Now, the two security forces have agreed to jointly take back the streets:
Egyptian military and internal security forces have coordinated a crackdown for the hours ahead in an effort to clear the streets of the demonstrators. The interior minister has meanwhile negotiated his stay for the time being, in spite of widespread expectations that he, seen by many Egyptians as the source of police brutality in the country, would be one of the first ministers that would have to be sacked in order to quell the demonstrations. Instead, both Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and al-Adly, the two main targets of ire for the demonstrators, seem to be betting that they can ride this crisis out and remain in power. So far, the military seems to be acquiescing to these decisions.
The real test for the opposition has thus arrived. In spite of a minor reshuffling of the Cabinet and the military reasserting its authority behind the scenes, Mubarak and al-Adly remain in power. The opposition is unified in its hatred against these individuals, yet divided on most everything else. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamist platform, for example, is very different from opposition figure Mohamed ElBaradei’s secularist campaign, which explains why no one has been able to assume leadership of the demonstrations. In evaluating the situation on the streets, the regime appears willing to take a gamble that the opposition will not cohere into a meaningful threat and that an iron fist will succeed in putting down this uprising.
Within the next few hours, police and military officials are expected to redeploy in large numbers across major cities, with the CSF taking the first line of defense. Tensions are still running high between the internal security forces and the military, which could lead to serious clashes between the army and police on the streets. The size and scope of the protests appear to be dwindling into the low thousands, though there is still potential for the demonstrations to swell again after protesters rest themselves and wake up to the same government they have been trying to remove.
This is rather like the notion I put forth of the army (which has a better image than the police) holding the outer perimeter to limit the protest scope while the police do the dirty work of mixing it up with protesters and rioters to break them up. There was not coordination as I first speculated, but now there is.
And the protesters are dwindling in numbers, which also matches what I expected. The regime didn't panic at the initial surge and has survived the first crisis. That was the biggest unknown in my mind.
But if the people who took to the streets now see the army and police as united, will protesting fervor be revived? Will they be disheartened? I believe mass protests are scheduled for tomorrow. We shall see how the security forces hold together, whether the army can remain loyal in this unfamiliar internal security role, whether Mubarak wants to stay and gamble his troops, and whether the fragmented opposition holds together to keep pressing for Mubarak or the entire ruling class to get lost.
