An online journal of commentary, analysis, and dignified rants on national security issues. Other posts on home life, annoying things, and a vast 'other' are clearly marked.
I live and write in Ann Arbor, Michigan. University of Michigan AB and MA from Eastern Michigan University. One term in the Michigan Army National Guard. Former American history instructor and retired nonpartisan research analyst. I write on Blogger and Substack. Various military and private journals have published my occasional articles on military subjects. See "My Published Works" on the TDR web version or under the mobile version drop-down menu for citations and links.
I have finally salvaged my pre-Blogger TDR archives and added them into Blogger. They are almost totally in the form of one giant post for each month. And the formatting strayed from the originals. Sorry.
But historians everywhere can rejoice that this treasure trove of my thoughts is restored to the world.
And for your own safety, don't click on any old Geocities links or any of their similar variations in my posts. Those sites have been taken over by bad and/or dangerous sites. Hover over links first!
The
Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous
week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on
everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me.
So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest
go in the data dump. Enjoy!
Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.
America had two alternate objectives at the start of the war. Regime change or pounding down Iran to buy time. The means to achieve either were the same for a while. We've apparently decided the larger objective is no longer worth pursuing. For now.
It was apparent from the start that America had two potential objectives for the Iran War of 2026,per the president:
“When
we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take.
This will be probably your only chance for generations,” he said.
Trump
strongly implies that the campaign is a drive-by attack that he hopes
Iran’s opposition can exploit—but it is up to them to win the fight.
Plan A was the more expansive regime change plan that Israel was mostly working on. Plan B was settling for striking Iran enough to weaken their nuclear industry, their military, their defense industry, their leadership, and their economy.
The Trump administration is arguing that the war in Iran
has already ended because of the ceasefire that began in early April,
an interpretation that would allow the White House to avoid the need to
seek congressional approval.
The statement furthers an argument
laid out by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth during testimony in the
Senate earlier Thursday, when he said the ceasefire effectively paused
the war. Under that rationale, the administration has not yet met the
requirement mandated by a 1973 law to seek formal approval from Congress
for military action that extends beyond 60 days.
This interpretation poses a dilemma for war opponents. No president of either party has ever accepted the validity of the War Powers Resolution. Even when presidents have reported to Congress, the wording "consistent with" rather than "pursuant to" was used to reject the idea that the president must report. If the administration's interpretation is challenged, it risks a trip through the courts that ends in declaring the 1973 law unconstitutional. As it likely is.
Top U.S. military leaders including Adm. Brad Cooper, the head of U.S.
Central Command, will brief President Donald Trump later on Thursday on
potential military action against Iran, a U.S. official told Reuters.
Did the president decide no bombardment or landing option is worth the effort at this point? Did he decide we already got the most bang for the buck already? Both against Iran and in a political context?
Will the momentum of declaring the war over for purposes of dealing with Congress expand to define the ongoing war (47+ years and still going)? Domestic needs could thicken that linkage. Is the blockade going to be an aggressive form of sanctions enforcement that doesn't rise to the legal level of war?
Will CENTCOM then be on a hair trigger if Iran opens fire anywhere to launch large retaliatory attacks to "mow the grass" inside Iran? Such defensive actions would not trigger the war powers resolution.
If this is the decision and not a pause before resuming the kinetic campaign, this is a military victory. Iran's military, nuclear program, and regime have been hammered.
But it is not a war-winning victory that replaces the mullah regime. Iran's rulers, after reviewing the results, still insist it endured but a flesh wound. And if we're nice and accept their demands they will admit the war was a draw:
U.S. President Donald Trump said on Friday he was not satisfied with the
latest Iranian proposal for talks on the Iran war, while Iran's foreign
minister said Tehran was ready for diplomacy if the United States
changes its approach.
But who is weakening behind the firm stances? Or will the war resume?
