Ukraine's military lacked the means to prevent Russia from threatening to encircle the city and capture its defenders. So it wisely withdrew its troops to a new line further west. Did Avdiivka break the West even if it didn't break Ukraine?
Russia is now grinding forward in the east, using additional forces sent to the section of the front; while keeping up the pressure in the south. They are willing to lose planes to support their ground attacks. As I asked in yesterday's data dump, does this mean Russia is running out of other ways to support ground attacks? I believe Russia doesn't rely on air power the way America does.
But I suppose it is also possible that Russia thinks it is time to commit its major uncommitted asset to achieve a significant breakthrough. Or at least doesn't believe it needs to hold it in reserve in case a Ukrainian offensive breaks through. And that, in part, is because American military aid has been on hiatus for many months.
After all the rush of enthusiasm after Russia stepped on a rake in its intended short and glorious victory parade through Kiev and Odessa two years ago, we've decided that a single costly Russian victory in a long battle for a small city means it is futile to help Ukraine defeat Russia's invasion?
The blame lies squarely with Western leaders. If they had backed up their stirring rhetoric and smiling photo-ops in the early months of the full-scale war with immediate decisions to start producing artillery shells and gun barrels, and if they had given Ukraine the long-range strike weapons it asked for, we would be celebrating victory.
I worried early on that the West would grow weary of a war grown "normal".
I warned that Ukraine needed a victory in 2023 to encourage Western will to arm it.
When Ukraine couldn't provide that in 2023, I at least wanted a symbolic strike at the heart of Russian power. Once that would have been a fatal blow to Russian logistics in the south. Now I assume Russia has had time to build up the land bridge. Although yes, the Russian sea supply route is risky with Ukraine's sea drones and NATO targeting information.
But Ukraine is trying to keep those hopes alive:
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces are planning future counteroffensive operations, although delays in Western security assistance will likely continue to generate uncertainty and constraints on these operations.
With a major caveat of course--resuming the flow of weapons and support.
[Ukraine must] show it’s a going concern militarily if it is to prove to potential allies they’re not betting on a weak horse.
So here we are without either signal event. Is it just me, or is this author saying Ukraine can't win--because America won't supply Ukraine--so why bother supplying Ukraine? If smaller countries are doomed to fall to larger countries, after all of human history why isn't the world composed of only a small number of large countries?
Repeatedly observers have advised Ukraine to lower its casualties by withdrawing from locations that Russia was pounding. But that potentially reduces the Russian losses and lets Russia improve its loss ratio by attacking new Ukrainian positions that may not be as good for defense as the positions the Ukrainians abandoned. I believe as a rule, retreats won't end Russian attacks.
And certainly the front moves deeper into Ukraine when Ukraine pulls its troops back. Unless Ukraine sucks Russians into a trap for a counter-attack that destroys a chunk of Russia's army, that doesn't end well for Ukraine.
That said, the narrow Avdiivka salient was a trap and I urged Ukraine to get out before Russia could close their pincers. Although I wrote in a perfect world Ukraine would have counter-attacked the pincers to cut off and destroy the Russian attackers enveloping the city to end the threat of encirclement.
UPDATE (Monday): Interesting:
Recent relatively high Russian aviation losses appear to be prompting a significant decrease in Russian aviation activity in eastern Ukraine, although it is unclear how long this decrease in activity will last.
I'd also like to know what is causing Russia's increased aircraft losses. Are NATO countries providing more targeting information to make up for a slowdown in ammunition and weapons deliveries?
Could F-16s be in the fight? There's RUMORINT to that effect. And it would explain why getting F-16s into Ukrainian hands is taking so long--it hasn't. Although I consider this a low probability explanation. No way video of F-16s in action wouldn't be out there from one side or the other.
UPDATE (Tuesday): Ukraine will create a strategic reserve:
Pavlyuk stated that Ukrainian forces will aim to stabilize the frontline while degrading Russian forces in order to rotate frontline Ukrainian units to training grounds in the rear for replenishment and restoration. Pavlyuk stated that this will allow Ukraine to create a grouping of forces that will conduct unspecified counteroffensive actions (possibly but not necessarily counteroffensive operations) in 2024.
If Ukraine can conduct a counteroffensive, that would be great. But I don't get the impression Ukraine could pull that off. Unless we have military aid primed to push into Ukraine once Congress authorizes aid.
I suspect this will be more useful to counter-attack Russia's renewed offensives by hitting exposed spearheads.
UPDATE (Friday): For all the needless panic alleging that Trump would let Putin conquer Ukraine, here's what Trump said recently about dealing with stalled aid to Ukraine:
[Trump] suggested a workaround -- convert the cost of the weapons transfers into a loan. Trump even specified that the loan would bear no interest and would only be paid "if Ukraine ever strikes it rich."
Seized Russian assets could one day constitute that "striking it rich" condition, no?
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
