Hey! What do you know? That charm offensive doesn't mean the mainlanders are Taiwan's new bestest friend ever:
Chinese leader Xi Jinping reaffirmed China's desire to bring Taiwan under its control in a meeting Monday in Beijing with the honorary head of the island's ruling party.
Xi's meeting with Nationalist Party honorary chairman Lien Chan was viewed on both sides as a symbolic gesture aimed a reaffirming warming ties between the former rivals following Xi's elevation to leader of the ruling Communist Party last year. Once-tense relations have given way to thriving trade, transport, and investment links, although there has been no commitment by Taiwan to political talks that might lead to China's unification goal.
I will say, no matter what I think of President Obama's foreign policy skills, I'd never think he'd concede our surrender in principle even if he didn't want to talk about timetables the way Taiwan's governing party has.
It may feel all nice that China doesn't snarl at Taiwan these days, but China fully expects the policy of closer relations to lead to Taiwan's surrender. At what point does Taiwan's refusal to talk end China's smiling charm offensive?
And will Taiwan's failure to even try to match China's military build up then deter a Chinese invasion?
Worse, will America be able to intervene? Two decades ago, we could intervene at will to stop a Chinese attempt to throw an invasion force across the Taiwan Strait. Now? That lengthening shadow of China's military threatens to buy China enough time to conquer Taiwan. The Taiwanese need to be capable of holding on long enough for us to intervene and they need to help us pierce that lengthening shadow:
Strong allies help weak allies who help themselves. That's the message the Naval Diplomat will be conveying next Tuesday at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, down in Washington, DC. The organizers asked me to comment on whether the U.S. pivot to Asia will enhance Taiwan's security, degrade it, or somewhere in between. My bottom line: it will bolster security if the islanders rededicate themselves to their own defense while helping U.S. forces pierce Chinese anti-access defenses. Beijing is trying to deter Washington from intervening on Taiwan's behalf; Taipei must mount a reciprocal effort to bias American decisionmaking toward coming to the island's rescue. ...
The purpose of anti-access is to inflict heavy damage on a superior opponent, inflating the costs of the effort to unbearable levels. Once the immediate costs or opportunity costs are too steep, Clausewitzian logic prompts leaders to abandon the venture — or forego it altogether.
This is the unforgiving logic Taipei must counteract. Showing Americans that fighting for Taiwan won't impose unacceptable losses or take too long is critical to swinging U.S. cost/benefit calculations toward intervention. That means devising strategy and forces that hold Chinese assailants at bay long enough for the U.S. Navy to force entry into maritime Asia. Taipei must stage some anti-access measures of its own, taking a strategically defensive stance that imposes prohibitive costs on PLA attackers. It means deploying sea and air forces to the island's east to help clear a corridor for American relief forces.
I've droned on for years about Taiwan needing to buy time by denying China a quick victory, and have addressed the need for Taiwanese sea control off of their east coast to allow US forces to reach Taiwan. We may be developing long-range weapons that will allow us to strike Chinese assets from beyond China's weapons range, but that doesn't get US supply ships and transport aircraft safely into Taiwan to provide material support to Taiwan.
I've wondered if we could even use the shield of Taiwan's geography to operate carriers close to Taiwan, but if Taiwan can't control their east coast, we will never know.
Counting on our loud "pivot" to the Pacific is no substitute for robust Taiwanese defenses. Our pivot is a very slow (and already ongoing) increase in the percentage of our fleet deployed in the Pacific. But if our fleet shrinks, even having a higher portion of our fleet in the Pacific will only slow our decline in power rather than reverse it.
Even if we wanted to fight China for Taiwan regardless of whether Taiwan can fight, increasingly we must have Taiwan in the fight for us to intervene in time to stop a Chinese conquest of Taiwan. While we could mobilize sufficient power to counter-invade Taiwan and liberate the island, would we? Do the Taiwanese really want to count on it?
Perhaps the Taiwanese think they can wage a guerrilla war against Chinese occupation and drive China from their shores? Good luck with that. But hey, maybe "Free Taiwan" bumper stickers will becomes as trendy as "Free Tibet" stickers. How much have the Hollywood types who advocate that freedom done to advance the cause?
Or do the Taiwanese really think that the tide of war has receded from the Taiwan Strait just because the mainlanders bare their teeth at Taiwan and call it a smile?