The U.S. military said it fired on Iranian forces and sank six small boats targeting civilian ships as it moved to reopen the Strait of Hormuz on Monday. The United Arab Emirates, a key American ally, said it had come under attack from Iran for the first time since a fragile ceasefire took hold in early April.
We'll see how Iran votes. And whether we vote harder.
[The] U.S. is not formally escorting individual ships. Instead, the
military has built up a multi-layered buffer that includes aircraft,
watercraft, airborne early warning systems and electronic warfare assets
to help neutral vessels complete their transits.
President Donald Trump said he would pause an effort to help stranded ships exit the Strait of Hormuz to see if the US can reach an agreement with Iran to end the war.
President Donald Trump’s abrupt reversal on his plan to help ships
go through the Strait of Hormuz came after a key Gulf ally suspended
the U.S. military’s ability to use its bases and airspace to carry out
the operation, according to two U.S. officials.
Seems odd since America set up forces on the land--with permission, I assume--to provide a protective bubble over civilian ships. And seems odd since the Gulf Arab states no doubt want their exports to resume. But that's the report.
UPDATE: I worry about tit-for-tat kinetics. But perhaps the real war is an economic squeeze on Iran so we don't need to really hammer Iran right now if it discourages Iran from hitting our Arab allies.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have lifted restrictions on the U.S. military’s use of their bases and airspace imposed after the start of the American operation to reopen the Strait of Hormuz[.]
Love to hear those conversations.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!
Russia's revived military antagonism has reversed the post-Soviet Royal Navy mission.
The problem Britain has defending waters in Europe from a revived Russian threat has left the defense of British interests and possessions around the globe short of naval assets. Britain can't afford to spare its more capable ships and subs for a global role.
Given limited resources, HM Government should therefore procure
smaller, cheaper ships to provide greater global presence and better
protection of British interests[.]
But just as the rise of the Kaiser's navy forced Britain to concentrate naval power in home waters, the sociopath Russians have made British homeland defense something that can't be assumed. Yet global interests remain. And there is no global fleet to call home.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!
Ukraine has a constantly evolving list of who is naughty and who is nice on the battlefield. But is it really useful for NATO? Or for Ukraine in a different type of war?
Ukraine has developed the Delta digital battle management system. With
Delta, Ukrainian soldiers can detect a target and pass that data to an
attack drone operator, who then destroys the target. The Delta system
software dramatically reduces the time between detection and attack. ...
Using an AI/Artificial Intelligence system the Ukrainians can track over
10,000 Russian weapons systems, troop positions and drone operators
each week. The map of these contacts is continually updated as the
Russians move or are destroyed. At the same time Ukrainian commanders
can also see the positions and movements of their own troops. This has
dramatically reduced the incidents of friendly fire when Ukrainian
soldiers are hit by Ukrainian drones or artillery fire.
That sounds great. NATO forces should be able to operate with that kind of speed. But is it just using recon drone data? Or can it use manned aircraft, satellites, signals intelligence, and even troop reports from the front?
Is the system optimized for--or just reliant on--Ukraine's static war? Could it function in a moving battle? Especially the ability to track friendly forces to avoid friendly fire.
I'm asking because while I want to learn from the Winter War of 2022 I do not want to simply copy the Winter War of 2022's lessons for Ukraine and for Russia from the conditions they face in the war right now.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!
Our freedom undermines the success of our military in demonstrating reasons not to test us in battle. Nothing we can do about that--our freedom is what we defend, after all--but it is a real problem with trying to measure deterrence.
It’s almost impossible to win a war any more given the disgustingness of today’s information space between American grifters, social media incentives for disinformation-fueled clicks and nefarious foreign influences posing as America First.
Again, I would never suggest that we suppress freedom of speech to prevent this problem. That would cause more problems. Even communist scum in America have freedom of speech. I just hope shame may eventually constrain the, ah ... enthusiastic .. expression of the right of dissent. A right that oddly is not met with mass arrests from our Orange Hitler regime.
