Monday, February 27, 2023

Don't Let Ukraine Fall in the Winter War of 2022

Too many Americans think America has no interest in defeating Russia in Ukraine. That is so wrong that I have trouble believing the argument is made. Europe is an asset for an enemy to exploit and not just an ally that won't spend enough to defend itself.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine continues. But Russian losses have had an effect:

Over the last year, the war in Ukraine has morphed from a multi-front invasion that included Kyiv in the north to a conflict of attrition largely concentrated along a 600-mile stretch in the east and south.

The Russians don't seem to be able to gear up their offensive, either in intensity or in scope. And the "concentration" is practically much smaller. Bakhmut still seems to be the focus of Russia's military.

But Russia still holds significant Ukrainian territory. If the war ends with that situation ratified, that would be enough to build up as a launching pad for additional conquests in the future:

If Russia occupies Ukraine, it would effectively border Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. ... And it would raise the question of whether and when Russia would press farther west. It would put Europe in a position it never conceived it would be in: living with a hostile and powerful enemy at its border, and a not-always-predictable America guaranteeing its frontiers.

Now, as always, Russian occupation of Europe would threaten U.S. control of the Atlantic – something for which Washington fought two world wars. ...

If Ukraine falls, the U.S. will be forced to engage Russia. Fighting directly in Ukraine will be a choice, which means doing so will be politically painful. Presidents are rarely rewarded for avoiding a threat that has not yet materialized, even if it’s inevitable.

A forward defense is necessary for America. In Europe, that policy should keep Russia as far east as possible. Because if we don't, Russia has no "natural" limits for westward expansion. And America's presence keeps Europe fighting with minimal American forces.

And Poland is hardly relying on the rest of NATO to defend it:

It is part of a mammoth military spending spree spurred by the war in neighboring Ukraine. Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak hopes the influx of arms will help build “the largest land force in Europe,” and he sees Warsaw signing billions in weapons contracts with U.S. suppliers.

America would need to fight Russia directly if Russia keeps moving west in the vitally important Europe. Which will draw away American power from the primary military threat in the Asia-Pacific region, with all the risks that would create as China continues to lean forward in Asia.

So it is much better for America's national security to help Ukraine stop Russia at Ukraine's borders when Ukrainians are eager to defeat Russia's invasion of Ukraine. 

And for God's sake, stop saying this war is a "quagmire" because it is still raging. Ukraine was invaded a year ago. And the fact that Ukraine is still fighting is a good thing--not a sign of doom.

UPDATE: There are a couple weeks of frozen ground remaining. Might Ukraine launch a belated winter offensive to set the conditions for a spring offensive, and count on the muddy thaw between winter and spring to degrade Russian counter-attacks?

UPDATE (Wednesday): Three drones, one assumes Ukrainian, were used to attack deep into Russia. Mostly a failure but did an oil facility sustain damage?

UPDATE (Wednesday): Ukraine says it may withdraw from Bakhmut, long under attack by Russian forces. Or Ukraine is baiting Russia into flinging more troops at their lines. Or both, in sequence.  

UPDATE (Saturday): I don't see reports of potential Ukrainian withdrawal from Bakhmut and reports of Ukrainian reinforcements being sent as conflicting information. 

To keep an enemy from turning an orderly withdrawal to another defensive line into a rout and gaping hole in your front you ideally want fresh troops to assist the withdrawing forces and keep the enemy cautious.

I'm still impressed that the Russians withdrew across the Dnieper River in Kherson province without the Ukrainians hammering them at the river. 

UPDATE (Saturday): I'd bury a massive string of explosives in Bakhmut's city center sewers to detonate when the Russians pull in to celebrate their victory.

UPDATE (Saturday): Losing Bakhmut wouldn't be much of a defeat for Ukraine, given the time and casualties Russia spent to be on the verge of taking it. But by fighting so long for it, it gained a value for Russia no matter how hollow that seems to observers. 

Would Ukraine launch a big counteroffensive as Russian forces exhaust themselves pushing into the wrecked city? Bakhmut itself wouldn't be the objective. Destroying the Russian ground forces capturing Bakhmut would be the objective.

My only concern is that Ukraine would be doing Putin a favor by destroying Wagner troops. Still, a big battlefield victory on offense that secured Bakhmut as a side effect would hurt Putin. We'll see. With so much talk about a counteroffensive in Zaporizhia (and I've done my share), is Ukraine looking elsewhere?

UPDATE (Sunday): I remain unsure of Ukraine's intent. 

An attack south from Zaporizhia to reach the Sea of Azov makes sense. It is farther from Russian supply sources. And the Kerch Strait bridge is still not fully repaired. Kherson front forces could launch an amphibious and airmobile assault across the Dnieper River when the main attack starts making serious advantages in the south.

Further, an attack on the Donbas front runs into the teeth of Russia's logistics system.

On the other hand, the Russians have had a lot of time to rest units on the southern front and have built lots of fortifications. And the Kerch Strait bridge is getting repaired. It would have been better to strike when the bridge was damaged. 

And as Russian forces batter themselves against Ukrainian defenders for small gains--and not only at Bakhmut--Ukraine gets two advantages. One, Russian units and supplies are depleted. And two, Russian forces advance into areas where they do not have fortifications to hold the line.

Another factor is that I don't know where the mud is forming. Is it worse in the Donbas? Is the ground still okay in the south? Maybe Ukraine has to wait until this mud season passes. Or maybe Ukraine has a window of still-firm ground to take ground and then use the mud to impede Russian attacks to eject the Ukrainians.

So I don't know where Ukraine commits what I assume is a gathering strategic reserve being built since Russia invaded. And I think I know that Ukraine will strike where it thinks it has the best chance of a decisive battlefield victory because the stakes are so high

UPDATE (Sunday): ISW thinks that Russia's recent faltering attacks may be wearing out the army and setting the stage for a Ukrainian counteroffensive.

I hope so. If Ukraine has the strategic reserve and ammunition. And if Ukraine doesn't give Russia even more time as it did after the September counteroffensives by not being able to generate a counteroffensive to take advantage of that fleeting opportunity before Russia reinforced its forces.

NOTE: ISW coverage of the war continues here.