Monday, January 23, 2012

How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Iranian Bomb

Wow, one of the dimmer bulbs in the NYT writing pool thinks bombing Iran would create a nuclear Iran:

The point of tough sanctions, of course, is to force Iranians to the bargaining table, where we can do a deal that removes the specter of a nuclear-armed Iran. (You can find some thoughts on what such a deal might entail on my blog.) But the mistrust is so deep, and the election-year pressure to act with manly resolve is so intense, that it’s hard to imagine the administration would feel free to accept an overture from Tehran. Anything short of a humiliating, unilateral Iranian climb-down would be portrayed by the armchair warriors as an Obama surrender. Likewise, if Israel does decide to strike out on its own, Bibi Netanyahu knows that candidate Obama will feel immense pressure to go along.

That short-term paradox comes wrapped up in a long-term paradox: an attack on Iran is almost certain to unify the Iranian people around the mullahs and provoke the supreme leader to redouble Iran’s nuclear pursuits, only deeper underground this time, and without international inspectors around. Over at the Pentagon, you sometimes hear it put this way: Bombing Iran is the best way to guarantee exactly what we are trying to prevent.

Tough sanctions years ago might have had a chance to stop Iran. But the lesson of Iraq is that tough sanctions--or even mild sanctions--can be portrayed as starving little children even as the regime finds money for what it wants.

Keller can talk about how he'd negotiate a deal, but this armchair diplomat is negotiating with himself--not actual Iranians who have been amazingly diligent in pursuing nuclear weapons despite world opposition to their plans. Good God, man, if the Iranians believe they need nukes to deter an invasion that we've apparently been perfecting for three decades now, they might actually believe we'd lie to them in order to trick the Iranians into giving up their nuclear weapons program. Hmm?

And Keller's description of getting anything less than denuclearization of Iran as something that can be portrayed by President Obama's foes as a surrender rather than being an actual foreign policy defeat is mind boggling. Yes, Mr. Keller, anything short of Iran giving up nuclear weapons plans would be a defeat for us. And any President who lets Iran go nuclear should properly be condemned for putting America's safety at risk.

The idea that attacking Iran will unify the people of Iran--who mostly hate the regime--is an article of faith in some circles. But while there will surely be some "rally around the flag" effect, when that wears off Iranians will ask why they have a government that provokes attack--or at least can't protect them despite all the claims about super weapons that Iran has been building for decades now. Or did I miss the resolute support that liberals enthusiastically provided George W. Bush for 7 years after the 9/11 attacks to bolster his efforts to protect us? Further, I'll ask this question again: what good does it do us to have a nuclear-armed Iran with rulers who hate us but with people who don't like the regime? Would poor poll ratings deter the mullahs from using a nuke? Would we really feel comforted if the people of Iran mostly felt really, really bad if their rulers used a nuke on Charleston?

And Keller's protest that Iran will continue their efforts if we attack is pointless. Unless that magical diplomacy works, Iran will get nukes eventually if we don't attack. If we knock them down far enough, redoubling their efforts will still mean they won't reach their nuclear destination as fast as they would have without our attack. And so what if our attack forces Iran deeper underground? If we refuse to attack, it could all be on the surface for all that matters. If Iran digs deeper, that at least takes more time and effort--which slows them down.

Further, what's with the wringing of hands over whether international inspectors are in Iran or not? With those inspectors, Iran is advancing toward nuclear weapons! Is Keller so confused that he forgets that the purpose of international inspectors is to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons? Does he think that the purpose of having international inspectors in Iran is to have international inspectors in Iran?

And I don't care if "sometimes" you hear in the Pentagon the line of thinking that bombing Iran will make them go nuclear. Sometimes Pentagon officials can be wrong or liberal.

Bombing Iran won't solve the problem of Iran wanting nuclear weapons. What it does is buy time. In the end, we need a regime change in Tehran. Get a non-mullah regime in Iran and they might decide it isn't worth the effort to build nuclear weapons. And at worst, having a non-nutball regime with nukes is far better than having a nutball regime with nukes.

Good grief. Iran is trying to build nuclear weapons right now. Bombing Iran will slow Iran down by an uncertain amount, it is true. But the fact that Iran will likely resume work on nuclear weapons doesn't mean that we caused that attempt to go nuclear. Is Maureen Dowd off today, or something?

You want a paradox? How do you write an op-ed without a functioning brain stem? How's that for a paradox? I bet you might even hear that question around the Pentagon sometimes.

UPDATE: Iran wants nukes and only wants to talk to mask their progress to getting nukes.

But that's too simple for the smart guys with the big desks to accept.