Don't focus too much on sending messages with our fleet sailing off enemy coasts. Focus on building a Navy to win wars.
These events show that American naval deterrence is failing, and a recent report from the Sagamore Institute concludes that it could soon evaporate.
That's BS.
The idea that the study calculated a one-on-one confrontation between and American destroyer and a Chinese destroyer pretends that we are in Monitor versus Merrimack duel days. Our Navy brings surface ships, subs, aircraft, and joint forces into the fight.
Mind you, I have deep concerns about our Navy. With particular concerns about our Navy leadership. I won't engage in happy talk.
But Iran challenged Reagan's much larger and still expanding Navy in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s. If deterrence rests on rational calculations, Iran showed that sometimes the calculations change dramatically in ways that look irrational to us. But it will make sense to Iran's rulers:
When we contemplate Iran's threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, we comfort ourselves that it makes no sense. The same goes for any North Korean threat to invade (or simply attack by bombarding Seoul if they understand how bad their mobile army is now) South Korea or whether it "makes sense" for China to invade Taiwan.
But as I've often noted, what makes no sense to us can make a lot of sense to others making the decision. Victor Hanson explains examples of this thinking[.]
We just won't know about their new thinking ahead of time. As I wrote about Iran's decision in this long essay:
On October 3, 1987, Iran crossed the line into irrationality. Unable to defeat her one enemy Iraq, Iran massed between 30 and 50 speedboats for an attack on Saudi Arabia's off-shore oil terminal at Khafji--the one used by the Kuwaitis and Saudis to sell oil in Iraq's name. Saudi Arabia responded by deploying warships and fighter aircraft. Iran pulled back but five days later in another confrontation the Saudis sank three speedboats.
Iran, apparently not satisfied with defeat at the hands of Iraq and then Saudi Arabia, even struck an American flagged tanker, Sea Isle City, with a Silkworm missile while it lay in Kuwaiti waters. The United States retaliated with Operation Nimble Archer on October 19, 1987, during which three Iranian oil platform bases were attacked. Many Iranians knew that a course of confrontation with America was foolish but the short term satisfaction of striking out at those who helped Iraq--even the United States--was beginning to win out over reason.
It was irrational from our perspective, of course.
So don't focus on how to deter enemies with our "presence" off their shores. I have deep concerns about dangling expensive warships close to enemies, which will tempt them to attack--not deter. My pucker factor always redlines when we send a carrier into the Persian Gulf.
We hope this presence also reassures allies. But I say send expendable ships. Because when the big ones burn that is the opposite of reassurance.
I hate the idea we cling to that we can send nuanced messages via naval signals. I would rather focus on building a Navy capable of fighting for control of the seas once a war commences--even if it defies our expectations of what our enemy would dare do.
UPDATE: Chinese analysts are thinking about the lessons of Pearl Harbor:
The argument they make is that China would launch a surprise attack to try to neutralize US bases in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly those on Guam and Okinawa, at the beginning of a campaign to conquer Taiwan, with the goal of weakening or eliminating the US ability to intervene in Taiwan’s defense.
A theater-wide Pearl Harbor--heck, I worry about a global Pearl Harbor. Although I admit I'm torn about whether China would bring America into the war immediately by attacking us, notwithstanding the immediate military benefits of a successful strike.
China might very well want to paint its invasion of Taiwan as an internal matter and focus only on defeating Taiwan in order to delay American intervention.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