Nor can I imagine the Iranian fanatics not drawing hope from the Saturday night assassination attempt against the president and whoever else would have gotten in the way (which included an officer who was hit but protected by his body armor) had he not been stopped outside the ballroom.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!
Ukraine and Russia to a lesser extent rely on battlefield drones as their primary tactical hammers. And so see every problem as a nail that must be pounded into the ground no matter how many blows it takes. What if either used another tool?
An up-armored Leopard 1A5 tank belonging to the Ukrainian army’s
5th Heavy Mechanized Brigade shrugged off 52 first-person-view drones in
a daylong bombardment, according to a new report from Ukrainian publication Defense Industry.
Every time I read about one of these mass FPV suicide drone attacks I wonder why an anti-tank gun or anti-tank missile wasn't used. With a tank optimized to stop small drones, wouldn't a direct-fire anti-tank weapon drill through the drone protection? The basic Leopard I is a very thinly armored tank. Even well-armored tanks are weaker away from the frontal arc.
I understand that if the tank is being attacked well behind the front "line" that direct-fire weapons can't be used. But I just get the impression that Ukraine and Russia use the FPV drones because that's what they have and not because it is the best weapon in the combined arms kit for the particular mission.
Without a static front line with a very wide No-Man's Land, how could
armies rely on firing so many drones at a single armored vehicle? Shouldn't direct fire be more in the mix?
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!
Sh*t got real in Russia. Putin is asking for "voluntary" contributions to the war effort from Russia's wealthy class. Once powerful centers of power, these rich people are now just cows to be milked. Is revenue a secondary objective to destroying the potential of oligarchs to fund rival centers of power to oppose Putin?
The European Council (EC) adopted on April 23 the final piece of
legislation underpinning the EU’s 90 billion euro (roughly $105 billion)
interest-free loan to Ukraine, which the EC initially approved in
December 2025.
And Ukraine only has to repay it if it gets reparations from Russia.
Even as he promised to take all of Ukraine’s Donbas region, he invited the assembled gathering of wealthy businessmen to contribute voluntary aid to the war effort.
The notion of shaking down business in a problematic time for the
country originated with the Rosneft director, who proposed the issuance
of war bonds as the fundraising process. Since he was not a major
shareholder in the company he runs, he will be spared the questionable
honor of contributing his own money.
Others, though, responded immediately, offering $1.1 billion. Another sanctioned businessman agreed to contribute when asked.
These
men had little choice. It is beyond belief that Russia’s major
billionaires would refuse, and that’s closely linked to why these men
should no longer be called oligarchs. Decades ago, they could impose
their will on Russia, manipulate the legislature, and bend or subvert
the law: they were oligarchs in the true sense of the word.
Ask not what Putin can do for the rich men formerly known as oligarchs--ask where the money is.
How ... feudal:
"[Russia's small wars] are
financed by members of Putin’s inner circle. They don’t come directly
out of state budgets. ... The oligarchs who
funded the annexation of Crimea, for example, received a
multibillion-dollar contract to build a bridge connecting that peninsula
over the Kerch Strait to Russia." This means of finance requires short
and/or small victorious wars. Which the Russians hope their nuclear
weapons can enforce after achieving gains.
It was all very feudal, no? And while Putin could have success in short and glorious special military operations, that method can't possibly scale up to sustain a war of attrition.
Yet the oligarchs lack the power to resist Putin's invitation to help. Will Putin squeeze these former supporters until they are impoverished? Will they seek new champions outside of Putin's orbit to survive this war?
NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
NOTE: Image obviously from JFK speech, with modifications.
The
Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous
week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on
everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me.
So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest
go in the data dump. Enjoy!
Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.
If Lebanon makes such a request, the West must answer.
For the U.S., Europe, and key Arab states — above all for NATO — this
would present a clear and consequential choice to help a sovereign
government restore control over its own territory. It is precisely the
kind of international engagement that would be both justified and
effective.
