China has problems that would potentially cripple them in a long war:
In contemporary China an actual war would likely destroy the communists, who are unpopular already because of corruption, abuse of power and pollution. A major component of any future war would be economic, as China is now dependent on imports of raw materials. That is something new in Chinese history, as the Chinese have, for thousands of years, prided themselves on self-sufficiency. That is gone and can't be regained without some drastic economic and cultural changes. Thus the Chinese communists are playing a game of bluster and bluff. This is especially true when you consider that the Chinese armed forces are also crippled by massive corruption and mismanagement. For that reason alone the Chinese government would avoid actual war.
That can be true. And irrelevant.
The Strategypage post describes how the Chinese leaders are stoking nationalism and expansionism as a pillar of support to replace communist discipline that was weakened in order to bolster the economy.
But that's a dangerous impulse to let loose. Even if the Chinese Communist Party leaders know that a war would be a disaster, could PLA leaders who have imbibed nationalism make a decision that drags China into war notwithstanding the party's desire to avoid war?
Although I'll note that China merged the multiple armed civilian naval organizations I worried about in the above post into a single coast guard, so that isn't the same scale of a problem. But the general issue remains--could a local military leader stoked up on nationalism drag China into a war?
I think it is quite possible that the very real and dramatic growth in Chinese military power will give some Chinese military leader the wrong idea that they are now strong enough to use that military power to achieve victory.
Could one of the lessons that China learned from 1989 to 1991 be that the Soviet Union should have rolled the dice with a war against somebody--even if not NATO--to contain the forces of disintegration?
Remember, a Chinese decision for war--whether from the top or from a lower level rogue commander--doesn't mean a Chinese decision for war with America.
As I've long said, China likely prefers to wage war on a close neighbor and win before America can intervene. Ideally, China would wage a short and glorious war against a small neighbor--like Taiwan--and win before America can intervene.
And if China holds the ground and America has to mount a counter-invasion to reverse the Chinese victory, Chinese nuclear weapons might be the ultimate barrier to an American response that otherwise might repeat the 1942-1945 counter-attack against Japan.
But the problems in China's military beneath their shiny new weapons could deny them the rapid victory they want and escalate to a US-China war that China would lose. Yet even an American victory would be very costly. It is better than losing. But the price is still potentially devastating.
Which is why I want China pointed inland and not out to sea where our allies lie close to China.
