For many Afghans, the situation in the capital is a gloomy reminder of the turbulent years leading up to the Soviet retreat in 1989 and the chaotic, dirty civil war that followed.
They fear the buzzword on the lips of foreign diplomats and the military, "transition," is little more than a public relations tactic to cover a polite rush to the exit, that they have seen before.
I hoped that our July "deadline" would work to our advantage if we played our cards right:
We aren't leaving in July 2011 and the enemy is failing to understand the nuance of that "deadline." Yes, it was probably a mistake to announce that non-deadline deadline, but there may be a silver lining as long as domestic forces committed to retreating can be contained. We can exploit this enemy perception of our pending departure even if that perception makes it more difficult for our forces over the next year. If the enemy feels that they will get relief next summer, and if instead we intensify our efforts next summer and fall, the reality that the enemy doesn't really know how long they have to endure our pressure will likely batter the morale of all but the most committed jihadi. And even the committed jihadis will suffer doubt and fear under those circumstances.
But we didn't. The president had no interest in containing forces committed to retreating as much as he wanted to cater to those forces. So people in Afghanistan are in danger of thinking we raised on a bluff and our now folding.
How can I blame them for that worry when their lives are on the line? I'm worried about that too, and the pace of withdrawal and the sentiment it reflects makes me worry even more.
Our president just doesn't want to win the wars we are in (even the one he started)--he just wants to avoid being blamed for losing them.