The Lebanese government has had the support of UNIFIL for decades without leveraging that to weaken Hezbollah--which reflects the force's role to shield Hezbollah from Israel. Western states have armed and trained the Lebanese military for decades and it remains incapable of remaining intact if it must fight internal enemies.
As long as Chinese power projection didn't reach out much beyond about
50 miles from China's coast, this wasn't an issue. But South Korea is a
major trading power with shipbuilding industries thriving on foreign
orders. They just launched a large Aegis-equipped destroyer for their
growing fleet.
With a large GDP reliant on trade, South Korea now
has the need to have open access to the sea. With a large GDP, South
Korea has the means to protect those sea lines of communication. And
with China heading out to sea, South Korea has the impetus to build a
fleet capable of defending those sea lines of communication.
China
is surrounded by actual enemies or potentially hostile neighbors and
I'd never trade places with them. As China builds up, others are
reacting. Like any communists, they don't understand that there is no
free lunch. Not ever.
Nineteen years later, China faces more opposition to its ambitions.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!
Drones are one more weapon to plug into fleet intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities rather than a replacement for the more expensive and capable weapons that rely on the ISR.
NATO is working to integrate emerging technologies like uncrewed surface
vehicles and fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles into crisis planning
through its latest major exercises in the Baltic and Mediterranean seas.
Congress has expressed interest in the status of the U.S. military’s
inventories of munitions (e.g., ammunition, bombs, missiles, torpedoes,
anti-aircraft weapons, missile interceptors). Since the United States
and Israel launched military operations against Iran on February 28,
2026, some Members of Congress have sought information on the stockpiles
and availability of U.S. weapons from the Department of Defense (DOD,
which is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under
Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025). Some Members have raised
concerns about potential shortfalls in munitions, while other Members
have said munitions are not an immediate concern. President Donald J.
Trump has said U.S. munitions are “virtually unlimited.” DOD officials
have said sufficient munitions are available, while maintaining that the
status of U.S. stocks is considered “an operational security matter.”
In these comments, officials have not differentiated between stocks of
air-to-ground and air-to-air munitions versus missiles and missile
interceptors.
If we had the ability to supply multiple wars at once, we would not only have sufficient to wage a war with a margin of error, but we'd still be adding to our war reserve stockpiles while also helping allies.
I have often raised a skeptical hand when drone purists throw panties at cheap, plentiful First Person View (FPV) drones for recon and strike. Yet I'm no denier, having raised the alarm back in 2018 about the small Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) threat to forward American combat units at the tip of the spear. I'm just asking for a little restraint on, ah ... enthusiasm ... for the new weapons.
In Army magazine I called for fighter drones to cover the forward Army ground units in contact with the enemy in a new zone of vulnerability outside of traditional weapons systems. I recognized that Air Force air supremacy would have no effect on that drone threat. I suggested an adaptation of the Navy categorization of the blue, green, and brown waters (at sea, closer to shores, and so close that dirt colors it at the shore and in rivers):
The Army should adapt the Navy continuum to the air domain to better improve air defense for Army ground troops in light of the problems the Air Force has in moving away from the blue skies where air supremacy has been fought for traditionally. The Air Force could lose the black skies of space to a potential independent U.S. Space Force. The brown skies low over the battlefield where dust, smoke and fog dominate the air domain are a challenge to the Air Force's ability to fully protect the Army from aerial threats. If the brown skies above Army units are effectively an extension of the ground domain, how does the Army control that air space for delivering firepower via small UASs and for preventing enemy forces from using rapidly deployed UASs flying low to bypass the Air Force command of the blue skies?
So when I urge caution in over-estimating cheap aerial drones, it isn't that I reject them. I just want them considered one more part of a combined arms fight. Especially as drone counter-measures proliferate--including interceptor drones.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!
For years I've considered a Ukrainian offensive to Crimea to be the most logical front to seriously harm Russia. Ukrainian military actions could be shaping the battlefield for such an effort.
