Wednesday, October 10, 2012

Is Afghanistan Doomed?

Is Afghanistan doomed from an American draw down of troops and hand off of responsibility for fighting the Taliban to the Afghans? It may be if we fail to separate the objective of defeating the Taliban to keep al Qaeda from having a sanctuary from the fate of a strong central Afghan government.

First, CBS's Lara Logan called the Obama administration claims of success to justify withdrawal nothing more than a lie:

Eleven years later, “they” still hate us, now more than ever, Logan told the crowd. The Taliban and al-Qaida have not been vanquished, she added. They’re coming back.

“I chose this subject because, one, I can’t stand, that there is a major lie being propagated . . .” Logan declared in her native South African accent.

The lie is that America’s military might has tamed the Taliban.

And a think tank sees disaster ahead for the Afghan government:

Afghanistan will be far from ready to take responsibility for its own security after Western forces withdraw in 2014, says a think-tank report released Monday.

The report from the International Crisis Group says the country faces almost certain collapse if it has another round of fraudulent elections.

Almost four years ago, this is the victory I called for:

The end result in Afghanistan, if all goes well, will be a nominal national government that controls the capital region and reigns but does not rule local tribes and which actually helps the locals a bit rather than sucking resources from the locals, who in turn do not make trouble for the central government or allow their areas to be used by jihadis to plan attacks on the West. We press for reasonable economic opportunities, with bribes all around (I mean, foreign aid), to keep a fragile peace.

And we stick around this time, unlike after the Soviets left Afghanistan when we ignored the place, for a generation or two to see if we can move Afghanistan into the 19th century (hey, let's not get ahead of ourselves).

Hopefully our military surge recedes by the end of 2011 and we can get down to a single combat brigade plus air power that function as a fire brigade and a hammer for the central government should a local difficulty exceed Afghan military capabilities.

I underestimated the time to get troops to Afghanistan and the time to transition--in part because we surged a second time after that post. But my goal highlights the problem between the two stories. We have pounded down the Taliban. And we have strengthened the Afghan security forces. The Taliban aren't gone, but they are weakened, especially in relation to the friendly forces opposite them.

But if we are counting on a unified, centrally run Afghan state to carry on the fight, we are asking for trouble.

Pacifying the Taliban south and east is a difficult task. Most of Afghanistan where there are few Pushtuns actually is pretty calm in regard to Taliban activity. In the south, some part of the Pushtuns are simply too hostile for hearts and minds approaches to win over. Some portion can be won over. Some portion can be cowed into passivity.

But some will fight--and with brethren across the border in Pakistan willing to carry on the fight, they will have the resources to do so.

As long as Pakistan is willing to support those Pakistani Taliban who bolster the Afghanistan Taliban, the fight will go on. The objective isn't to turn Afghanistan into a peaceful unitary state but a place where al Qaeda can't gain a sanctuary to attack us at home. I still want a nominal central government with more of our efforts focused on the locals to fight with our support to keep the Taliban out of power and beaten down enough to keep al Qaeda (or any other jihadis who want to strike us at home) from having a sanctuary in Afghanistan.

I'm just too far from the theater to know if projects like local defense forces mean we are focused enough on the locals to make up for weaknesses at the center. And if we think that weakness at the center means we need to focus more on the center's success, I think we are counting on the wrong asset to win this war.

Of course, the bigger problem is that the administration is claiming that we have won not just in Afghanistan but in the entire Middle East, and so we can safely pivot to the Asia-Pacific region. I've long felt that Afghanistan is really peripheral to the main jihadi problem in the Arab Moslem world. Afghans and Pakistanis don't set the trends for the Arab Moslem world. That's the main reason I've always rejected the notion that Iraq distracted us from Afghanistan. Iraq was the main fight--that's why al Qaeda shifted their focus from Afghanistan to Iraq until we finally defeated them in Iraq during 2007's surge offensive and Awakening.

So the administration, believing Afghanistan is the real war and believing we've won in Afghanistan, ignores the reality of the September 11, 2012 embassy attacks and pretends that killing Osama bin Laden ended that messy war on terror. The administration pretends that the war can be replaced with tame Moslem rappers and efforts that figuratively attempt to get more young Moslem men to "like" us on Facebook.

Hell, is the entire war on terror doomed?

Have a nice day.

UPDATE: Regarding Afghanistan, remember that some slippage could occur without leading to the Taliban taking over. Remember that the Taliban did not control the northeast 10% of the country where the Northern Alliance held their ground. Granted, once we intervened that was a fatal hole in the Taliban defenses that we exploited. So I'm not saying that any slippage that allows the Taliban to gain ground is a good thing.

But it isn't necessarily fatal if we don't panic and assume all is lost because the enemy fights back.

As an illustration, let's look at India. Nobody really thinks of India as a state fatally compromised in its integrity. But Indian authority has been strongly challenged by Maoist rebels:

The three year old Indian campaign against Maoists in the eastern states is making progress. In many rural areas where the Maoists were long in control, the leftists are much weaker on the ground. The government sent 80,000 special police into these areas (including over 70 paramilitary police battalions). The years of patrols by these police (who are operating as infantry and police) has reassured the locals to the point where more people are reporting Maoist movements and locations. This leads to more raids on Maoist camps and fewer armed Maoists to contest the police and intimidate civilians. The information gained from Maoist camps and prisoners has led to the identification and capture of more Maoist leaders (who often hide in plain sight in cities and towns).

Just don't panic at every little thing. Work the problems, wage the war, and in the end win the war.

UPDATE: Thanks to Mad Minerva for the link.