justification for invasion after we failed to find new chemical weapons in Iraq. Don't believe me? Read the New York Times, then:

President Bush's national security team is assembling final plans for administering and democratizing Iraq after the expected ouster of Saddam Hussein. Those plans call for a heavy American military presence in the country for at least 18 months, military trials of only the most senior Iraqi leaders and quick takeover of the country's oil fields to pay for reconstruction.

The proposals, according to administration officials who have been developing them for several months, have been discussed informally with Mr. Bush in considerable detail. They would amount to the most ambitious American effort to administer a country since the occupations of Japan and Germany at the end of World War II. With Mr. Bush's return here this afternoon, his principal foreign policy advisers are expected to shape the final details in White House meetings and then formally present them to the president.

Many elements of the plans are highly classified, and some are still being debated as Mr. Bush's team tries to allay concerns that the United States would seek to be a colonial power in Iraq. But the broad outlines show the enormous complexity of the task in months ahead, and point to some of the difficulties that would follow even a swift and successful removal of Mr. Hussein from power, including these: ...


Huh. Plans. Who knew?

The problem isn't that we didn't plan. The problem is that our plan didn't survive contact with the enemy. Our assumptions were wrong.

So to review. We had many reasons to overthrow the Saddam regime. Indeed, there was bi-partisan consensus that Saddam had to go until about early 2004.

We may not have found WMD in Iraq, but Saddam was hardly innocent and not even the current anti-Iraq War people believe he was innocent. I don't think we've written the final chapter on that issue, in any case.

One of our assumptions for the post-war that didn't hold was that we could use a de-Baathified Iraqi army to police a largely peaceful Iraq. But the Iraqi army self-disbanded during the war.

That was one of many assumptions that didn't hold--but that's a far cry from saying we didn't have ideas about what would happen after we won the conventional war. Did you read that Times article?

The anti-war side tosses in these falsehoods as casual asides hoping nobody will notice the lie as they move on to the main issue of the article. By this tactic they hope to change the history. But the archives remain. And the truth is still there if we will remember it.

Shame on Zakaria and Korb. They're free to disagree over policy, but revising the facts of history is dishonest. Indeed, it's half-baked