Ukraine is continuing to attack south, next to what's left of the Kakhovka Reservoir remaining after the destruction of the Kakhovka dam.
Ukraine's drone attacks behind Russian lines seems to focus a lot on the stretch from Crimea to Rostov, according to maps I've seen on videos but can't find in static form anywhere. But ISW notes the effort:
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign
against Russian military and logistics assets in occupied Zaporizhia
Oblast. ...
Ukrainian long-range strikes continue to impact Russian energy assets and logistics in occupied Crimea. ... [strikes] destroyed Russian capacity to store petroleum products, fuels, and
lubricants at one of the three main logistics hubs in occupied Crimea
along with Sevastopol and the Kerch Bridge.
Ukrainian Crimea-based partisan group Atesh reported on April 12 that
Atesh agents conducted a sabotage operation on an unspecified date that
destroyed a Russian locomotive near the Likhovskaya railway station in
Rostov Oblast, which [...] Russian forces use to deliver supplies to
Zaporizhia Oblast.
I also heard that Ukraine hit the last fuel ferry that moves train car tankers across the Kerch Strait. If the Ukrainians can drop the Kerch Strait Bridge that it previously just damaged, Russia could have severe problems sustaining their forces in Crimea and on the Kherson front.
Russian forces are reportedly overextended across the frontline
in western Zaporizhia Oblast despite receiving reinforcements from
Russia’s strategic reserve.
Russian offensive operations have stalled in the past few months while
Ukrainian forces advance, often unopposed because there are no Russian
troops available to stop them. Ukrainian drone production from local
factories have Russian troops fleeing or committing suicide rather than
face obliteration by these drone swarms.
Not that Russia's war effort has collapsed. But I did write four weeks ago that the ground war seems different now. As in shifting against Russia.
Ukraine's Defence Ministry said on Wednesday it was introducing a new
model of operations integrating drone warfare with infantry activity and
pointed to successes announced by its top commander in retaking
territory from Russian forces in the south of the country.
If Russia's supply problem and Zaporizhia frontline problems increase, we may finally find out if Ukraine has a strategic reserve available to throw into a counteroffensive. It could be a continuation of the drive south near the reservoir that would be supported by river crossings along the Dnipro River should the Ukrainian drive really start gaining ground.
Note that this would reverse the main effort that I speculated about in the river crossing post.
Mind you, this is sheer speculation based on bits of information interpreted in ways that support some past notions. It also assumes Ukrainian capabilities I can't confirm. Bit it has been almost three years since the failed 2023 counteroffensive. Surely, Ukraine has made progress in training to create such a force by now, no? And the speculation is based on decades of playing board war games. That's dangerous ground to be on. I have no way to really test my notions by looking deeper into the intelligence to see if it supports or refutes my notion. I'm but a civilian in my figurative basement. So I put it out there.
But at the heart of my thinking is the belief that Ukraine's commanders and NATO advisors can't possibly be content with--bordering on being inconceivable--sitting on the strategic defensive forever until the Russians give up. Professionals must be thinking about offensive action to actively break part of the Russian ground forces after the defensive war of attrition does its job on the Russian troops. Right?
Right?!
UPDATE: A couple timely bits of news add dots to the potential picture I have formed in my mind. First up:
Russia's "Crimea" operational-tactical group continues to actively mine
the coastlines and beaches as Russia fears Ukrainian marines might land
there again.
Not that D-Day is being planned. But a supporting effort for an overland attack approaching Crimea? Tip to OPFOR Journal.
Ukraine’s Security Service said its Alpha special operations unit
conducted a drone strike on the Crimean peninsula, damaging military
assets including three Russian naval ships.
NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
The
Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous
week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on
everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me.
So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest
go in the data dump. Enjoy!
Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.
Europeans slashed their heavy ground force weapons because they believed Europe was a zone of peace after the Cold War and not because they were prioritizing expeditionary warfare. Also, the Europeans' checks were in the mail and the sun was in their eyes.
