Wednesday, February 08, 2023

Matching Resources to Actual Threats to Russia

As long as Russia is determined to reform their military, what should it look like to confront real military threats to Russia?

Russia's foreign policy and military power are horribly twisted. Russia continues to make enemies where it needs to make friends. And continues to ignore the biggest threat to Russia.

Before invading Ukraine, Russia seemed like it could support a military of 750,000 despite a paper strength of 900,000 troops. I'll use that paper number as the base figure to start from, assuming it represents the weight of value. There are also 554,000 paramilitary troops.

Strategic Environment.

I will assume that the Russians need their best combat units in the Far East where China has massive dormant land claims on Russia. In Europe, NATO is not a threat but there are smaller military and security threats present.

The border with Central Asia needs forces to assist former republics resist Chinese influence.

Russia needs sufficient forces in the Caucasus where Islamist tendencies are always simmering. And Russia needs to protect the territory it took from Georgia.

Russia will also need forces along its smaller Black Sea coast, in part to watch Turkey.

Moscow should contain the heavy strategic reserve while some good units defend St. Petersburg.

Decent forces need to be deployed along the western border and in the Northern Fleet area.

I'll start in bold with what my most recent (2018) ISS The Military Balance credits Russia with having.

The Army--280,000.

The country with the largest land border needs ground troops. I'd increase this to 420,000.

I'd abandon the over-hyped Battalion Tactical Group and focus on divisions and brigades. I'd also restore the old Soviet practice of having Category I, II, and III units. Category I are ready to go to war, with at least most of their men in place. Category II are half-strength needing mobilized troops to fill out. Category III are cadre-level forces with older equipment that requires mobilized troops to staff under active leadership.

Category I would mostly be in the Far East with some around Moscow and St. Petersburg just in case, plus some in the Caucasus.

Category II would be mostly in the Far East with some in the Caucasus and along Russia's western border, from the Kola Peninsula to Ukraine.

Category III would be in western and central Russia close to where most of Russia's population is in order to absorb reservists and conscripts.

Airborne Forces--45,000

This is a decent part of the Russian ground forces. It is a strategic reserve for all of Russia's long land border. The airborne forces would remain mostly in western and central Russia.

I'd keep it as is. Expanding it would dilute tenuous quality. And expansion would strain Russian airlift capabilities that it relies on to be a strategic reserve. And reducing it deprives Russia of some competent troops.

Special Operations--1,000

Keep it as is. Again, don't pretend that quality can be maintained with expansion.

Navy--150,000.

The Navy is too large. It should be mostly a very heavily armed short-range coast guard plus nuclear subs, both attack and ballistic missile types. I'd slash it to 90,000. 

This would include naval infantry--20,000 reduced from 35,000--for guarding naval bases and limited amphibious operations; naval aviation--15,000 reduced from 31,000; and coastal artillery/missile--4,000 increased from 2,000.

Russia has downgraded their premier Cold War Northern Fleet to focus the navy in the Pacific. That's wise. Flotillas in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea are necessary. The Baltic Sea should have enough to hold NATO forces at bay in the Gulf of Finland. But naval mines, coastal defense, and aircraft would be most valuable. And the long Arctic coast needs protection.

I'm uncertain about where Russia should park their SSBNs. In the past I've figured the Northern Fleet is the best bastion area. But with Russia demoting the Northern Fleet, perhaps the Sea of Okhotsk in the east is best for a protected SSBN bastion, facing America and China.

Russia needs to keep enemy navies from approaching their coasts and needs to protect its most survivable nuclear deterrent, the SSBNs.

Aerospace Forces--165,000

This is too large to support for an essentially poor country. I'd cut it to 124,000 with the savings applied to keeping the remaining most modern aircraft in service with enough flying time, support, and weapons to serve all across Russia's huge border. Plus an air defense and ABM force. And space assets.

Strategic Rocket Forces--50,000

I don't think the strategic rocket forces are more than a shell of their paper strength. While it is possible Russia knows this and keeps excess unmaintained missiles as dummy missiles, I'd slash this to 25,000 in order to focus on maintaining a smaller actually usable nuclear force.

Russia is putting into the service the new RS-24 ICBM. Russia's nuclear force is "the final defense of the largest nation on the planet." True. But they have to work. Or inspire enemy confidence that they work.

Command and Support--180,000

We've seen that Russia's command and support is inadequate for large-scale combat operations. I'm not sure this isn't a corruption issue and so is immune to more troops. But just in case I'll bump it to 200,000 with a nod to a probable need to cut tooth to have an adequate tail.

Railway Troops--29,000

Given the reliance on railroads for the bulk of Russian troop movements and logistics, increase this to 40,000.

Paramilitary Troops--554,000

I'll leave this as is, for border, rear area, domestic, and limited battlefield support.

So that's the skeleton of my suggestion. For what it's worth. Given the damage to Russia's ground forces and the weakness exposed in their air and naval forces, it will take a long time to get here. But maybe defeat in Ukraine will be the motive for Russia to accept the real threat to Russia from China while reformatting their rebuilt military for real as opposed to Russia's fantasy Satanic Nazis gathering in Europe.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.