NATO allies over two decades reshaped their ground forces in the image
of a U.S. Army focused on operations in the Middle East, a decision that
explains the loss of combat power in Europe, according to new research.
Europe’s insufficient arsenal of tanks and heavy artillery is often
blamed on tight defense budgets, but a new U.S. Army War College paper
argues that the bigger culprit was spending choices centered on lighter
expeditionary forces built for Afghanistan.
It sounds like a convenient excuse for Europeans to blame America for Europe's own priorities, as if those countries lack agency.
It is insane to believe Europeans couldn't send the small contingents they did deploy without getting rid of too many of their tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery back in Europe. Reshaping their ground forces in the Army's image would have allowed that. American troops didn't bring tanks to Afghanistan but retained them in our force structure, just in case.
Europe's lack of tanks--and lack of troops who fight with or without tanks--is on the Europeans.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!
At the request of Chinese merchants, 2,300 Chinese troops were sent to
Vladivostok to protect Chinese interests there. The Chinese army fought
against both Bolsheviks and Cossacks.
Coalition warfare has always been messy. Different procedures, systems,
standards, doctrines, and operational caveats complicate and slow
coordination at every level of conflict. AI may finally cut through that
dynamic to become the connective tissue that makes multinational forces
more cohesive and coherent.
Yet having standardized physical weapons, doctrines, and processes still seems vital. I'd want AI to cope with the differences that creep in despite the common standards rather than let coalition members go wild on their own private Idahos.
And I'd want AI to manage updates to adapt to a changing wartime battlefield without breaking standardization--which the article addresses with its call to make software rather than hardware the realm for updates.
The M1-E3 is designed as a bridge to keep the Abrams tank effective in the face of anticipated 2040 threats without continuously adding weight until the Army can design a new 5th generation tank.
A weight reduction of approximately 10 tons from the current SEPv3.
A hybrid-electric diesel engine that will produce some 50 per cent improved fuel efficiency.
An unmanned turret similar to those in contemporary MBT
designs is seen in both Europe and Russia. This could reduce crew size
from 4 to 3 by incorporating an autoloader. The three crewmen will be
seated in the hull.
An advanced set of armor protection developments designed to defeat drone-deployed munitions.
A command and control system that permits Integration with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
An AI-powered threat detection and fire control system.
While many urban warfare tactics are universal, you need to fight differently when trying to take an enemy city than you would when trying to rescue/separate a city's population from enemy insurgents.
Gaza differed from this experience in several fundamental respects,
as Israel did not fight alongside a host nation, but rather against it.
In Mosul, there was a legitimate Iraqi government, which at least part
of the population supported, and the Islamic State ruled the territory
for only two years. Hamas, by contrast, functioned not as an insurgent
movement but as the sole authority of the Gaza Strip for almost two
decades. Through its control of political institutions, welfare systems,
education, and ideological indoctrination, it transformed both society and terrain into a prepared urban battlespace. Polling data from Gaza and the West Bank, including PCPSR surveys
from December 2023, show overwhelming public support for Hamas’ October
7 attack and its earlier attacks on Israeli civilians, even when
support for Hamas as a governing movement fluctuated.
Under these conditions, Israel could not plausibly expect to win over the local population.
Organized anti-Hamas militias and protests against Hamas’ rule emerged
only after its military capabilities had been severely degraded late in
the war, and even then remained limited. For most of the conflict, the
key structural conditions that underpin the Iraq and Afghanistan
paradigms — friendly local government and a persuadable population —
simply did not exist.
Winning hearts and minds isn't some wimpy alternative to fighting
insurgents. It is how you fight an insurgency when the objective is the
people themselves. You want their hearts. You can settle for their
minds. And when you are pacifying an enemy population, you need to grab
the insurgents by the balls so the people's hearts and minds will
follow.
And capturing an enemy city defended by that enemy's regular forces is even more dangerous. Doctrine for one situation is not a template for all situations.
